A decade of regulating agricultural biotechnology liability in Canada : a case study from 1994 - 2004 by Smyth, Stuart James
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A Decade Of Regulating Agricultural Biotechnology 
Liability In Canada: A Case Study From 1994 - 2004 
 
 
 
A Thesis Submitted to the College of 
 
Graduate Studies and Research 
 
In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements 
 
For the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
 
In the Interdisciplinary Graduate Studies Program 
 
University of Saskatchewan 
 
Saskatoon  
 
 
 
 
By 
 
Stuart James Smyth 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
© Copyright Stuart James Smyth, January 2005. All rights reserved. 
 
 ii
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Innovation is the fundamental driver for the advancement of societies. The advent of 
the Industrial Revolution in the 17th century precipitated a dramatic increase in the 
rate of innovation. Societies of the time struggled in how to deal with the rapid 
changes that resulted from these innovations and their application. Present day 
society is no different. 
 
Innovations in today’s society have the ability to be widely adopted and the potential 
to affect far larger segments of the population that previous innovations. The rapid 
rise of genetic modification is one such innovation. This innovative technology has 
been widely adopted by the drug and agriculture industries and as a result, it has 
impacted all segments of Canadian society. 
 
This thesis examines how Canadian society has dealt with the specific innovation of 
agricultural biotechnology, or the genetic modification of plants. The 
commercialization of genetically modified plants has resulted in regulatory 
challenges for the government, intellectual property and liability concerns for 
industry and consumer acceptance issues within the general public.  
 
By researching the interaction and relationships between government regulators, 
private firms and consumer organizations, it is possible to identify how Canada has 
 iii
reacted to the challenge of regulating agricultural biotechnology. The 
interdisciplinary framework necessary to accomplish this requires conceptual 
contributions from economics, political science and sociology.  
 
In the development of the innovation, or innovative product, the regulatory approval 
process requires a risk analysis for all new plant varieties. This risk analysis process 
is comprised of risk assessment, risk management and risk communication. This 
thesis argues that risk and the application of risk analysis is appropriate for pre-
commercialization, but once the innovative product is in the marketplace, any failure 
regarding this product can be viewed as a potential liability.  
 
The management of and communication about liabilities differs from that of risk 
management and communication. The key theme of this research is to examine how 
regulators in Canada have attempted to regulate post-commercialization liabilities 
and to identify what governance structures or institutions are essential for the 
regulation of post-commercialization liabilities. 
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Chapter One 
 
Innovation and Agriculture 
 
 
1.1   Introduction 
Innovation is the key driver behind social advancement and change. While it brings 
beneficial new products and processes to societies, it also can trigger a level of fear 
and uncertainty. Over time, individual countries and cultures have found a myriad of 
ways of dealing with the commercialization of new technologies. Commonly, the 
social acceptance of innovative products that possessed a level of public uncertainty 
have been managed through the development and implementation of effective 
regulations. Social trust in government has acted as a facilitating mechanism for the 
successful commercialization of some innovations and innovative products that are 
commonplace in today’s society. 
 
This thesis argues that the difference between risk and liability is that risk deals with 
hypothetical possibilities prior to commercialization and liability deals with 
marketplace externalities in the post-commercialization period. Public policy 
literature related to the application of liability is very limited and the objective of 
this research is to review the risk literature and discuss how it can be modified and 
applied to examine issues of liability resulting from the innovation of agricultural 
biotechnology. 
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Legally, a liability results when an obligation is not fulfilled. From this legal 
perspective, there are only two kinds of liability—criminal and civil. Criminal 
liability occurs when there has been a criminal act committed, i.e. where someone 
breaks the law of the land. Civil liability arises when an obligation has not been met 
by a party and can result in litigation for compensation on behalf of those affected. 
The application of liability within the context of this research examines how 
liabilities have been managed and addressed in the post-commercialization period 
for products resulting from biotechnology. 
 
Before it is possible to discuss the application of liability to agricultural 
biotechnology, it is important to understand how science has advanced to the point 
of being able to deliver commercialized products from this innovation. Genomics 
research is quite recent and new applications of this innovative process are 
continually being discovered.  
 
It can be claimed that innovation in agriculture has been going on since mankind 
first domesticated wild plants species. Regardless of when innovation was first 
applied to plants, mankind has played an important role in the dispersion of some 
plant varieties around the world (i.e. maize) and has manipulated many plant species 
to produce greater yields. In North America, for example, most of the plants that are 
staples in our daily diets have been introduced to this continent from other parts of 
the world or been enhanced over time to provide greater yields. In short, plant 
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genetics is a very important area of innovation for commercial agriculture in the 
modern age. 
 
The birth of modern genetics took place over 50 years ago with the discovery of the 
double helix in deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) by Watson and Crick in 1953. This 
was a substantial news story and received considerable press coverage. As with 
many discoveries, the vast future potential of the double helix was, to a large degree, 
grossly under-estimated. The research in this new field continued for the next two 
decades with minimal public awareness. Thirty years ago, in a California laboratory, 
the next major innovation in this field of genetics occurred. The extraction and 
insertion of genes within the genetic code of an organism was accomplished for the 
first time and the technology known as recombinant DNA (rDNA) was born. 
 
This time the research community had a greater level of understanding about future 
applications of the technology and a heightened level of concern existed among 
researchers. There was so much concern that a voluntary research moratorium was 
enacted by world scientists in 1975 to enable more to be learned about the 
technology of gene splicing, including the safety of those working in the 
laboratories. Protecting confidential information was not of prime concern—this 
process was very transparent, including representatives from the media, scientific 
magazines and the US federal government. While the issue received press coverage 
in scientific magazines, it was not viewed by the popular press as a major 
newsworthy event. Events in society forced scientific stories to the margins of the 
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popular press—change was happening quickly in many sectors of society and the 
end result was the marginalization of science. 
 
Research involving genetically engineered viruses and bacteria continued through 
the 1970s and, by the end of that decade, researchers were beginning to search for 
ways to apply this technology to plants. Conducting genetic engineering research 
with plants was more time consuming than working with viruses and bacteria 
because the genetic code of plants was more complex. The first genetic modification 
of a plant occurred in 1983, and the research continued rapidly, so that by the end of 
the decade field trials were already underway with new crop varieties. Following 
several years of crop trials, a number of these new genetically modified (GM) plants 
were commercialized in the early and mid 1990s. 
 
The first commercial planting of a GM crop occurred in China in 1992 (James and 
Krattiger, 1996). This initial planting involved 100 acres of transgenic tobacco and 
was done for the purpose of seed multiplication. The first commercial acreage of a 
GM crop for food purposes occurred in 1994—this was in the US by Calgene, with 
their transgenic, delayed-ripening tomato. The variety, known commercially as 
FlavrSavr™, was initially produced on an estimated 10,000 acres. In 1995, other 
crop types were introduced, including cotton, canola, potatoes and maize. James 
(2003) estimates that in 2003, GM crops were grown on 167 million acres in 18 
different countries. 
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The number of crop kinds that have been genetically modified continues to grow as 
an increasing number of transgenic fruits, vegetables, spices and flowers are being 
granted regulatory approval. Many of the new transgenic crop varieties are facing 
increasingly rigid regulatory standards prior to receiving variety approval. Many of 
these new regulations attempt to provide a clearer perspective of the risk related to 
the commercialization of the prospective new transgenic crop variety. 
 
Biotechnology has accelerated the rate of development of new crop varieties. In the 
past three years an average of 30 new GM varieties have been introduced annually. 
The rapid adoption of GM varieties and the subsequent diffusion by the seed 
industry into a wide range of stacked input traits and differentiated novel output 
traits have fundamentally altered the marketing system for these new plant varieties. 
Input trait varieties are those that improve the agronomics of the crop, such as 
through herbicide tolerance, while output trait varieties offer attributes that generate 
down-stream market value, such as low cholesterol cooking oil. 
 
While the front end of the supply chain (seed development firms and producers) has 
not viewed the application of biotechnology as a fundamental shift in agricultural 
practices, the consuming public has. The reasons for this reluctance to accept the 
products of the innovation of biotechnology are varied and frequently difficult to 
quantify. Nevertheless, the innovative process is continuing in Canada at a rapid 
pace and new products and processes are continually being commercialized.  
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To date, both industry and regulators have managed the risks of commercializing 
these innovations. The risk evaluation systems operating in most developed (OECD 
– Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) countries are 
generally scientifically-based processes that combine the identification and 
characterisation of hazards with assessments of exposure to characterise risk. In 
essence, they purport to objectively assess the probabilistic outcomes of discrete 
adverse events, for the most part abstracting from issues related to risk management 
or risk communications. The practice is that governments establish a risk threshold 
for products or classes of products that would reject new products with unacceptable 
risks but would allow those with acceptable impacts to enter the market. The very 
recent application of liability pertaining to biotechnology may be a substantial 
challenge that will require considerable time and capital to address satisfactorily.  
 
Risks related to the commercialization of genetically modified crops have been 
identified by both the private firms involved in the commercialization process and 
the Canadian regulatory agencies. The Canadian regulatory agency responsible for 
approving the commercial release of GM plants deemed all GM plant varieties to be 
plants with novel traits, thereby, subjecting the GM plant applications to additional 
environmental, allergenicity and toxicity testing. The firms involved in 
commercializing the initial varieties of GM plants in Canada worked with the 
regulatory agency to facilitate the development of these additional regulations. 
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Ultimately, the risk assessment system ought to be designed to make the right 
decisions; that is accepting safe products and rejecting unsafe products. As with any 
human system, there is potential for error, especially when a new class of products is 
being considered where there is no empirical evidence. While the system is and 
should be designed to avoid making Type 1 errors, i.e. accepting something that is 
not safe, it has to be mindful of the trap of making Type 2 errors, i.e. rejecting safe 
products and activities. While we can tally up the cost of Type 1 errors in lost lives 
or damaged ecosystems, we cannot convincingly estimate the cost of foregone 
opportunities and all of the attendant benefits that could flow from them. The 
difficulty is that social amplification of risk significantly raises the potential of 
making a Type 2 error, thereby diminishing the flow of new and innovative products 
and progress in a science-based economy. 
 
The application of post-commercialization liability to agriculture is relatively new. 
Historically, agriculture production was either consumed domestically or exported 
internationally with little fanfare. In today’s marketplace, the production of GM food 
products has created numerous challenges for both domestic consumption and 
international exporting. One of the results of this is that on-farm actions have the 
potential to disrupt established trade patterns. The research for this thesis examines 
how the agricultural biotechnology industry has worked to ensure that post-
commercialization liabilities have been minimized. 
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1.2   Background 
The maturity of an innovation reflects the social comfort of any corresponding 
liability. Over time, societies accept the potential liabilities of innovations as the 
comfort level related to the use of the innovation or the innovative product becomes 
part of the mainstream of the society. Substantial innovations such as those that can 
be called transformative technologies (i.e. computers) have a major impact on the 
societies into which they are commercialized and acceptance of the transformative 
technology is not an instantaneous reaction. Rather, marketplace failures have to be 
prevented to allow society to appreciate the fact that the transformative technology 
is one that is beneficial and safe.  
 
The innovation of commercialized transgenic plants is less than a decade old and as 
a result, society has not defined its comfort zone for liabilities that are arising and 
that may arise in the future. Many argue that the present array of transgenic 
innovations is but the trickle prior to the deluge that is coming (James, 2003, CBAC, 
2003). If this anticipated deluge of transgenic plant innovations is to have any 
commercial potential, the present liabilities (both real and hypothetical) will have to 
be satisfactorily addressed by all transgenic stakeholders. 
 
The application of liability is evolving, especially as it pertains to agriculture. 
Historically, lawsuits in crop agriculture have been mostly about production 
externalities, such as aerial spraying. Occasionally, an aerial application of a 
chemical would be too close to a neighbouring farmer’s land and it would drift onto 
a crop belonging to another farmer. Depending on the crop, the damage could be 
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substantial. In some instances, the farmer whose crop was adversely affected sued 
the commercial sprayer of the chemical for damages suffered. Another commonly 
cited example is the situation where a scrub bull escapes an enclosure and 
indiscriminately impregnates a neighbour’s pure-bred cattle.1 The relationship 
between liability and its application to agriculture is explained in greater detail in 
Chapter Three. 
 
Innovations in agricultural biotechnology over the past decade have fundamentally 
changed the way that risks from this technology are analyzed and how the resulting 
liabilities are managed. In the early 1990s, transgenic plants were identified by 
Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada (in its role as forerunner to the Canadian Food 
Inspection Agency) as possessing a unique genotype when compared to 
conventional plant varieties and therefore, were classified as plants with novel traits. 
These plant varieties were subjected to additional risk reviews and assessments prior 
to the granting of variety approval. These additional regulations ultimately delivered 
decisions that worked from the basis that transgenic varieties were substantially 
equivalent to conventional varieties, and therefore variety approval was given to the 
new transgenic varieties. However, the science-based risk assessment methods that 
were used to approve the commercialization of the new plant varieties have not 
provided the reassurance to a seemingly nervous consuming public about the long-
term safety of consuming these GM food products. 
                                                          
1 For a detailed analysis of how tort law relating to stray animals can be applied to patent rights of 
transgenic plants, see Kershen, 2004. 
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Canada is not alone regarding the application of liability to agricultural 
biotechnology. Other countries with greater levels of consumer concern have begun 
to address this issue and have either implemented or suggested new actions that need 
to be taken to resolve how liabilities from agricultural biotechnology will be 
addressed.  
 
The 2001 New Zealand Royal Commission, that examined the issue of genetic 
modification as it applied to that country, included a chapter on liability, opening the 
discussion with the following questions: “Who is, or is not, liable for damage caused 
by genetic modification? Who should be? To what extent?” (p. 311). This is a very 
strong statement in that one could perceive that it presupposes that damages from 
genetic modification are a forgone conclusion. However, the Royal Commission 
ultimately rejected a special liability regime for transgenic crops, believing instead 
that any liabilities (should they arise) could be adequately addressed through present 
legal regimes (i.e. existing tort laws). Ultimately, the Royal Commission, after 
thorough review of this subject, believed that any potential liabilities from 
transgenic crops do not differ in nature from existing technologies. 
 
Similarly, the United Kingdom (UK) Agriculture and Environment Biotechnology 
Commission (2003) recently released a report on co-existence and liability relating 
to the production of genetically modified (GM) crops in the UK and recommended 
to the UK government that the UK Environmental Protection Act of 1990 be 
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amended to provide financial compensation to those harmed by the commercial 
release of GM crops, “… irrespective of criminal liability.” (p. 11) 
 
Meanwhile, the Danish government has proposed a strategy for co-existence of 
organic and GM crop production, where the onus of responsibility is placed on the 
producers that adopt GM crop technology (Danish Ministry for Food, Agriculture 
and Fisheries, 2003). The Danish Minister for Food, Agriculture and Fisheries, was 
quoted as saying “… it is crucial that the GM farmer shoulders the burden” for 
ensuring segregation of GM crops. This burden to accept liability from co-mingling 
of GM crops would be expected to negatively impact the adoption rate of GM crops 
in Denmark. 
 
The genetic modification of crops has changed the nature of the liability debate and 
the application of the term. The commercial release of transgenic crops has created a 
split within large-scale commercial agriculture, not only between countries, but 
within countries as well. Internationally, there has been a split between European 
Union (EU) countries and North America (the US and Canada). The EU views 
transgenic crops as a threat that presents unacceptable liability and will not allow 
domestic production of transgenic crops for large-scale food consumption, or the 
importing of many transgenic raw materials or processed food products. North 
America has approved the commercial release and encouraged wide spread adoption 
of a variety of transgenic food crops, which, by some estimates, are incorporated 
into nearly 70% of all processed foods.  
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These splits within agriculture at both the international and domestic levels give rise 
to potential liabilities from agricultural innovations. International trade could 
potentially be damaged should a commodity export be tested and found to contain 
unacceptable levels for transgenic varieties. Domestic production of quality assured 
differentiated products (e.g. GM-free and organic) could also be potentially affected 
by the wide-spread adoption of transgenic crop varieties. Ultimately, one overriding 
issue is beginning to emerge: is there a liability if a sales market is damaged by co-
mingling of genetically modified seeds and, if so, who is liable? 
 
As other countries proceed with legislation regarding liabilities from GM crops, 
Canada has not been immune from this issue. The Saskatchewan Organic 
Directorate is seeking legal remedy from Monsanto and Aventis (now Bayer 
CropScience) for allegedly destroying the ability of Saskatchewan organic farmers 
to export organic canola due to the commercialization of the two companies GM 
canola varieties. This case is presently before the court and is the first legal case 
where producers are suing the developers of innovative crop technologies for 
potential market losses. 
 
The relationship between liability and agricultural biotechnology will become 
increasingly important for Canada in 2005, when consideration of liability and 
redress regarding the transboundary movement of living modified organisms 
commence under the Biosafety Protocol. There is the concern that this process will 
be used to erect barriers to the transfer of technology research and development 
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between developed and developing countries. Canadian participation in this 
discussion has so far focused on ensuring that the process is an open, inclusive and 
science-based approach. Canadian delegates to the Biosafety Protocol have acted to 
ensure that any liability rules or regimes that are proposed are based on realistic 
probabilities rather than theoretical concerns. 
 
If a rigid liability regime is adopted, either within Canada or internationally, such 
that liabilities for marketplace externalities are placed upon the innovating firm, then 
there is the potential for a reduction of research and development, which will lead to 
fewer innovative products being commercialized. The research for this thesis 
examines liabilities that have arisen to date in Canada and examines how they have 
been effectively addressed through existing and evolving mechanisms. 
 
 
1.3   Research Agenda 
Agriculture biotechnology is a transformative technology that has brought 
considerable change to the way food is produced. Using an institutional/governance 
approach, the research undertaken for this thesis examines the question of how the 
regulation of agriculture biotechnology has developed within Canada. The 
conceptual construct that is developed for this research identifies the major 
stakeholders and their roles within the agricultural biotechnology system. This 
conceptual construct is then applied to a variety of actual occurrences within the 
development of agriculture biotechnology to demonstrate the strengths and 
weaknesses of different institutions in the regulation of biotechnology. 
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The research focus of this thesis is to assess the regulation of innovation, specifically 
the regulation of agricultural biotechnology. Innovation naturally brings change, and 
change can often instill worry or uncertainty in societies. While innovation produces 
new products or opportunities to use old products in new applications, it can also 
produce liabilities. The management of liabilities resulting from innovation is crucial 
to both the rates of adoption of the innovation and society’s acceptance of the 
innovation. 
 
Historically, many innovations have involved inanimate objects. Innovations in 
construction, electronics and transportation all provide classic examples. Innovations 
in these fields created social upheavals in the societies of the time. Technological 
advances have fostered innovations involving animate objects, such as plants that 
are consumed as a regular part of our daily diets. Historically, conventional cross 
breeding of plants was structured to select for traits normally found within the same 
species. Recent innovations have resulted in transgenic plant varieties where plants 
contain genes inserted from other plants, animals or microbes.  
 
Regulatory failures or delays increase the likelihood that commercialization will be 
delayed, creating the potential for negative economic circumstances. Heller (1995) 
has estimated that a one-year delay in commercializing an innovation reduces the 
rate of return on investment for the new product by 2.8%, while a two-year delay 
results in a reduction of 5.2%. Delays can also affect social outcomes. For example, 
a recent American study of plant biotechnology by Gianessi, et al., (2002) found that 
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current transgenic plants increased yields by four billion pounds annually and 
reduced pesticide use by 46 million pounds annually. The combined value of these 
effects was estimated to be US$1.5 billion. Delays in commercialization of 
transgenic plants would reduce the benefits of higher yields for producers and 
increase the application of pesticides into the environment. This has the potential to 
create the scenario where producers are economically worse off and, arguably, those 
sensitive to pesticides could also be deemed to be worse off. 
 
When a transformative technology affects the market place, the public relies on the 
government to regulate the changes. Governments have three options when it comes 
to managing innovation. First, federal regulators can work from existing regulations 
and make changes and revisions to the existing regulations to try and ensure that no 
regulatory gaps exist. In terms of time and cost, this method can be extremely 
efficient. Second, regulators can begin the process of regulating the innovation from 
scratch, beginning with no regulations and working with industry to develop an 
entirely new regulatory framework. This method takes more time and money than 
the first option. The third option available to government is to do nothing, let the 
industry develop standards for the innovation and only move to regulate if public 
opinion or market failure dictates the need for government involvement. 
 
Industry can develop industry specific quality assurance standards or codes of 
practice to ensure the constant delivery of high quality products to the marketplace. 
Industry standards require a delicate balance. If standards are overly rigorous, they 
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can act as barriers to entry for new firms, thus preserving the marketplace for larger 
firms. On the other hand, if industry standards are not rigorous enough, the quality 
of the product in the marketplace declines and consumers may switch to alternative 
products, resulting in large losses to the industry. 
 
The role of society in developing regulations for innovation is perhaps the most 
difficult to identify as representation in society can be very fragmented. The 
opportunity for society to participate can also be diverse, ranging from participation 
in Royal Commission hearings to writing letters to local newspapers. The challenge 
of a science-based regulatory process is that there is no official capacity for the 
inclusion of comments or concerns from the consuming public. A variety of attempts 
have been undertaken to incorporate the public’s opinion, but few have provided 
satisfactory results. 
 
This thesis will argue that when an innovative technology enters the marketplace 
and is not successfully adopted, this is a marketplace failure. This differs from when 
a company launches a new product that is rejected due to a flaw in the marketing 
plan, this is a complete inability of the regulators, the industry and society to grasp 
the potential of the innovation and to co-operate, thereby facilitating the adoption of 
the innovation. 
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The research for this thesis has examined the dynamics of the interaction between 
regulators, industry and society, or what can be identified as the three key 
stakeholders in the management of innovation. 
 
 
1.4   Objective of the Study 
The objective of this thesis is to examine the dynamics between government 
regulatory bodies, industry firms and civil society groups pertaining to the 
innovation of agricultural biotechnology. This objective will be achieved through 
analysis of the following crucial aspects of institutional governance: 
• An analysis of regulatory overlaps that exist between regulatory agencies, 
private firms and civil society actors, by focusing on institutional governance 
responses to agricultural biotechnology; 
 
• Identifying gaps within the regulatory framework for agriculture biotechnology, 
examining the stakeholder responses to these gaps and assessing the success of 
the response mechanism; and 
 
• Examining the liabilities that have resulted from the above regulatory gaps with 
a focus on how the liabilities were managed and what the costs, both financial 
and social, has been to the agricultural biotechnology industry and society in 
general. 
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These objectives will be achieved by the use of four articles that have been 
published in peer review journals. These articles examine different aspects of the 
dynamics between regulators, private firms and civil society.  
 
The first article examines the dynamics between Canadian regulators and two seed 
development firms that commercialized the first GM varieties of canola in Canada. 
This article was published in 2001 in the journal International Food and 
Agribusiness Management Review (Smyth and Phillips, 2001). This article examines 
the use of identity preserved production and marketing systems for the production of 
GM canola.  
 
The second article explores the relationship between Canadian regulators and civil 
society as it pertains to the role of regulators regarding food safety. This article is a 
combination of two publications. The front end of this article was published in 2002 
in the journal AgBioForum (Smyth and Phillips, 2002). This portion of the article 
offers working definitions and a practical taxonomy for the terms identity 
preservation, segregation and traceability. The remainder of the article was 
published in 2003 in the journal Trends in Biotechnology (Smyth and Phillips, 
2003). This section of the article discusses how the increased demand for product 
differentiation is placing new constraints on the supply chain. It concludes with an 
assessment that reflects the need for mandatory labeling. 
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The third article focuses on the interactions between private firms and the larger 
society. This article was published in 2002 in the journal Nature Biotechnology 
(Smyth, et al., 2002). This article addresses how public concerns regarding cross-
pollination of GM varieties with conventional varieties could jeopardize the 
commercialization of future genetically modified crop varieties. 
 
The fourth article provides an examination of the dynamics that exist between 
regulators, industry and civil society regarding the emerging innovation of plant- 
made pharmaceuticals. This article was published late in 2004 in the journal 
Biotechnology and Genetic Engineering Reviews (Smyth, et al., 2004). The article 
presents the scale and scope of plant made pharmaceuticals and examines the role of 
institutional governance within this context. 
 
These four articles highlight the Canadian regulatory response to potential liabilities 
in agricultural biotechnology. The justification for undertaking such a narrow 
regulatory analysis is largely due to the fact that large-scale commercial production 
of GM crops occurs only in Argentina, Canada and the United States. The research 
for this thesis examines the complete, post-commercialization supply chain and how 
it relates to liability. This is not possible in Europe due to the moratorium that was 
enacted in 1998. The only commercial production of GM crops occurring in Europe 
is for animal feed varieties approved pre-1998 and is contained to Spain and 
Romania. Simply put, the commercial production of GM crops in Europe has not 
reached the point where a marketplace liability assessment would be possible. 
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1.5   Conceptual Constructs 
To properly analyze the process of regulating transformative technology change, this 
thesis uses a framework that focuses on the interactions among the three identified 
stakeholders. This framework has been carefully developed following a thorough 
examination of related discipline-specific models from the academic disciplines of 
economics, political science and sociology. This framework has been structured to 
highlight areas of regulatory overlap and to identify where regulatory gaps have 
occurred. The framework focuses on identifying what governance strategies have 
been adopted by the various stakeholders within agricultural biotechnology and how 
these stakeholders have managed the liabilities that have resulted over the first 
decade of commercialized transgenic crop production.  
 
The framework used in this thesis is designed to identify the drivers for the 
governance strategies and to evaluate the success of these governance strategies in 
the management of liabilities. Some of the governance strategies adopted for the use 
of agricultural biotechnology have been very successful at managing liabilities, 
while other strategies have been ineffective in managing liabilities, which has 
resulted in costly class action activities. 
  
 
1.6   Organization of the Research 
Chapter 2 provides a review of the existing literature as it relates to this study and 
summarizes how the most important theories relate to this thesis.  The chapter 
reviews the theoretical contributions regarding institutional approaches to innovation 
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from the disciplines of economics, political science and sociology. The chapter 
provides working definitions of institution and risk. The literature reviewed in this 
chapter is largely neo-institutional and focuses on how innovation theory and models 
that have been developed to illustrate how innovation relates to governance. One of 
the objectives of this literature review is to identify formal and informal 
organizational structures that exist within institutional frameworks. 
 
Chapter 3 presents the framework that is used in the subsequent chapters. The 
framework identifies the major stakeholders and highlights where regulatory 
overlaps and gaps have existed within the regulation of agricultural biotechnology. 
The framework is explained in detail and the importance of institutional actors and 
their role in relation to governance are highlighted within this discussion. The 
framework shows how each chapter relates to a specific overlap. 
 
Chapter 4 focuses on the regulatory gap that existed between the canola industry and 
the federal regulators in Canada at the time of the initial commercialization of GM 
canola and the challenges that resulted from this gap. When the Canadian Food 
Inspection Agency (CFIA) approves a new crop variety, there is no consideration 
given to, or avenue to allow for an analysis of, the impact on present export markets. 
When GM canola was commercialized, the canola industry faced foreign market 
concerns and was forced to address the issue of containment to reassure the foreign 
markets that Canada could and would ensure shipments of GM-free canola. This 
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chapter examines the non-governmental organization/industry governance 
mechanisms used to contain GM canola. 
 
Chapter 5 provides a discussion on product differentiation and the effects on 
consumer labeling. This chapter addresses the overlap between federal regulators 
and Canadian society. There are a variety of terminologies used to describe product 
differentiation and this chapter identifies the three options and provides definitions 
of their use. Following this is an analysis of the non-governmental organization/ 
regulatory governance structures at the various stages of the supply chain for each 
system in the marketplace. This analysis is followed by a review of consumer 
labeling demands and willingness to pay. This section of the chapter compares 
recent studies on what consumers are demanding when it comes to labeling GM 
food products with studies on what consumers are willing to pay for information 
about GM labeling. 
 
Chapter 6 focuses on those transgenic crop liabilities that exist between firms in the 
industry and society at large. When new technologies are commercialized, 
regardless of how effective the regulations are, some individuals will deliberately or 
inadvertently, misappropriate the technology, thus diluting the benefits and creating 
the potential for liabilities. This chapter identifies where liabilities have developed 
from the use of GM crops and examines the industry/regulatory governance 
structures that have developed to manage these liabilities. 
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Chapter 7 offers an analysis of the challenges of regulating the liabilities from plant 
made pharmaceuticals. The previous three chapters analyzed the overlaps between 
the principal stakeholders in situations where there is involvement primarily from 
two stakeholders. This chapter examines the area of overlap at the center of the 
framework, where the interests and concerns of all three stakeholders overlap. The 
prior chapters discussed what regulations were needed and what gaps existed with 
an existing innovation and Chapter 7 discusses which issues will be important when 
dealing with a radically new innovative technology. This chapter identifies those 
gaps that presently exist and discusses how these gaps will need to be addressed by 
regulation to ensure that the management of liabilities is maintained. 
 
Chapter 8 offers concluding comments on the topic of regulation of liabilities. The 
first section discusses how the various academic disciplines have grappled with the 
issue of modeling transformative technologies. The second section presents the 
strengths and weaknesses of the methodology used in the course of the research. The 
third section provides a summary of the previous four chapters and presents the 
major conclusions from the thesis. The fourth section presents some of the 
limitations of this thesis. The fifth section presents some observations about research 
extensions that could arise from this thesis. 
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Chapter 2 
 
Theory and Literature Review 
 
 
2.1   Introduction 
This chapter focuses on the existing theory and literature from the academic 
disciplines of economics, political science and sociology. Working from an 
interdisciplinary approach, these academic disciplines each contribute a unique 
perspective regarding the regulation of innovation. However, none of these 
disciplines by themselves offer a thorough structure for understanding the broader 
issue of the impacts that a transformative innovation can have on an entire society. 
The intent of this chapter is to present and assess the theory and literature from the 
various academic disciplines and to highlight the strengths and weaknesses of the 
various structures. 
 
The disciplines of economics, political science and sociology are long-standing 
disciplines and enjoy rich fields of theory and literature. The challenge of working in 
research disciplines with an abundance of theories and typologies is to conduct a 
review that is thorough enough and that ultimately selects theories and typologies 
that are directly relevant for an examination of the research topic. The use of an 
institutional/governance research approach provides one potential approach for 
examining the issue of regulating innovation. 
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As was identified in Chapter 1, risk deals with pre-commercialization hypothetical 
issues and liability with post-commercialization challenges. To date, all of the 
literature on liability comes from the work of legal academics, and while this is 
important literature, it does not address the issue of how to regulate innovation. The 
application on the inclusion of liability is addressed in further detail in Chapter 3.  
 
The literature that has been reviewed for this thesis comes from the broad fields of 
institutional analysis, institutional governance and risk. These topics have an 
abundance of literature and it is therefore possible to analyze this literature and 
apply it to the topic of this thesis. The literature that is reviewed in this section 
examines how the disciplines view institutions and risk.  
 
Table 2.1 helps to demonstrate how the numerous theories, discipline specific 
typologies and literature references are accommodated in this literature review. It 
provides discipline specific definitions for institutions and risk. The importance of 
institutions for this research can best be summarized by North (1990), when he 
states that “[i]nstitutions are the rules of the game in a society or, more formally, are 
the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction. In consequence they 
structure incentives in human exchange, whether political, social or economic.” (p.3) 
The economic interpretation of institution is one that was developed from the theory 
relating to transaction cost analysis. From this perspective, an institution is the 
mechanism that allows a transaction to occur or that facilitates a transaction. The 
economic definition of risk is taken from the literature related to insurance and more 
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specifically, how to price insurance to address risk variances. Within the literature, 
there is a research focus on gambling and the definition of risk is where the 
probability that the outcome or output of an event (such as the chance of winning 
from gambling) is lower than the expected value of the same event (the actual 
winnings). 
 
Table 2.1: Interdisciplinary comparison of definitions for institution and risk 
Discipline Definition of Institution  Definition of Risk 
Economics Williamson: Institutions are the 
broad framework of markets, 
hierarchies and hybrids through 
which a transaction is channeled. 
Varian: The probability that the 
output of an event is lower than 
the expected value of the same 
event. 
Political 
Science 
Atkinson: Institutions are 
mechanisms, bundles of rules, 
through which choices are made 
and conflicts resolved. 
Stanbury: Adverse effects for 
citizens resulting from 
inappropriate government actions. 
Sociology Gibbons: Cultural practices that 
have the greatest impact on 
society over time and space can be 
referred to as institutions. 
Sandman: Risk is a function of the 
level of hazard from exposure to a 
toxin multiplied by the level of 
public outrage. 
Sources: Williamson, 1993; Varian, 1992; Atkinson, 1993; Stanbury, 2000; Gibbons, 
1994; and Sandman, 1994. 
 
The political science definition of institution focuses not on market transactions as 
economics does, but on the rules and mechanisms that allow choices to be made. 
Institutions may not necessarily be formally defined or identified, but can also be the 
informal operating structures. The political science definition of risk is the adverse 
effects upon populations from inadequate or inappropriate government actions. This 
means that people within a particular society can be negatively affected as a result of 
government actions that do not properly address the severity of a situation or event. 
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Within the realm of sociology, an institution is identified as those cultural events or 
practices that work to shape or impact a given society (Gibbons, 1994). Unlike the 
marketplace transactions or the governance structures, this definition focuses on the 
composition of the society and institutions are those events that, over time, help to 
define that particular society. The sociological definition of risk is derived from the 
scientific definition. In science, risk is a function of hazard multiplied by the time of 
exposure, which allowed scientists to determine the level of risk from working with 
specific substances. Sociology has more broadly defined risk as a function of hazard 
multiplied by socially constructed views of exposure or what Sandman calls outrage. 
In this definition of risk, outrage is a measure of society's concern that an event has 
occurred.  
 
This table highlights how varied the definitions of these two terms are across the 
academic disciplines that relate to this research. The economic definitions relate to 
how transactions are handled and the expected outcome. The political science 
definitions address how government choices affect citizens. The definitions from 
sociology focus on how society is heavily involved in defining both terms. 
 
 
2.2   Institutional Literature 
Williamson (1979) drawing on Coase’s (1937) theory, developed the analytical 
framework for transaction cost analysis, stating that the classical “… economic 
institutions of capitalism are explained by reference to class interests, technology, 
and/or monopoly power—the transaction cost approach maintains that these 
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institutions have the main purpose and effect of economizing on transaction costs” 
(1985, p.1). By economizing, Williamson means that any inefficiencies associated 
with a transaction are removed, or at least reduced. Williamson (1993) goes on to 
say that “… transaction cost economics approach to the study of institutions is 
predominantly concerned with the governance of contractual relations. Governance 
may be defined as the institutional framework – broadly consisting of markets, 
hierarchies and hybrids – through which a transaction is channeled” (p.16). This 
definition of institutions provided by Williamson is widely recognized as a starting 
point that numerous other researchers have used for their own research on 
institutional economics. 
 
North (1990) addresses technical and institutional change and attempts to understand 
the commonalties and differences between the two. North believes that institutional 
changes are the more complex of the two due to the multifaceted interrelationships 
that exist with both formal and informal constraints. North observes that a key point 
is that stakeholders have varying degrees of vested interests in institutional change 
and will try to influence institutional changes towards their favour.  
 
Picciotto (1995) examines the essential institutional fundamentals required for 
successful Third World development projects from the perspective of projects 
undertaken by the World Bank. Picciotto uses examples of Third World 
development projects to describe what institutional structure and level of operation 
is required to ensure that resources devoted to projects are utilized in the most 
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economical manner possible. Specifically, he focuses on the public, private and 
voluntary sectors and the interaction among these sectors (Figure 2.1). This 
institutional methodology attempts to provide insights into how these three 
stakeholders need to come together to foster successful development projects.  
 
Picciotto discusses how each sector represents different individuals, involves 
different incentives and is effective in producing goods or attributes with specific 
characteristics. The government sector produces public goods (A) (e.g. public health 
and safety), usually characterized by low excludability,2 low rivalry3 and low voice,4 
that are involuntarily consumed by all citizens equally. Conversely, the private 
sector provides market goods (D) (e.g. brands and product specific warranties), that 
exhibit high excludability, high rivalry and low voice, and are consumed voluntarily 
by individuals. In contrast, the participation sector specializes in common pool 
goods (F) (e.g. standards that go beyond regulations but include more than one 
firm), with low excludability, from low to high rivalry and high voice (e.g. co-
ordination). 
 
While discussing the government, private and common pool goods, Picciotto 
focuses on the relationships that develop in the three areas where overlap occurs. 
The overlap between government and private goods (B) are deemed to be toll goods 
and are classified by public or regulated private corporations and can be typified by 
                                                          
2 Excludability is a circumstance where individual consumers can be excluded without incurring 
substantial cost. 
3 Non rival, or low substractable, goods are ones where the consumption by one person does not 
diminish the ability of other persons to benefit from the good. 
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public utilities. The overlap between private and common pool goods (E) are civil 
goods. Institutions in this category are non-governmental organizations (NGOs). 
Examples would be public advocacy groups, professional standards and civic action. 
The overlap between common pool and government goods (C) are public goods. 
Institutionally, these are represented by hybrid organizations that are responsible for 
issues like rural roads. 
 
 
Figure 2.1: Institutional Design Parameters     
       
 
     Hierarchy 
     (State Sector) 
Market          Participation 
(Private Sector)          (Voluntary Sector) 
 
Source: Picciotto, 1995. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                   
4 Voice is the ability of members in a sector to have their opinion heard by those who make decisions. 
 
A 
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While Picciotto provides a good model for the assessment of resource utilization, 
there are two omissions in this model that relate to managing liabilities. The first is 
that there is no consideration of risk in Picciotto’s model. This is important as it 
deals with how information about a project is communicated to those directly and 
indirectly affected. Picciotto does not mention how information about the risks and 
benefits of Third World development projects were communicated to the local 
populations. This is an unfortunate oversight as communicating the benefits of any 
project with the local population is an important key to the projects overall success. 
The second oversight is Picciotto’s unexplainable lack of focus on the center of his 
model, where all three spheres overlap. While all the institutions that play a role in 
the overlaps identified as B, C and E are thoroughly explained, he offers no insight 
as to what individuals and institutions are affected in this area. For the purposes of 
this research, this offers an opportunity to adapt the model illustrated above and to 
identify what institutional policies and actions are occurring within the center of the 
model. 
 
 
2.2.1 Summary 
Table 2.2 identifies three key aspects of institutional theory that have made a 
substantial contribution to the development of this interdisciplinary model. The 
contributing theories address the importance of the role that institutions have and 
how institutional constraints affect the transaction costs. 
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Table 2.2: Critical elements of institutional theory 
 
Author  Key 
concept 
Critical theoretical 
contribution 
Implication for model 
William-
son 
Transaction 
cost analysis 
Over-regulation of innovation 
will be viewed as an increased 
transaction cost, meaning that 
the regulation is not 
economically efficient. 
This theory can be used to examine 
whether the stakeholders involved with an 
innovative technology view proposed 
regulations as economically efficient. 
North Informal 
institution 
constraints 
Formal constraints are easily 
identified; it is the informal 
constraints that have an impact 
on stakeholder relationships. 
This theory works well to position the 
stakeholders and then to identify what 
informal constraints exist and how they 
impact each stakeholder. 
R
es
ea
rc
h 
Er
a 
M
id
 1
99
0s
  E
ar
ly
 1
99
0s
   
  1
98
0s
  1
97
0s
   
Picciotto Model of 
resource 
utilization 
The interaction between public, 
private and voluntary sectors is 
essential for successful 
development projects. 
This interaction and the characterization 
of the actors in the areas of overlap is the 
key focus of this model.  
 
Williamson’s transaction cost analysis theory is a valued contribution to this 
research as it identifies that regulations are a cost of doing business. This theory can 
be used to examine the interaction between industry and government in relation to 
the development of regulations. North’s theory regarding informal constraints is 
important for an analysis of governance institutions as there is considerable 
difficulty in identifying informal constraints and the working to identify solutions. 
Picciotto’s model of resource utilization is valued because it examines what 
institutional actors exist within the areas of overlap. This is important for this thesis 
as regulatory overlap is a key aspect of the research. 
 
 
 
2.3   Governance Literature 
In an attempt to help students of public policy better understand the process, Dye 
(1987) compares and contrasts several models of public policy. He explains the 
concepts of institutionalism, policy behavioural process, group theory, elite theory, 
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rationalism, incrementalism, game theory and systems theory. In the end, he sets out 
some general criteria that can allow the user to evaluate the effectiveness of a policy 
model.  
 
The criteria are: 
• it should order and simplify political life so it allows the user to understand the 
real world relationships; 
• it should identify the significant aspects of public policy; 
• it should be congruent with reality; 
• it has to communicate something meaningful; 
• it should direct inquiry and research into public policy; and 
• it should suggest an explanation of public policy (Dye, 1987). 
 
As the literature moves through the 1970s and into the 1980s, the emergence of 
detailed policy analysis models is evident. The work of such academics as Atkinson, 
Coleman, Doern, Pal and Skogstad have all greatly contributed to the development 
of this literature.  Those within the neo-institutional school of thought argue that 
while institutions have formal organizational structures, they also have informal 
organizational dimensions, legal dimensions (i.e. operating rules) and cultural 
dimensions (i.e. operating norms and values), whereas conventional institutional 
theorists believe that institutions are bound by more rigid operating protocols. 
Atkinson (1993) suggests that neo-institutionalism provides for a “… more complete 
understanding of constraint and creativity” (p. 26). The political realm is largely 
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about the sources, uses and structures of power through government and public 
policy. Atkinson goes on to argue that institutions: 
  
… are mechanisms, bundles of rules, through which choices are made and 
conflicts resolved. Institutions establish who is permitted to participate, how 
decision-making is to be accomplished, and what limits (if any) are to be 
placed on the range of possible outcomes. So, while human beings are 
central to institutions, institutions represent deliberate attempts to channel 
and constrain human behaviour (p. 6). 
 
 
Peters (1989) argues culture is comprised of three distinct spheres: societal; political; 
and administrative (Figure 2.2). This typology clearly demonstrates the integrated 
theory concept as all three of these spheres overlap and affect public administration, 
which is the development and implementation of public policy.  
 
Peters suggests that bureaucracies “… are bound by many thin but strong bonds to 
their societies and their values” (p. 40). The bond between the political culture and 
public administration is twofold: first, this bond connects the politicians with the 
bureaucracy; and second it joins those involved in political parties and organizations 
to the bureaucracy. Administrative culture is connected to public administration by 
both formal and informal organizations that are created by a common point of view 
in an attempt to exert influence on the development of public policy. Public 
administration is also bound by the cultural values of the particular society.  
 
At any one time, society will have views and opinions on what is acceptable for that 
society. These values then act as informal boundaries for those in the bureaucracy 
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developing public policies and regulations. With this model, Peters begins to 
identify the major stakeholders within a public policy process and attempts to 
demonstrate how the authority of these stakeholders overlaps with the authority of 
the other stakeholders to create the concept of an integrated policy development and 
implementation that presently applies to the regulation of agricultural biotechnology. 
 
Figure 2.2: Culture and Public Administration 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Peters, 1989. 
 
Another conceptualization of political institutions is offered by Brooks. Brooks 
(1989) works from the public choice model of public policy and argues that this 
model “… represents an attempt to explain political behaviour, including the policy 
decisions of governments, in terms of a theory of individual choice developed in 
microeconomics” (p. 49-50). He notes that none of the stakeholders in this model 
(Figure 2.3) acts single-mindedly, but rather that each stakeholder works to limit or 
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restrict the goals of the other stakeholders. The typology shown below focuses on 
four areas of interplay, the central area where all there inner spheres overlap and the 
three areas of overlap between two of the stakeholders. The electorate does not 
participate directly in the public policy formation process, but are important and it is 
the electorate that chooses the players within the politician sphere. Brooks argues 
that public policy is a “… continuous and multi-level process of bargaining in which 
power is based on control over resources that can be used as the basis for profitable 
exchange” (p. 53).  
 
Figure 2.3: The Policy Process Viewed from the Public Choice Perspective: 
Four Interrelated Games 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Brooks, 1989. 
 
While Brooks goes on to cite some of the short-comings of this model, the concept 
of the interaction among the three internal stakeholders (i.e. politicians, special 
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interest groups and bureaucrats), the media and the electorate is an important 
contributing concept to the development of the methodology for this research. The 
crucial point from this model is the center where all three stakeholder spheres 
overlap, as this is where Brooks suggests the key to the decision making process 
exists. 
 
Coleman and Skogstad (1990) discuss the role of policy networks in relation to the 
development of public policy. They argue that a government department's or 
agency’s ability to control or limit access to a policy network ultimately dictates the 
outcome of the policy process. Policy networks then, are those groups of state, 
society and industry stakeholders that exert the influence they possess in an attempt 
to create a public policy that is most favourable to their position. They suggest that 
these relationships are very formal, adversarial and increasingly technocratic. In 
relation to biotechnology, the latter two relationship characteristics are certainly 
true, however, it is a difficult argument to say that these relationships are formal in 
nature. While it is true that the regulatory process is very formal in that the 
regulations for products of biotechnology have all been codified, the relationship 
among the stakeholders is presently very informal. This innovation is too new to 
have developed highly formal policy network relationships. 
 
Pal (1997) takes the work of Coleman and Skogstad and further develops the idea of 
policy networks and how they relate to public policy analysis. Pal offers five 
different types of policy networks: pressure pluralist, where groups promote 
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developed policies rather than participating in the policy development process; 
clientele pluralist, where the state relies on and even allows associations to 
participate in policy development; corporate, where groups and the state participate 
in policy development and implementation; concertation, where state and 
association are equal partners in the policy process; and state-directed, where the 
state dominates the policy process. Pal offers a typology that focuses on what 
considerations go into creating public policy (Figure 2.4).  
 
Figure 2.4: Elements of Policy Content 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Pal, 1997. 
 
The above typology shows how the theoretical thinking has become integrated. The 
typology has three distinct spheres: problem definition; instruments; and goals; and 
these spheres are connected by an additional loop that ultimately ties the whole 
Problem Definition 
• Recognition 
• Definition 
• Appearance of problems in 
clusters 
• Causality
Goals 
• Intermediate vs. ultimate 
• Specific vs. general or 
vague 
• Policy goal vs. real goal 
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• Theoretically a wide menu 
• Distinct from implementation 
• Constrained by legitimacy, 
legality and practically 
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process together. This typology demonstrates how aspects of importance in one 
sphere spill over and affect aspects of the other two spheres, which is the major 
focus of this methodology. 
 
The political science literature offers a variety of policy analysis models. Aspects of 
these typologies that relate to governance and a better understanding of the public 
policy process have been incorporated into the model developed to examine 
transformative technologies such as biotechnology. 
 
 
2.3.1 Summary 
The critical aspects of political science theory are highlighted in Table 2.3. The 
critical contributions of these four authors provide this methodology with a thorough 
ability to understand the subtleties and nuances of governance and public policy 
development. Incorporating the concepts from these models has provided this model 
with the flexibility necessary to identify where communication gaps exist as well as 
identifying which stakeholders in the regulatory process are capable of exerting the 
greatest level of influence on decision makers. 
 
A common theme for the theoretical contributions regarding governance theory is 
the influences that are applied to the policy development process. The contributions 
from these four authors all examine the decision making process, but each does so 
from a unique perspective.  
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Table 2.3: Critical elements of governance theory 
 
Author Key concept Critical theoretical 
contribution 
Implication for model 
Dye Criteria to 
evaluate 
effectiveness 
of policy 
models 
Policy models should 
reflect reality and 
communicate 
something meaningful. 
This model represents all 
stakeholders and addresses 
the management of liabilities. 
Peters Culture and 
public 
administration 
model 
Administrative, 
political and social 
cultures attempt to 
influence policy. 
This model identifies the 
conflict between science- 
based and socio-economic 
based regulations. 
Brooks Public choice 
model 
The key to the decision 
making process is the 
center of stakeholder 
overlap. 
By including the role of 
industry, this model provides 
an accurate analysis of 
interaction within the central 
overlap. 
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Pal Elements of 
policy content 
model 
Policy networks have 
an impact on public 
policy. 
This model concentrates on 
the relationship of the inner 
stakeholders by creating areas 
of overlap to show that the 
actions of one, directly affect 
the actions of the others. 
 
 
Dye examines governance models and suggests that models have to reflect political 
reality, which is important, since if the model is not representative of reality, the 
results may be less meaningful. Peters discusses how various cultures attempt to 
influence policy development. This is important to this thesis given the cultural 
change regarding the acceptance of biotechnology and GM foods over the past 
decade. Brooks highlights the importance of overlap and suggests that the areas of 
overlap are key to the decision making process. There is considerable governance 
overlap in biotechnology and this is an important contribution to this research. Pal 
focuses on the importance of policy networks and the impact that the actions of one 
stakeholder has on the actions of other stakeholders. Pal’s research is valuable given 
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his focus on policy networks and the development of these networks. This research 
is used to show how policy networks have developed within biotechnology. 
 
 
2.4   Risk Literature 
Shrader-Frechette (1990) has written extensively about risk and has focused on the 
difference between perceived risks and actual risks. She argues that all risks are 
perceived, but there are criteria for why some risk perceptions are viewed as more 
objective than others. She offers eight reasons why actual risks are not typically 
distinguishable from perceived risks: 
i) risk probabilities do not reflect risk frequencies; 
ii) actual risk estimates are rough and imprecise; 
iii) aspects of hazard, real or perceived, are not quantifiable; 
iv) risk is theoretical not a precise empirical confirmation; 
v) risk perceptions often affect risk probabilities and it is frequently impossible 
to distinguish hazards from perceptions; 
vi) distinction between actual and perceived risk should not be left to ‘allegedly 
objective’ experts; 
vii) perceived risk is not an erroneous understanding of actual risk; and 
viii) there is no distinction because there are only perceived risks. 
 
Ultimately, Shrader-Frechette is arguing that experts are not always right (nor 
objective) and this is a factor in society's lack of understanding regarding 
perceptions of risk. 
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Traditional risk assessment theory suggests that risk is a combination of the level of 
adverse effects of the agent to other organisms and the length and level of exposure. 
This can be expressed in the following formula: 
RISK = HAZARD x EXPOSURE 
If the time of exposure is brief (fractions of a second) or low and the level of hazard 
is a high dosage, the level of risk would be low or minimal (i.e. receiving an x-ray). 
Science has used this formula to evaluate whether initial research findings should 
proceed or be halted. However, scientists who use this formula assume that those 
involved with the innovation properly understand its uses and applications, and the 
formula does not factor in human error. 
 
Sandman (1994) has argued that regulators should instead use the following formula 
for understanding consumer perceptions of risk: 
RISK = HAZARD x OUTRAGE 
Sandman believes the old formula underestimated the actual level of risk because it 
ignored outrage. Public concern is focused on whether the risk is acceptable rather 
than on the scientific perceived level of public risk. This has important implications 
for risk communication, as food safety institutions must address consumer outrage in 
their response to the risk assessment. Outrage in relationship to GM foods was that 
consumers were outraged that it was present, not with the tolerance levels that were 
established for co-mingling of GM and non-GM products. The challenge of 
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assessing outrage is how to accommodate outrage when society wants zero risk, 
which is unachievable. 
 
Publicly managed risk analysis systems are vital to creating trust. Van den Daele, et 
al., (1997) identify three types of risk that affect the safety of products and consumer 
perceptions of those risks: 
• Probabilistic risks involve those theoretically grounded and empirically 
demonstrated risks related to the product or its technology. The methods and 
much of the evidence are available in peer-reviewed journals or public records. 
• Hypothetical risks, in contrast, involve those possibilities that are grounded in 
accepted theory but lack empirical experience or evidence that can establish 
probabilities. Most of these can be identified in academic literature. 
• Speculative risks, in contrast to the other two areas, have neither established 
theory nor experience to back them up. Those speculative risks that have much 
basis can often be found in working papers or other developing literature. 
Beyond that, almost any correlation can be made to show the potential for risk, 
irrespective of whether there is any theoretical basis for the possibility. 
 
Risk assessment systems should be able to effectively handle risk analysis, which is 
relatively mechanistic, and likely should be able to handle risk management. Risk 
communication, however, is extremely complex for agricultural biotechnology 
because of the wide array of speculative issues that science cannot adequately 
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respond to. In absence of complete certainty about, or at least significant experience 
with a new technology or product, risk assessment systems must inherently be based 
on institutional governance approaches that have historically provided trust as a 
means of providing consumer safety assurance. In turn, trust is instilled as a result of 
reactions to risk assessments that are carried out by institutions. Trust grows as risk 
analysis involves elements of social concern and risk management procedures 
address public concerns. Finally, trust is firmly embedded in the public through the 
success of the risk communication process that develops over time. Strong 
institutions are crucial for successful and trustworthy products resulting from 
transformative innovations. 
 
Stanbury (2000) writes about the regulation of risk from a Canadian perspective and 
focuses on the Canadian government's risk management activities. He offers eight 
‘routine pathologies’ that the government is subjected to: 
 
i) insufficient or poor economic analysis; 
ii) no guidance (from the Treasury Board) on the economic value of life; 
iii) idiosyncratic or haphazard selection of risks for government action; 
iv) “silo management” or a lack of “horizontal mechanisms” to implement a 
general risk management policy across a score of specialized departments 
and agencies; 
v) government actions being too often based on preference of the most fearful; 
vi) one-size-fits-all types of government action to deal with risks; 
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vii) potential misuse of the precautionary principle; and 
viii) poor risk communication. 
 
These criticisms are leveled against all departments of the Federal Government, not 
specifically against those involved with the regulation of biotechnology. However 
they can still be applied to those regulating biotechnology. 
 
Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff provide one possible method of analyzing the interaction 
among the institutions of academia, industry and the state, which is known as the 
Triple Helix. The underlying theme of Triple Helix analysis of innovation is to 
examine the dynamics occurring among the three stakeholders: government; 
industry; and academia. Most discussions regarding the Triple Helix typology of 
innovation analysis refer to the third version, or Triple Helix III. The initial 
typology, Triple Helix I, was a very institutionalized typology, where the 
relationship between government, industry and academia was largely controlled or 
directed by the state (Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff, 2000). The Triple Helix II 
relationship can be described as individual spheres with lines of communication that 
operate with high levels of mistrust and suspicion. Triple Helix III is the typology 
that most realistically represents the existing relationships in industrialized 
economies. In this typology, government, industry and academia are again 
represented by distinct spheres, but all three spheres overlap each other (Figure 2.5). 
The center of this typology, where all three spheres overlap, is characterized by 
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trilateral networks and hybrid organizations (Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff, 2000). 
Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff argue that the common objective of this typology is  
“… to realize an innovative environment development, and strategic alliances 
among firms, government laboratories, and academic research groups” (p. 112). This 
typology highlights the integration of academia, industry and state and shows the 
arrangement of innovation analysis that it is designed to identify the dynamics and 
the impact of these dynamics on the three stakeholders. 
 
Figure 2.5: The Triple Helix Model of University-Industry-Government 
Relations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff, 2000. 
 
 
There has been very little discussion about the potential role of a fourth helix, which 
is defined as the public. Baber (2001) briefly mentions the concept of a fourth helix, 
in suggesting that visiting teams of prominent research scientists in developing 
countries could be conceived as a fourth helix. In developing this further, Mehta 
(2002) argues that the regulation of biotechnology has been “… made unnecessarily 
complex and inherently unstable due to a failure to consult the public early and often 
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enough” (p. 1). Public acceptance of innovation is crucial to successful 
commercialization and products sales. Without an accepting public, the full potential 
of the innovation may not be realized. 
 
This section of literature focuses on risk and discusses the importance of the public's 
inclusion into decision making processes. The models that have been highlighted in 
this section focus on the integrated aspect of industry, state and society. When 
consideration is given to the inclusion of a fourth helix, public opinion, the 
applicability of these models to this research topic increases dramatically. 
 
 
2.4.1 Summary 
The contribution of these authors and concepts demonstrate the importance for 
society to have meaningful input into regulatory processes, even though science-
based risk assessments processes do not allow for social input. This is not to say that 
consumers should be allowed to dictate regulations to government and industry, but 
rather that their concerns and questions be seriously addressed and informative 
responses provided. While the Canadian regulatory system does not incorporate 
these social concerns and industry is very opposed to move away from science-
based regulation, social concerns can not continue to be outside of the regulatory 
process. The inclusion of societal actors will distinguish between those actors that 
have legitimate concerns and those seeking media attention. The action of societal 
actors with legitimate concerns that are included in preliminary regulatory 
discussions will increase the transparency of the regulatory process, thereby 
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providing those who could not find the answer to their questions with factual based 
information. The critical aspects for the methodology of this thesis from the risk 
literature are identified in Table 2.4. 
 
Table 2.4: Critical elements of sociology theory 
 
Author 
 
Key 
concept 
Critical theoretical 
contribution 
Implication for model 
Sandman Importance 
of outrage 
Public is more concerned 
about the presence of a 
risk rather than the level 
of the risk. 
This model will allow users to 
determine what level of liability 
communication exists within a 
particular regulatory structure. 
van den 
Daele 
Classifica-
tions of 
risk 
Properly managed risk 
analysis systems are vital 
to the creation of trust. 
This model can be used to identify 
which stakeholders are legally and 
contractually responsible for the 
management of liabilities.  
Etzkowitz 
and 
Leydes-
dorff 
Triple helix 
model 
The dynamics of the 
interaction between 
academia, state and 
industry. 
Incorporating the dynamics of these 
relationships with the dynamics of 
society are the focus of the model. R
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Baber and 
Mehta 
Role of the 
4th helix 
The ability for societal 
participants to have their 
opinions and concerns 
addressed. 
This model incorporates all four 
helixes; state, industry and society 
are the three helixes represented in 
the core of the model while the 
fourth helix of academics surrounds 
the inner three. 
 
One unifying theme that reaches across this section of literature are the numerous 
dynamics of risk and their applicability to the broader society. The ability to 
perceive risks varies individually and this factor is increasingly important. Present 
day societies are becoming increasingly concerned about the safety of the food that 
is consumed on a daily basis and are demanding additional information on the 
quality of food products.  
 
Sandman identifies that consumers will not be reassured by knowing that a risk may 
be within a defined tolerance level, but will be outraged that there is a possibility of 
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the risk even occurring. Van den Daele, et al., provide a classification of risks, and 
this structure is valuable in that it attempts to classify risks into categories that can 
be responded to by peer reviewed data and those that will have to be addressed 
through alternative methods. Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff offer a dynamic model that 
explores the interaction among stakeholders and offers insights into the relationships 
that exist within the areas of overlap. These insights are an important contribution to 
this research as one focus of this research is to identify the relationships and the 
dynamics of these relationships within the regulatory framework for biotechnology 
in Canada. The recent research by Baber and Mehta regarding a fourth helix is 
important, as they address one of the shortcomings of the Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff 
diagram, the non-inclusion of society.  
 
 
2.5 Conclusions 
The combination of these critical theoretical contributions result in a model designed 
to examine regulatory scenarios for the management of socio-economic liabilities. 
The fact that there is no common definition of risk or institution within these various 
literature streams is part of the problem associated with managing liabilities from 
technology transformations such as agricultural biotechnology. It is possible to view 
agricultural biotechnology as an institution on its own and all the actors and 
stakeholders can be positioned within this methodological framework, creating the 
possibility of developing one definition for institution and liability that can then be 
used to provide meaningful insight into how the potential for liabilities can be 
effectively managed by regulation. 
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Each of the three contributing disciplines has theory and structures for dealing with 
innovation. Economists offer advice on how firms and industry, together with 
governments and associations, can develop new, effective supply chains to 
differentiate products for different markets, at a price premium. Political scientists 
tend to use biotechnology to illustrate how public regulatory schemes are weakened 
when they ignore the core principles of effective public policy—transparency, 
accountability and responsibility. Sociologists suggest that many of the problems 
and uncertainties around transformative technologies can be moderated through 
more, new and better communications and debate. The problem is that each provides 
too narrow a perspective to resolve the problems of transformative technological 
change. 
 
Ultimately, each of these approaches has some application, but none alone will 
resolve the challenge of managing liabilities of a transformative technology. Each 
would manage one or more liabilities of the technology, but often at the expense of 
creating a new liability. Chapter 3 explores in greater detail how an interdisciplinary 
approach can be applied to this issue. 
 
The management of liabilities will increase in importance with greater 
implementation of the BioSafety Protocol. International discussions and 
consultations will began in the fall of 2004. One option available to stakeholders 
within agricultural biotechnology is to do nothing and let the existing systems adapt 
and resolve any liabilities that might arise from the introduction and use of 
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agricultural biotechnology. Without any further action, disputes about the 
technology would ultimately land in various administrative tribunals and civil 
courts. While this approach is often the most appropriate for an incremental 
technology, it is unlikely to be optimal for a transformative technology such as 
agricultural biotechnology. The potential impacts of the technology simply span too 
many domains. The claims and counterclaims will inevitably conflict. This research 
suggests that new institutions (e.g. new norms, formal and informal policy networks 
and the fourth helix) will need to be developed to ensure successful management of 
the use of this technology.  
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Chapter 3 
 
Conceptual Constructs for this Research Project 
 
 
3.1   Introduction 
This chapter identifies the specific contributions from the previous chapter and 
demonstrates how the theory and typologies discussed there can be utilized in an 
interdisciplinary research approach to develop a conceptual construct that is capable 
of assessing liability in relation to innovation. To demonstrate how these conceptual 
constructs were developed, the key contributions summarized in Tables 2.2, 2.3 and 
2.4 are applied to build, piece by piece, the conceptual construct used for this thesis. 
The intent is to demonstrate how the theoretical contributions from each academic 
discipline can be drawn together into a new structure that provides the opportunity to 
critically assess transformative technologies.  
 
Section 3.2 discusses the legal framework and shows how it is applied to the issue of 
liability management. This section focuses on the various legal terminologies that 
can be applied to liability issues concerning transgenic crops. Section 3.3 introduces 
the concept of socio-economic liability and provides a definition and explanation of 
this concept. Section 3.4 demonstrates the development of the framework used to 
examine socio-economic liability. It outlines how the theoretical contributions from 
Chapter 2 can be drawn together into a single framework for assessing technological 
 53
transformations. This process of construction is undertaken step-by-step and 
highlights what specific contribution has been drawn from the preceding chapter. 
Section 3.5 shows the final methodology in its entirety and explains the theoretical 
elements and practical conditions of the framework. This section will provide the 
details of the framework and identify the key areas that are the focus on this 
research. Section 3.6 applies this framework to the issue of liability. This section 
uses the developed framework to visually identify how the subsequent four chapters 
relate to the methodology and shows the reader what specifically will be addressed 
in each of the four chapters. 
 
 
3.2   The Legal Framework to Liability Management 
Legally, a liability results when an obligation is not fulfilled or when there is a 
failure to comply with previously defined requirements. From this legal perspective, 
there are only two kinds of liability—criminal and civil. Criminal liability occurs 
when there has been a criminal act committed, i.e. when someone breaks the law of 
the land. Criminal liability in relation to agricultural biotechnology is not the key 
issue, as no firm or individual has been tried for a criminal infraction. 
 
Civil liability arises when an obligation has not been met by a party and can result in 
litigation for compensation on behalf of those affected. Lawsuits from those affected 
by thalidomide and silicone breast implants are examples of civil liability. The 
remainder of this section examines the areas of civil liability law that have been 
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applied to agricultural biotechnology in several court cases. Some of the cases have 
already been dealt with by the courts and some are still presently before the courts. 
Varying Statements of Claim filed by plaintiffs have sought damages for negligence, 
strict liability, nuisance, trespass, and pollution. Various lawsuits have also accused 
seed development firms of failing to conduct environmental impact assessments 
prior to the release of transgenic crops. This section examines each of the above 
concepts and claims. 
 
Negligence 
In negligence law, defendants are not responsible for every consequence of a 
negligent act. In other words, there are limitations on the impacts of a negligent act. 
The tort of negligence has three key components: the negligent act; causation; and 
damages. Proof of negligent liability has to include all three components. The focus 
of this section will be on the first component, the negligent act, as the intent is to 
provide an analysis of the issue rather than delve into the causation and damages of 
specific biotechnology cases. 
 
The examination of a negligent act focuses on foreseeability, duty of care and 
standard of care. The question of foreseeability emanates from the decision of the 
Privy Council in Overseas Tankship (U.K.) Ltd. v. Morts Dock and Engineering Co. 
Ltd., The Wagon Mound (No.1) [1961] A.C. 388 (P.C.). Foreseeability in this case 
was seen to be based on three separate but linkable events. First, when furnace oil 
was discharged by the boat ‘Wagon Mound’ into the harbour (this case is referred to 
as the Wagon Mound case), it was foreseeable that this oil would spread. Second, it 
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was foreseeable that if the oil spread it could be ignited as a result of some unrelated 
event. Third, when a fire ignited due to some welding that was taking place, it was 
foreseeable that property damage could be expected. Based upon the Wagon Mound 
case, it is possible to apply this series of three ‘what-if’ questions to applications of 
new innovative products or processes. 
 
This series of events could be the justification for asking seed development firms 
three ‘what-if’ questions regarding the foreseeability of, for example, GM pollen 
spreading. It would be realistic to pose the following three questions. First, should 
officials in seed development firms or federal regulatory scientists have known that 
the pollen from some transgenic plants had the potential to travel great distances? 
Second, should these officials or scientists have been able to predict that if 
transgenic plants were widely adopted that the pollen would be widely dispersed? 
Third, should these officials or scientists have known that the transgenic pollen 
could land in fields where it was not wanted? 
 
When faced with addressing these questions, the answers are blatantly apparent. The 
response to the first question can only be affirmative; most farmers know that pollen 
has the ability to travel great distances. The response to the second question would 
also be positive, as it is a logical progression from the first question in that if 
transgenic crops were rapidly and widely adopted, likewise would be the dispersion 
of pollen. It seems improbable that anyone could argue anything but yes to the third 
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question, as it would be physically impossible to prevent the transgenic pollen from 
landing in or on other fields once it had been released.  
 
Based on the above, the biotechnology industry would be wise to concede 
foreseeability to plaintiffs. This would then shift the key focus of the debate to the 
issues of duty of care and standard of care. However, the concession of 
foreseeability would imply that there is a prima facie duty of care owed to the 
farming community at large. One could successfully argue that there were sufficient 
data available at the time of variety approval to justify foreseeability. 
 
The focus would then examine whether there were sufficient conditions to establish 
a duty of care. Osborne (2000) offers a standard definition of what constitutes duty 
of care. Duty of care is described as “… a question of law which requires the judge 
to determine if the defendant is under a legal obligation to exercise reasonable care 
in favour of the plaintiff” (Ch. 2, p. 1). This definition of duty of care is very broad 
and open to varying interpretations. 
 
The application of duty of care ultimately focuses on two key factors: Who was 
harmed and what is the nature of the relationship between the party suffering harm 
and the party causing harm? Those suffering harm can range from a single 
individual, as in the case of Donaghue v. Stevenson [1932] A.C. 562 (H.L.), or it can 
be a large group of people, such as the women that suffered from faulty silicone 
breast implants. While defining who was harmed as it relates to duty of care is rarely 
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a contentious issue, determining the nature of the relationship is frequently a 
contentious issue. 
 
In the case of Donaghue v. Stevenson the nature of the relationship was the 
contentious issue. The facts of this case from the early 1930s are that Mrs. 
Donaghue and a friend went to a restaurant, where her friend purchased two bottles 
of ginger beer. The bottles were opaque and Mrs. Donaghue poured some of her 
beer into a glass and drank this portion of the beer. She then poured the remainder of 
the bottle into the glass, at which point, the remains of a snail floated in the glass. 
Mrs. Donaghue became physically ill from consuming the ginger beer. The brewer 
of the ginger beer, Stevenson, claimed that since Mrs. Donaghue had not purchased 
the beer directly, there was no duty of care owed to Mrs. Donaghue. The British 
House of Lords disagreed with this argument and ruled that the “… manufacturer of 
products does owe a duty to the ultimate consumer to take reasonable care to prevent 
defects in its products which are likely to cause damage to a person or property” 
(Osborne, 2000, Ch. 1, p. 1).  
 
More recently, the definition of duty of care has been more narrowly defined by 
Lord Wilberforce in Anns v. Merton London Borough Council [Note 79: [1978] 
A.C. 728 (H.L.)]. In this decision he states: 
 
First one has to ask whether, as between the alleged wrongdoer and the 
person who has suffered damage there is a sufficient relationship of 
proximity or neighbourhood such that, in the reasonable contemplation of the 
former, carelessness on his part may be likely to cause damage to the latter – 
in which case a prima facie duty of care arises. Secondly, if the first question 
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is answered affirmatively, it is necessary to consider whether there are any 
considerations which ought to negative, or to reduce or limit the scope of the 
duty or the class of person to whom it is owed or the damages to which a 
breach of may give rise (Osborne, 2000, Ch. 2, p. 2). 
 
The use of the Anns dictum suggests that where there is a relationship and there is 
reasonable foreseeability of damages, there would be a presumption of a prima facie 
duty of care. The Anns dictum also created a process for a more transparent 
discussion of duty of care issues. Osborne (2000) believes that it was important for 
two additional reasons. First, it created a presumption of a duty of care in all 
relationships, giving rise to a reasonable foreseeability of damage to the plaintiff; 
and second, it placed on the defendant the unenviable and sometimes considerable 
burden of persuading the court why the plaintiff did not deserve to be protected from 
his negligent conduct. 
 
While the Anns dictum originated in Britain, it is not used by British courts today. 
However, in Canada the Anns dictum has been consistently applied since the mid 
1980s. Canadian courts have interpreted the first stage of the Anns test, reasonable 
foreseeability, as demonstrating that reasonable foreseeability of damage was 
probable based on the actions of the defendants. As such, there are few issues arising 
from this stage of the Anns test. The second stage of the Anns test, factors affecting 
the relationship that may restrict damages, has been widely debated. Osborne 
believes this stage of the test:  
 
… permits a full and open debate about the societal costs and benefits of 
recognising a duty of care. It not only allows the prima facie duty to be 
negated, but it also allows this duty to be restricted or modified to meet 
policy concerns. For example, the courts may demand that some additional 
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element be found in the relationship, such as reliance by the plaintiff, an 
assumption of responsibility by the defendant, a specially close relationship, 
or some other element that defines the relationship more closely than 
foreseeability, before a duty will be recognised. (Osborne, Ch. 2, pp. 2-3, 
2000) 
 
Ultimately, the duty of care as it relates to agriculture can be analyzed using two key 
concepts. The first concept, as it relates to the introduction of new transgenic crop 
varieties, would examine whether there is any reasonable foreseeability of harm that 
may potentially arise from the introduction of a transgenic crop variety into the 
environment. Secondly, the concept requires consolidation of any policy reasons or 
considerations that may be applied to reduce or remove the identified damage.  
 
The first concept, reasonable foreseeability, would appear to be part of the 
regulatory review of the transgenic crop application. A science-based regulatory 
system examines all aspects for potential environmental harms. The fact that 
approval is granted for transgenic crop varieties would indicate that the issue of 
potential liabilities resulting from environmental harm have been analyzed 
thoroughly and the science of the day had deemed that the production, processing 
and consumption of the crop type and the resulting food products to be safe. When a 
new transgenic crop receives variety approval from the federal regulatory agency, 
the mandate of reasonable foreseeability of harm would appear to have been 
satisfied. There is a lingering doubt, however, whether theoretical, hypothetical or 
speculative risks, which usually are not addressed in regulatory systems due to 
inadequate evidence, might meet the test of foreseeability. 
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An examination of the second concept suggests there is a need to recognize that the 
boundaries between the role and authority of Parliament and the role and authority 
of the judiciary can in some instances become clouded. Some civil society issues can 
become very contentious due to the debates arising between Parliamentarians and 
within the professional legal community. However, one issue that the courts have 
routinely left to the discretion of Parliament is the distribution of wealth. 
Technological innovations, which frequently redistribute wealth, are thus covered by 
policy not law. 
 
This preference for choosing technology winners ultimately means that some group 
in society will lose. This concept is not new to present day innovations (the makers 
of buggy whips are the classic case of an industry that lost with the introduction of a 
new innovation, in that case, automobiles). North American society has generally 
chosen not to financially compensate industries or individuals that suffer financial 
loss due to innovation commercializations. Biotechnology companies can argue that 
they have properly followed all regulations relating to the commercialization of 
transgenic crop varieties and any losses in the agriculture industry are unfortunate 
but not their fault. Based on previous innovations, losers in agriculture could be 
expected, but North American policy (and even society at large) does not call for 
financial remuneration to flow to those that are adversely affected economically by 
the introduction of GM crops. 
 
 61
Those firms that have commercialized transgenic crops in North America can 
legitimately state that they have followed the federal regulatory process. Duty of 
care issues that fall into the socio-economic category may well be rejected by the 
judicial system given that there are no federal regulatory structures in place in North 
America that would justify their inclusion. Courts that are faced with tort cases 
claiming large financial damages due to the introduction of transgenic crop 
technology may decide that they do not want to rule on the re-distribution of wealth 
resulting from this technology and may instead suggest that this is a policy matter 
better dealt with in the political process. 
 
There is ample precedence for this. Fleming (1983) notes: 
 
For some situations the appropriate standard of conduct is prescribed by the 
legislature instead of being left to the evaluative process of judge and jury. 
The complexity of modern life has spawned a profuse progeny of 
governmental regulations, demanding observance of fixed and specific 
precautions for the safety of industrial operations, building construction, road 
traffic and so forth. (p.117) 
 
This removes any debate regarding the principle of standard of care. The 
Government of Canada, through the CFIA, has examined and tested transgenic crops 
and deemed them to be substantially equivalent to the existing varieties and has 
allowed their registration for commercial purposes. Given that the seed development 
companies have complied with the government regulations and are legally entitled to 
sell transgenic seed anywhere in Canada, the courts may choose to recognize that 
any liability resulting from negligence would not be allowed in deference to policy. 
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Trespass and Nuisance 
Some have argued crosspollination is a form of trespass or nuisance. Making an 
argument claiming trespass against the production of transgenic crops would seem to 
be difficult. In the decision in Philips v. California Standard Co. (1960), 31 W.W.R. 
331 (Alta. S.C.) the judge identifies that in England and Canada trespass involves a 
physical entry on the property of another. While there is no physical entry in the 
sense of a human or an animal entering a property, there is physical entry of GM 
pollen. There have been some agriculture cases of trespass involving livestock but 
there are no known cases of legal action based on plants, portions of plants or weeds. 
Existing case law suggests that trespass only pertains to entries that can be 
physically prevented. To be successful in arguing that GM pollen should have been 
controlled would mean proving that the CFIA was negligent when approving GM 
canola. As a result, it would be doubtful that an argument based upon trespass could 
succeed5. 
 
Nuisance cases may be equally problematic. There are two variations of nuisance, 
private and public. Private nuisance can be defined as a substantial and reasonable 
interference with the use and enjoyment of land. In public nuisance there has to be a 
defined group or class of individuals that has perceived harm at the hands of another.  
 
                                                          
5 Kershen, 2004, offers a different perspective on this argument by examining Canadian and 
American application of trespass case law to transgenic crops. Kershen argues that the law of stray 
animals provides valuable insight for producers that are faced with the inadvertent presence of 
transgenic crops. 
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While the discussions regarding nuisance are many, the decision of Lord Lloyd of 
Berwick in Hunter v. Canary Wharf Ltd. (1997) NLOR No. 324 NLC 197044701 
provides a very concise definition of private nuisance: 
 
Private nuisances are of three kinds. They are (1) nuisance by encroachment 
on a neighbour’s land; (2) nuisance by direct physical injury to a neighbour’s 
land; and (3) nuisance by interference with a neighbour’s quiet enjoyment of 
his land. In the case of encroachment the plaintiff may have a remedy by way 
of abatement. In other cases he may be entitled to an injunction. But where 
he claims damages, the measure of damage in cases (1) and (2) will be the 
diminution in the value of the land. This will usually (though not always) be 
equal to the cost of reinstatement. The loss resulting from diminution in the 
value of the land is a loss suffered by the owner or occupier with the 
exclusive right to possession (as the case may be) or both, since it is they 
alone who have a proprietary interest, or stake, in the land. (Notes 39 and 40) 
 
An examination of the three kinds of nuisance is insightful. The first, encroachment, 
would only apply if it could be physically proven that GM pollen has encroached on 
the land of another producer. This argument would presumably follow the logic 
needed to prove trespass. Thus, it may be difficult to claim nuisance if there is no 
proof of encroachment. 
 
The second form of nuisance, direct physical injury to a neighbour’s land, may be a 
possible argument if the presence of GM pollen can be viewed as a direct injury. 
Pollen from any plant species is only viable for a few hours, thus making it 
challenging to demonstrate how the presence of GM canola pollen, for example, 
could be viewed as an injury to the land. The pollen from GM canola could be an 
indirect damage, as it may affect the plants growing on the land, but the pollen can 
not physically damage the land. 
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If an argument were made for physical injury, the damages awarded would be for 
the decrease in the value of the land or the cost or restoring the land to its original 
form. The latter option would only be possible with the complete ban of GM crops 
in Canada and the US. To show a decrease in land value would be extremely 
problematic, as there is no identifiable market for land that has not produced a GM 
crop. It would be very problematic in North America to try and determine what, if 
any, market premium exists for land that has not produced a GM crop.  
 
The third kind of nuisance, interference with enjoyment of land, also seems a 
challenging argument, as pollen, in the conventional sense, is not an irritant about 
which individuals complain. Public nuisance is more difficult to prove than private 
nuisance, as proof of special damage must be made. Successful public nuisance 
cases have occurred where some form of toxic material is released by a company 
into a local body of water and poisons most or all of the local aquatic wildlife, thus 
being a public nuisance to local fishermen. A caveat to this is if ‘interference with 
enjoyment of the land’ can be interpreted to have a financial meaning. If a court 
decides that a farmer’s financial enjoyment has been affected, the importance of 
nuisance may increase. 
 
Furthermore, individual farmers are also often protected from nuisance suits. In 
Canada, for example, The Agriculture Operations Act of Saskatchewan states: 
 
The owner or operator of an agricultural operation is not liable to any person 
in nuisance with respect to the carrying on of the agricultural operation, and 
may not be prevented by injunction or other order of any court from carrying 
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on the agricultural operation on the grounds of nuisance where the owner or 
operator uses normally accepted agricultural practices with respect to the 
agricultural operations. (p. 5) 
A very important issue that develops from the above quote is how much time has to 
pass before a new technology is ‘consistent with accepted customs and standards’. 
Two cases of aerial crop spraying may shed light on the issue. In the case of 
Mihalchuk v. Ratke (1966) 57 D.L.R. (2d) 269 a lawsuit arose from an aerial spray 
application made in 1965 and the judge noted that this was an unusual operation. 
The second case, Cruise v. Niessen (1977) 82 D.L.R. (3d) 190 is based on an aerial 
application made in 1975 and the judge noted that aerial spraying is no longer 
viewed as unusual. In the case of aerial spraying, ten years was enough to make this 
technology a common practice. Including the crop produced in 2004, genetically 
modified crops have now been grown for ten years. The transgenic canola acreage 
for 2003 was between 65% and 70% of all canola acres in the province. Two out of 
three canola growers use this crop technology and it has become a very popular 
option for weed management practices.  
 
Strict Liability 
The issue of strict liability is also relevant to transgenic crops. Typically, strict 
liabilities are found for one-time occurrences, such as is the case of Rylands v. 
Fletcher (1868), L.R. 3 H.L. 330, affg L.R. 1 Ex. 265. The ruling in Rylands v. 
Fletcher is based on the premise that an item or product not naturally occurring, but 
being stored on one's land may be inherently dangerous. In this case from Britain, 
Fletcher owned a mill and he constructed a reservoir to supply it with water. During 
the construction of the reservoir, the contractors discovered five long-abandoned 
vertical shafts. Not knowing they were abandoned mineshafts, the shafts were filled 
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with soil. The reservoir was partially filled with water and shortly afterwards one of 
the soil-filled shafts gave way, flooding the nearby coal mine owned by Rylands. 
Rylands sued Fletcher for the destruction of his mine. The ruling in Rylands v. 
Fletcher describes the item or product being stored on one’s land as not naturally 
occurring and therefore, this product is inherently dangerous. In this case, creating a 
large inland body of water was viewed as a dangerous activity. This ruling has three 
important considerations for any GM cases: first, the drift of GM pollen is not a one-
time occurrence, rather it happens annually for a period of 3-6 weeks; secondly, it 
would seem impossible to argue that GM pollen is stored in any form or fashion 
upon a farm; and finally, there are no scientific arguments that can be made in 
favour of the GM pollen being inherently dangerous, given that regulatory agencies 
have approved these varieties for all uses in both Canada and the US. 
 
Pollution 
Some have claimed that GM pollen is a form of pollution as defined under 
environmental protection legislation. Most existing pollution legislation refers to the 
discharge of a pollutant, defining the obligations of an owner of the pollutant and of 
those who control a pollutant that causes the damage or loss. It is important to note 
that legislation of this kind refers to the discharge of hazardous substances. The 
requirements for a product to be listed as a hazardous substance are that the product 
has the potential to harm the environment, human health and/or other living 
organisms. Such substances are usually listed in some form in a related 
environmental act.  
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Discharge as it relates to GM crops will vary, depending on whether it is applied to 
the GM seed or the GM pollen. There is no doubt that GM seeds have been 
deliberately discharged into the environment by seed development companies after 
receiving approval for unconditional release by federal regulators. In North 
America, the federal government approved the release (and thereby the discharge) of 
GM crops. Discharge as it relates to the pollen is a very complex issue to assess. 
Pollen from GM plants is released, dispersed or emitted into the environment just 
like the pollen of every other plant. The difficulty of this in a court of law would be 
how could a farmer who has been negatively affected identify which field was 
responsible for dispersing GM pollen.  
 
Both ‘owner of a pollutant’ and the ‘person having control of a pollutant’ prior to 
first discharge include successor, assignee, executor or administrator of the owner or 
person. Executor and administrator are not applicable in this case by definition. One 
issue of importance is whether the use of a Technical Use Agreement (TUA) 
between the seed provider and the farmer identifies the farmer that signs the TUA as 
either a successor or assignee. Black’s Law Dictionary (1979) defines assignment as, 
“… a transfer or making over to another of the whole of any property, real or 
personal, in possession or in action, or of any estate or rights therein. … the transfer 
by a party of all of its rights to some kind of property, usually intangible property 
such as rights in a lease, mortgage, agreement of sale or a partnership” (p.109). 
Based on this definition, a TUA would not be an assignment of property. Rather, it 
is an agreement that allows the farmer to use the technology in exchange for a fee, 
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and it remains the property of the technology owner. Arguably, the enforcement of 
intellectual property rights embedded in patents and Plant Breeders Rights would 
similarly vest ownership in the technology provider. 
 
The definition of pollutant and pollution and their relation to GM pollen will be 
crucial to the success of any potential lawsuit. We do know that GM seed and pollen 
are not currently listed as hazardous substances in any country and there are no 
published data to suggest that consumption of these products is physically harmful. 
The organic industry argues the existence of GM pollen is harmful to its agricultural 
use of the environment. However, it must be made very clear that harm as it is 
applied in the organic sense is not harm in the physical sense of the word—the 
application of the word harm in this case is financial. The question courts will be 
asked to decide upon is whether harm as it is applied within the definition of 
pollution extends to financial harm. 
 
Some opponents of agricultural biotechnology have tried to advance the argument 
that GM crops should have been subjected to more extensive environmental 
assessments by all levels of government, be they federal and state or provincial. The 
regulation and approval of plants Canada is exclusively a national responsibility—
no sub-national government has yet developed legislation regarding the regulation of 
plants and many are constitutionally prevented from doing so.  
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3.3   The Problem of Socio-Economic Liability 
For the purpose of this research, a socio-economic liability is defined as the decline 
in social trust for all innovations and the economic decline from commercialization 
delays when a company or government regulatory body fails to meet its publicly 
stated objectives, which are, ultimately, their social responsibility.  
 
The differentiating feature between socio-economic liabilities and conventional legal 
applications of liability is that, with socio-economic liabilities, there is often no 
direct identifiable failure. Because there does not need to be an identifiable failure, 
there is no possibility of foreseeability and, therefore, no standard or duty of care 
exists between the social challenge and the owner of the innovation. This form of 
liability has no direct causation and firms that operate well outside the area of the 
innovation can be negatively affected by the actions of other firms in the industry. 
 
When a regulatory failure occurs, the resulting media coverage has the ability to 
affect social perceptions of innovation. Negative media coverage will result in some 
consumers that were initially indifferent to a specific innovation becoming 
concerned about it or possibly even opposed to innovation in general. The bottom 
line is there is a loss of social trust in innovation, be it specific or general. This is not 
to say that the decline in trust will always be long term, or that it can not be 
reversed, but rather that there will be fewer consumers willing to express support for 
an innovation or the resulting commercial products.  
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Regulatory failure increases the likelihood that commercialization will be delayed, 
creating negative economic consequences. As we have seen, Heller (1995) has 
estimated that a one-year delay in commercializing an innovation reduces the rate of 
return on investment for a new product by 2.8%, while a two-year delay results in a 
reduction of 5.2%.  
 
The absence of criminal or civil liabilities does not negate the fact that when a 
regulatory failure occurs, there are social externalities that are ultimately borne by 
other firms and by consumers. While these externalities may not generate a level of 
harm that is large or severe enough to trigger litigation for compensation, a socio-
economic liability is created with regulatory failures.  
 
Current Court Action on Liability 
There is a clear delineation in the approach taken by North American governments 
opposed to that taken by the EU and in the government member states. The EU has 
adopted a precautionary, go-slow approach and has placed a de facto moratorium on 
the commercialization of transgenic crop varieties. The EU moratorium was lifted in 
April 2004 but it is yet to be seen how quickly GM comercializations will take 
place. North American governments have moved to legislate in favour of this 
technology and have approved numerous transgenic crop varieties. 
 
Most court cases in Europe to date have dealt with the opponents of GM crops and 
their destruction of test plots. Meanwhile, European governments are examining 
their existing liability laws to determine if they adequately address potential lawsuits 
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involving co-mingling or the unintended presence of GM crops. For instance, the 
recent UK study on co-existence of GM crops recommends that compensation be 
made available to those that suffer financial loses due to the presence of GM crops 
through no fault of their own (AEBC, 2003).  
 
Over the past few years there have been a variety of court cases in North America 
involving liability. Given that those negatively affected by the introduction of 
transgenic crops have little or no recourse of action with the regulatory agencies in 
North America, they have indicated that they may turn to the legal system in an 
attempt to seek remuneration. In Canada, for instance, the Saskatchewan Organic 
Directorate (SOD) representing a group of organic producers has filed a lawsuit 
against Monsanto and Aventis (now Bayer Crop Sciences) seeking compensation for 
alleged lost organic canola markets following the commercialization of transgenic 
canola. In addition to compensation for damages, the SOD is seeking an injunction 
against the commercialization of GM wheat. The justification for the injunction 
against GM wheat is that the SOD believes the presence of GM wheat will 
jeopardise their ability to export organic GM-free wheat to Europe.  
 
One other Canadian court case is the counter-suit launched by farmer Percy 
Schmeiser against Monsanto for allegedly polluting his farmland. This case is 
separate from the patent infringement case that was just decided by the Supreme 
Court of Canada. The Supreme Court ruled that Schmeiser had illegally used 
Monsanto’s patented canola technology but was not required to compensate 
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Monsanto for the illegal use of this technology. Schmeiser’s counter suit alleging 
pollution by Monsanto was put on hold until the decision was handed down by the 
Supreme Court in the patent infringement case. However, Schmeiser has publicly 
stated that his fight with Monsanto is over, so this action may not be pursued. 
 
Liability lawsuits in agriculture related to potential market losses have the potential 
to severely limit future benefits of biotechnology. At the present, there is a growing 
unease in the agricultural biotechnology industry that legal injunctions may become 
increasingly common as opponents of GM crops attempt to use this strategy to 
prevent the commercialization of new GM varieties.  
 
The remainder of this chapter focuses on the connection between the theory and 
structures from Chapter 2 and the above discussion regarding liability and 
demonstrates how these concepts can be combined into a single interdisciplinary 
concept for examining liabilities from innovation. 
 
 
3.4   The Framework for Examining Socio-Economic Liability 
The models and typologies discussed in the Chapter 2 offer, in their own unique 
way, a useful tool for analyzing innovations of transformative technologies. 
Components of these models and typologies provide the opportunity to build a 
comprehensive framework capable of assessing innovations in biotechnology. 
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The initial contribution to the comprehensive framework comes from the research of 
Picciotto (Figure 2.1). The three overlapping spheres representing the sectors of 
government, private goods and common pool goods provide one of the central key 
components for this research. Containing these three spheres within a triangle has 
also been adopted. While Picciotto does not clearly define the use of the triangle, 
this research has adopted the use of the triangle to define the borders of agricultural 
biotechnology. The key contribution of Picciotto’s research is that he identifies who 
the actors are, the stakeholder relationships that develop, and that he focuses on the 
role of institutions and defines the governance issues that exist in the areas of 
overlap (defined as B, C and E in Figure 2.1). As was identified in Chapter 2, the 
major oversight of Picciotto’s research is the lack of explanation at the center of the 
model where all three spheres overlap. A major focus of this research is to attempt to 
understand the actors and the relationships within this area. 
 
The typology offered by Peters (Figure 2.2) identifies how public administration is 
influenced by culture, in this case, social, administrative and political cultures. The 
development of public policy needs to be conducted within the boundaries of a given 
society’s cultural values. For the framework of this research, public administration is 
taken, at a broad level, to be the Canadian government and, more narrowly, the 
Canadian regulators of biotechnology. Peters’ typology offers a good 
conceptualization of which formal and informal organizations influence public 
administration.  
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While Picciotto’s research ignored what occurs at the center of his model where all 
three spheres overlap, Brooks provides some analysis of what actors and 
relationships exist within this area (Figure 2.3). Brooks suggests that this area is the 
focal point for the decision making process and researchers can learn a great deal by 
better understanding the dynamics of the actors and relationships. Brooks points out 
that none of the stakeholders act single-mindedly -- rather, he suggests that the 
actions of one affect the actions of the others. The following chapters examine this 
specific aspect of his typology. Brooks’ typology is also important as his is one of 
the few that include special interest groups as key stakeholders in the decision 
making process. 
 
In their typology, Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff (Figure 2.5) discuss the center of this 
diagram, where all three spheres overlap and they suggest that this area is 
characterized by trilateral networks and hybrid organizations. This provides an 
additional perspective on what takes place in the center of a diagram where three 
spheres overlap. Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff use the state, industry and academia as 
the actors for their typology and this research has modified their identification of 
major actors to include the suggestions presented in the research of both Baber and 
Mehta. These two researchers suggest that the Triple Helix concept is limited in its 
application due to the absence of a fourth helix, where the fourth helix is 
representative of society's views and concerns. This research considers these views 
and incorporates them into a unifying framework. 
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This section has identified the important components from the various discipline 
specific typologies that provide unique insights and useful approaches to analyzing 
innovations and resources. The following section explains how these various 
components can be incorporated into a new framework capable of analyzing 
transformative technologies. 
 
 
3.5 Defining the Framework 
The following framework has been developed to examine the interactions among the 
stakeholders of government regulators, biotechnology industrial associations and 
civil advocacy groups as they attempt to manage socio-economic liabilities arising 
from transformative technologies such as agricultural biotechnology. Figure 3.1 
offers a new framework for analyzing transformative technologies, such as 
agricultural biotechnology. 
 
This framework is shown in a state of equilibrium where various academic 
disciplines are engaged in discussions and debates about the transformative 
technology, as defined by the three outer spheres. The triangle represents the 
transformative technology and the three key stakeholders within the triangle also are 
shown in a position of balanced power and authority. In reality, when the innovation 
or innovative product is commercialized, the triangle of the transformative 
technology would overlap the sphere of scientific research (the economy sphere) and 
the spheres of governance and society would be represented with less overlap, 
possibly to the point of being tangential to the triangle of the transformative 
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technology or completely outside of the triangle. This, of course, would change over 
time as the sphere of governance became increasingly engaged and this sphere 
would overlap to a greater degree as would the sphere of society (once the society 
began to show an increased awareness of the transformative technology). 
 
Figure 3.1: Institutional Liability Framework 
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In addition to the three outer spheres being shown in equilibrium, so are the three 
inner spheres that are representative of the actors or key stakeholders within a 
transformative technology. At the early stage of the transformative technology the 
spheres within the triangle would not appear as balanced as they are in this 
framework. The sphere of industry firms would tend to be comprised of the small 
number of firms conducting research regarding the transformative technology. It 
would be too early in the development of the industry for an industry organization to 
have organized. The regulatory sphere would not be positioned entirely inside the 
triangle of the technology transformation as the regulations would be in 
development. The sphere of civil advocacy groups would likewise be moved to the 
edge of the triangle as the society in which the technology transformation was 
occurring would have limited awareness of the technology. 
 
This framework provides a conceptualization that allows for the identification of 
institutional governance actors and their proximity to the technological 
transformation. Working towards the objective of including all of the actors in the 
decision making process, this framework provides a visualization of where the 
various actors would be positioned early in the debate about a technology 
transformation and solutions to the problem of how to more fully integrate the actors 
into the debate could be identified.  
 
The three outer spheres represent the institutions of the marketplace or the economy, 
government and society. The private sphere contains scientists working in public 
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and private laboratories, industrial research and development and firms that produce 
products for the marketplace. The government sphere is comprised of government 
and the people that are employed by governmental institutions, international trade 
organizations, multilateral trade agreements, as well as elected officials and 
bureaucrats. The third sphere, collective, contains social groups and also represents 
all individuals within a defined geographical region, such as a country. 
 
The triangle represents the parameters of the technological transformation, in this 
case agricultural biotechnology. This triangle has its points in the three outer 
spheres. The identification regarding these points is not meant to be a specific 
positioning of the actors, but rather an approximation of where each actor begins to 
interact with the transformative technology. The point in the private sphere is 
represented by private industry research and development and publicly funded 
researchers. The point in the government sphere is where the legislators of a nation 
debate and develop legislation pertaining to transformative technologies. The point 
in the collective sphere is defined as those within a society who are interested in a 
new innovation, such as, agricultural biotechnology. The closer an individual moves 
towards the sphere of the economy, the more they typify consumers and the closer 
they move towards the sphere of governance, the more they typify voters. 
 
The inner sphere of industry firms is typified initially by private firms and by 
industry firms as the technology advances, taking actions or developing standards to 
ensure that risks are carefully managed to meet with the expectations of society. The 
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role of private firms is to take products that are approved following a risk analysis 
and to manage the successful commercialization of the product into the marketplace. 
An example of how exposure to risks is managed in agriculture can be the use of 
buffer zones for GM corn production. Buffer zones are used to manage the risk of 
the European Corn Borer developing resistance to Bt corn. A further example in the 
food processing industry is the use of hazard analysis critical control point (HACCP) 
standards to ensure that risks of food contamination are managed and minimized. 
This does not mean that the risks are reduced to zero, as the concept of zero risk as it 
applies to food safety does not exist. The reason tolerance levels exist is to ensure 
that the level of risk is within acceptable levels for safe human consumption. 
 
The inner sphere of regulatory agencies is defined by government regulators who 
work conducting risk assessments. Materials and substances defined as hazardous 
have been identified by laboratory testing over time and substantial literature has 
been published on this subject. Government regulators provide lists of hazardous 
materials and substances and have developed procedures for handling and safe 
storage. In addition, levels of containment facilities have also been developed to 
ensure that there is no escape of hazardous products into the environment. This area 
of overlap is typified by government regulators and scientists working to further 
define hazards and thereby reduce the potential for the development of liabilities. 
 
The inner sphere of civil advocacy groups is typified by the actions and demands of 
society regarding concerns that have developed from inefficient risk communication. 
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Risk communication frequently becomes the domain of the mass media and the 
media are well suited to provide the conditions for the onset of outrage when these 
concerns are not adequately addressed. Historically, new products and technologies 
have been introduced into the marketplace using enormous advertising campaigns in 
a time frame where societies had a high level of trust in government. Existing 
products and technologies that originated in the agriculture biotechnology industry 
were not marketed to the consuming public, which is a particular problem in a time 
when there is a decreasing level of society’s trust in governments. Consumers have 
also gained power and authority of supply chains for food products at the expense of 
private firms when it comes to influencing the introduction of new products and 
technologies. The conditions for the development of outrage are strongest when the 
expectations of society fail to match the products and technologies emerging from 
industry in a time frame of low consumer trust in government. 
 
The overlap between each of the three inner spheres can be defined by existing 
institutional actors. The overlap between industry firms and regulatory agencies is 
defined by the judicial institutions that exist. When regulatory agencies and industry 
firms in numerous sectors of the economy disagree on the interpretation of existing 
regulations or standards the method of resolution is frequently the court system. The 
legal institution in its role as a dispute settlement mechanism is called upon to render 
decisions that both parties will abide by. The challenge that arises from actions of 
this kind is that the Supreme Court of Canada does not have a mandate on social 
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policy, which is increasingly what it is being asked to decide upon. This overlap can 
also be represented by the actions of the Auditor General.  
 
In Canada the interaction between the CFIA and the biotech industry is not 
structured to allow public involvement. Biotechnology firms provide data on new 
crop varieties following field testing and the data is assessed by scientists working at 
the CFIA, who may demand additional data be provided and will approve the variety 
when sufficient information is available. The CFIA will repeat some experiments to 
confirm that the data submitted is reliable and it is not uncommon for up to 50 
different scientists to work on a particular varietal approval process. An additional 
process in Canada was the writing of the recent Royal Society of Canada report on 
GM foods. This report was written by a small group of experts after meeting and 
discussing GM food safety issues with government and industry officials. 
 
The overlap between regulatory agencies and civil advocacy groups is defined by 
numerous government methods to share and gather information. Leading examples 
of this are royal commissions, specially structured government committees and 
government organized public forums. This form of public consultation allows 
individuals as citizens to address politicians directly to voice their support or 
concerns about the given topic of discussion. In Canada this area has been 
dominated by the Canadian Biotechnology Advisory Committee (CBAC). This 
committee was charged with the mandate of ‘engaging in a national conversation’ 
and as a result, held numerous public forums across Canada to gather input from 
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Canadian citizens and other interested societal groups and organizations. Designed 
to be an ongoing advisory body, the goal of the Canadian government is that CBAC 
will continually provide feedback and advice on biotechnology. Another process that 
is commonly used in this realm is the use of royal commissions, such as the recent 
New Zealand Royal Commission on Genetic Modification. 
 
The overlap between industry firms and civil advocacy groups is defined by two 
factors. The first is private industry warranties or guarantees, where the industry has 
established standards that are designed to provide additional quality assurance as 
they exceed the defined mandatory regulation requirements. They allow individuals 
as consumers the ability to use the courts if they are not satisfied with a firm’s 
policy.  The second factor is the role of the media in today’s instant information 
society. The media can be seen to have taken on the role of industry watchdog. The 
overlap between firms and civil advocacy groups can also defined by agencies or 
independent third parties that are involved in testing for food safety. These bodies 
are mandated to monitor processed and whole food products to ensure that tolerance 
levels for harmful contaminants have not been exceeded. The monitoring can be 
mandated by the regulatory agency or it can be a voluntary standard that is enforced 
by the industry. When a food safety concern is detected, these bodies inform the 
firm that produced the product and this firm then issues a product recall. In the 
Canadian food system, this process can instill consumer trust in the food safety 
system as consumers are reassured that the quality of their food is continually 
monitored and that the products on the store shelves are of the highest quality. An 
 83
example of this can be taken from the steady sales level of beef products following 
the announcement of ‘mad cow’ disease in Canada in 2003. 
 
In developing a framework to examine the role of institutional governance in 
relation to liability management of agricultural biotechnology, attention was given to 
the contributions that focus on the relationships that exist, how they develop and 
who leads the process. A clear understanding of the actors, their roles and the 
relationships that exist within the areas of overlap provides an opportunity to apply 
this framework to socio-economic liability scenarios in the following chapters to 
assess if the framework contributed to the decision making process. 
 
 
3.6   Applying the Framework 
The above framework has been used in the course of the research for this thesis to 
better understand the regulation of agricultural biotechnology. The focus of the 
following research papers has been to examine what actors and relationships exist in 
the areas of overlap within the inner spheres. Figure 3.2 illustrates the central portion 
of the model and identifies where each research paper has focused. The framework 
has been largely applied to research related to genetically modified (GM) canola 
given that it is the leading transgenic crop in Canada. The following four chapters 
each examine one of the areas of overlap.  
 
The overlap area identified by the number 4 represents Chapter 4. This chapter 
examines the regulatory gap that existed in the mid 1990s when the initial varieties 
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of GM canola were released. At this time, the Canadian government regulators 
approved GM canola and once this was done, the industry realized that its major 
export markets were not willing to accept GM canola. This chapter examines how 
industry and regulators worked together to develop an identity preservation system 
to ensure that all the GM canola was contained within the North American market.  
 
Figure 3.2: Relationship of Research Papers with Framework 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Adopted by author from Picciotto, 1995. 
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identified. This chapter examines the relationship between the federal regulators and 
society and what the role of the regulators can be regarding food safety. 
 
The overlap area defined by the number 6 represents Chapter 6. This chapter 
examines the interaction between the industry associations and how they have 
managed GM crop production. The agricultural biotechnology industry's efforts to 
ensure the public that any liabilities from GM crops are being effectively identified 
and reliable information is communicated to the public is discussed in detail. 
 
The area of overlap at the center of the diagram identified by the number 7 
respresents Chapter 7. This chapter analyzes one of the newest technologies in 
agricultural biotechnology, that of plant-made pharmaceuticals. This agricultural 
innovation has been proceeding for the past 15 years, in many instances with 
minimal or a complete lack of regulation. This lack of regulation has resulted in 
several regulatory violations in the United States over the past year and this may be 
undermining consumer confidence in this techology. This chapter identifies where 
the regulatory gaps exist in the regulatory process and offers suggestions on how to 
improve the regulatory process to ensure that no further regulatory failures occur.  
 
Positioning these research papers in this manner highlights the interdisciplinarity of 
the research for this thesis. Issues examined in these chapters include: consumer 
acceptance, gene flow, regulation, labeling, risk communication, supply chain 
management and liability. The result is a very thorough analysis of how to regulate 
the innovation of agricultural biotechnology. 
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Chapter 4 
 
Marketplace Liabilities During Commercialization  
 
 
4.1   Introduction 
The global agri-food sector is in the initial stages of a rapid transformation. 
Historically, crop production has been pooled for transportation purposes. Today we 
are witnessing a move towards product differentiation. Identity preservation was 
initially used by the crop production industry to distinguish between grades of 
grains. The industry has now progressed to the point that it uses identity preservation 
for organic production, specialty contracts and buyer specific purchase requirements. 
Plant breeding technology over the years has created a large number of varieties 
with input and output traits that require identity preservation to maintain their value. 
Biotechnology has increased the number of varieties requiring identity preservation, 
which has led to the rise in use of identity preserved production and marketing 
(IPPM) systems. As end users continue to refine their purchase requirements, the 
number of IPPM systems will increase and the volume these systems are capable of 
handling will rise. Initial grade differentiation has been extrapolated to 
accommodate the increase in grain varieties requiring IPPM systems. As consumer 
demand grows in importance in terms of the entire food chain, IPPM systems are 
expected to become commonplace in Prairie agriculture.  
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This chapter applies the model to five IPPM systems used in the canola industry 
since 1995, concentrating on systems constructed to maintain regulatory conformity 
and market access. A number of regulatory systems have evolved to manage public 
expectations and concerns. In Canada and the US, once regulatory approval is 
complete, no further private industrial organization is required to maintain market 
access for GM canola. In Japan, private firms have chosen to adopt IPPM systems 
for GM canola to supplement and support the public regulatory system, in effect 
differentiating new products from old products in order to maintain market access 
and consumer acceptance. In the case of the EU, the regulatory system has not 
approved new varieties and the canola industry has decided it cannot operate 
profitably there and has abandoned that market for canola. Section 4.2 describes the 
background leading up to the development of the system. Section 4.3 presents the 
theoretical framework for examining the motivations and structure of IPPM systems. 
Section 4.4 uses the methodology to provide detail and analysis on the structure and 
costs of the systems adopted. Section 4.5 examines some of the implications of this 
analysis for other products and other markets.  
 
 
4.2 Background 
Biotechnology innovations entered global agri-food markets in 1995 with the 
introduction of recombinant Bovine Somatotrophin (rBST) and herbicide tolerant 
canola, corn, cotton and soybean varieties. Since then the rate of new product 
introductions has risen sharply, with more than 13 crops already transformed. James 
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(2003) estimates that in 2003, GM crops were being produced in 18 countries and 
that more than 40 new varieties involving input and output traits are in the R&D 
pipeline and likely will be ready for commercialization before 2007. Given the 
potential for stacking both input and output traits, the potential permutations and 
combinations leading to new products are enormous.  
 
Irrespective of consumer attitudes, if new varieties introduced in Canada but 
pending approval in Japan or the EU were allowed to co-mingle with approved 
varieties, the resulting shipments to export markets would be jeopardized. Table 4.1 
presents the distribution of Canadian production by consumer market. This table 
does not provide export data for all Canadian canola export markets, just the major 
markets prior to the commercialization of GM canola. Facing that market structure 
and the accelerating flow of new products, Canadian companies had three options. 
First, the companies could commercialize the new varieties, co-mingle production 
and lose access to the EU and Japanese markets, which in 1994-5 imported 42% of 
the Canadian output. Second, the companies could withhold their new varieties until 
they were approved in all key markets, even though Heller (1995) has estimated that 
a regulatory delay of even one year decreases the rate of return on a new product by 
2.8%. Third, Canadian producers and exporters could accept responsibility to 
separate GM canola from traditional canola and develop a system to provide quality 
assurance of delivery to the key export markets, which would involve Canadian 
export companies developing new systems of identity preservation production and 
marketing.  
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Table 4.1: Canadian canola production and export destinations 
% of production flowing to key export 
markets 
Year Canadian 
Production 
(000t) 
% total 
production 
consumed 
domestically 
Total Japan EU US 
1992-3 3,872 22% 78% 42% 8% 21% 
1993-4 5,480 15% 85% 33% 19% 21% 
1994-5 7,233 26% 74% 25% 17% 19% 
1995-6 6,436 30% 70% 28% 6% 24% 
1996-7 5,056 12% 88% 42% 4% 26% 
1997-8 6,266 15% 85% 34% 1% 31% 
1998-9 7,588 21% 79% 31% 0% 24% 
1999-0 8,798 33%* 67% 31% 0% 23% 
2000-1 7,088 4%** 96% 27% 0% 25% 
2001-2 5,062 12% 88% 31% 0% 27% 
* Due to record production in this crop year, domestic carry-over was 1.5-2 times normal. 
** Domestic consumption still low due to record production in previous year. 
Source: Exports are the sum of seed, oil and meal trade; retrieved from the World Wide Web 
at: http://www.canola-council.org/stats. 
 
Developing product differentiation systems is usually precipitated by consumer 
demands, producer liability or regulatory requirements.  So far IPPM systems have 
been adopted for seven input trait varieties of canola in order to maintain market 
access in Japan. All of the systems introduced in 1995-6 were explicitly designed to 
maintain technical regulatory access.  Neither consumer attitudes nor product 
liability concerns played much of a role in these systems.  Consumer attitudes 
toward GM food products in 1996 were significantly different to those of consumers 
today. At least partly due to lack of awareness of GM foods, consumers were not 
exerting significant pressure for segregation of GM from non-GM foods.  North 
American consumers were voluntarily accepting Flavr Savr® tomatoes and rBST 
milk, Japanese consumers did not raise public concerns about GM foods and even 
EU consumers, who had just begun to express concerns, were willing to buy some 
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GM foods.  In Britain, over 1.8 million cans of tomato paste labeled as being 
genetically modified were sold from 1996-98 (Agnet, 1999). Zeneca, the company 
that introduced the product, could not satisfy the demand of British retailers wanting 
to carry it. At least partly due to the generally neutral to positive consumer response 
and partly because of the nature of GM canola, food manufactures and retailers also 
faced few concerns about liability.  Processed canola produces oils, which by their 
nature do not include any proteins and hence are free of GM elements, while the 
meal is not directly consumed by people.  Rather, it is fed to animals as feed.  The 
food manufacturers and retailers faced fewer risks of GM seeds entering the food 
chain and contaminating their supplies. 
 
 
4.3   The Conceptual Framework 
This section of the chapter uses the methodology from Figure 3.2 to examine the 
relationships and interactions that occurred between the Canadian canola industry 
and the federal government regulators to ensure that Canadian canola markets would 
not be jeopardized from the commercialization of GM canola. While the Canadian 
regulators have no mandate regarding new crop varieties post-commercialization, 
they closely observed the industry’s process of ensuring market access and did work 
to facilitate discussions with specified export markets to provide quality reassurance. 
The focus of this section is to identify the important issues that existed in the area of 
overlap between industry associations and regulatory agencies. The following 
section then uses this framework to identify how these issues were addressed to the 
satisfaction of Canadian canola export markets.  
 91
Ultimately, identity preservation is about quality.  Quality is a multifaceted aspect 
for any product. Neo-classical economic theory suggests that two key elements are 
vital to the creation of quality: consumer tastes and preferences; and producer efforts 
to develop consistent, safe, affordable, attractive fare that meets consumer demand. 
Economics supply chain theory suggests that most, if not all, of these elements can 
and should be produced within minimally regulated markets. Increasingly, however, 
the literature is pointing to variables of trust and confidence in the creation and 
operation of markets (Fukuyama, 1995 and Stiglitz, 1999). Markets for many 
products are often not able to create, by themselves, the conditions of trust that 
generate the socially optimal quantities of goods and services produced and 
consumed. Hence, there is a much more explicit role for public and private 
regulation in markets than neoclassical theory generally suggests. This is especially 
true for GM agri-food products, where perceived risks and public uncertainties 
abound. This section discusses the theoretical aspects of marketing GM products and 
will identify how this influenced the canola industry and its choice of marketing 
systems.  
 
Tirole (1988) has explicitly identified a basis for integrating trust into conventional 
consumer theory. He posits that there are three types of goods: search goods, where 
consumers can visually identify attributes before consumption; experience goods, 
which require consumption to determine the attributes; and credence goods, where 
the unaided consumer cannot know the full attributes of consuming a good, at least 
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for some period after consumption. Trust usually is a key element in markets for 
experience and credence goods. 
 
Applying this framework to genetically modified canola helps to illustrate how and 
why the industry has responded as it has to the different market circumstances. The 
search, experiential and credence attributes of canola have historically been assured 
through a combination of public and private regulatory systems (Table 4.2). In the 
production system, the public sector has tended to establish the general environment 
for private actors to effect transactions. The Canadian Food and Drugs Act sets rules 
for human consumption of low-erucic acid canola, the Feeds Act sets maximum 
tolerances for glucosinolate levels, the Canada Seeds Act specifies the performance 
standards for new germplasm, and the Canadian Grains Commissions sets and 
monitors the standards for the seeds trade. Although processors can grade canola on 
the basis of visual and physical attributes, such as seed weight, impurities, existence 
of cracked or green seed, percentage oil content, erucic acid and glucosinolate 
levels, and potentially the presence of transgenes (Canbra does some grading for 
GM elements), a consumer cannot distinguish any of the key quality differences 
valued by consumers through simple search procedures or for most attributes 
through consumption. At the retail level consumer labeling laws have operated to 
establish consistency of standards around labels. Meanwhile, the private sector has 
established common-property or private mechanisms to manage the transactional 
elements to the attributes. The Canola Council of Canada trademark on canola 
establishes the marketing standards for use of the name, processors have selected 
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canola seed to meet both government and industry standards, and the industry and 
private companies have used trademarks to manage their private interests. 
 
Table 4.2: Product attributes and potential regulatory responses to GM plants 
 Search attributes Experiential attributes Credence attributes 
Public role in setting 
rules for the 
transaction 
Consumer labeling 
laws to prevent 
fraud 
Seeds Act regulations 
ensuring consistent 
quality 
Health, safety and 
environmental 
regulations; product 
liability and tort laws
Private mechanisms 
for managing the 
transaction  
Voluntary labeling Trade marks backed 
up by IPPM systems 
Private warranties 
and brands backed 
up by IPPM systems 
Source: Smyth and Phillips, 2001. 
 
This type of public-private regulatory structure was more or less replicated in many 
other producing and consuming countries.  As Kennett, et al., (1998) note, the 
existence of an effective grading system (which involves managing the experiential 
aspects and credence risks) reduces the need for vertical co-ordination between 
buyers and sellers of canola. As a product with little variation in consumer 
preferences in most countries, there was no incentive to establish any managed 
production or marketing systems. Nevertheless, as Jacquemin (1987), notes, "… 
hierarchies, federations of firms, and markets compete with each other to provide 
co-ordination, allocation and monitoring. It is only when one organizational form 
promises for specific activities a higher net return than alternative institutional 
arrangements that it will survive in the long run." (p.138) 
 
Genetically modified canola has introduced some differences to the system. As 
noted above, consumers in different markets perceive significantly different risks 
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and have varying levels of uncertainty about the long-term benefits and costs of GM 
foods. All these credence factors require a much higher level of trust than the other 
product attributes. In Canada and the US, governments have addressed those 
concerns through their novel food, feed, seed and environmental regulatory systems. 
In addition, product liability and tort laws help to assure consumers that if dangerous 
products enter the food chain and cause harm, there are accessible means for 
consumer action to gain compensation. All of these mechanisms provide the base of 
‘trust’ necessary for the marketplace to manage transactions, albeit moderated by 
extensive public and private regulatory measures.  
 
The regulatory systems in Japan and EU have evolved somewhat differently, 
creating different market concerns. In Japan, the single largest export market for 
canola, the regulatory system has operated somewhat more slowly than in Canada, 
with the result that some varieties of GM canola have been approved for unconfined 
release in North America but approval has been delayed in Japan. To date, no 
products approved in North America have been rejected in Japan; all have been 
approved, if with a lag. As a result, the industry had three clear options about how to 
proceed: it could delay planting in Canada until approved in Japan; it could allow 
co-mingling of varieties that are both approved and pending in Japan, thereby 
jeopardizing the Japanese market; or it could operate a private IPPM system to 
separate and route sales of unapproved varieties to the North American market. As 
theory suggests, this ended up being a simple economic question, with the research 
companies assuming costs of $30-40/tonne for a purpose-built IPPM system in 
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exchange for accelerated adoption of their varieties, which improved the return on 
their investment. 
 
The EU market represented a far different proposition because the choice of what to 
do was less clear. The EU regulatory system was held in such a low level of trust 
that it was unable to handle consumer concerns around GM canola (Gaskell, et al., 
1999).  The Canadian export industry was faced with the choice of establishing a 
private regulatory mechanism to assure GM-free shipments, or to forego the market. 
A number of factors came into play in this case. The EU, while at times a large 
market for canola, has historically been a marginal, swing consumer. Furthermore, 
European consumers so far have not shown any willingness to pay a premium for 
GM free canola. In this case, the industry decided that the potentially large, 
permanent costs of an IPPM system to handle the risks in the EU market would not 
be compensated by either large sustained shipments or price increases. Hence, the 
industry declined to serve that market once the verifiable stocks of GM-free canola 
were run down.  
 
 
4.4 Using the Framework 
This section examines the specific actions taken by the canola industry to address 
the concerns regarding co-mingling of GM canola with conventional canola. The 
first part of this section outlines the structure and cost of the IPPM systems. It 
identifies all of the participating stakeholders and defines the collaborative efforts 
that were required to successfully reassure Canadian canola export markets that the 
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GM canola would and could be differentiated from conventional canola. The second 
part of this section discusses the governance structures that existed in the mid 1990s 
and explains why the industry needed to take the initiative on this issue. This section 
identifies the lead stakeholders and explains the role they played in the effort to 
reassure the Japanese importers that Canada would only export non-GM canola to 
Japan until the Japanese government approved the importing of GM canola. 
Japanese approval came in the winter of 1997. 
 
The introduction in 1995 of two herbicide tolerant (HT) varieties of canola 
precipitated the first IPPM system for a GM crop in Canada, and the world. As the 
Government of Canada does not have the legal mandate to govern the exporting of 
GM canola, the industry chose to take the initiative and develop the export rules 
needed to assure continued access to foreign markets. The exporting of oilseeds in 
Canada has always been the responsibility of the private sector, although the 
Canadian Wheat Board would have played a small role in the transportation of 
oilseeds when it had the authority to allocate rail cars to Board and non-Board crops. 
The research/seed companies and grain companies shared this task. This group 
developed a series of strategic alliances vertically through proprietary supply chains 
and horizontally through the Canola Council of Canada to manage the flow of GM 
product in order to allay concerns in the Japanese market. This section focuses on 
the factors that brought these groups together to develop the Japanese market for 
GM food products and examines how they successfully accomplished the task of 
developing export regulations. 
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Monsanto and AgrEvo (now Bayer Crop Sciences) have been the two companies at 
the centre of the effort (Table 4.3). In the 1995 crop they each introduced HT 
varieties in Western Canada, initially through a seed multiplication program and 
then through commercial release. The 1995 harvest of approximately 30,000 acres 
and the 1996 harvest of approximately 240,000 acres were produced under IPPM 
conditions. Once market access to Japan was assured for the 1997 crop, the IPPM 
system was abandoned for B. napus varieties. Beginning in 1997 and continuing 
through the 1999 season, a number of Roundup Ready® B. rapa varieties were 
introduced under IPPM systems. In 1999 the four varieties accounted for 64,000 
acres of production. 
 
Table 4.3:  Canola Acreage under IPPM systems, 1995-99  
Year AgrEvo Liberty-LinkTM Monsanto Roundup Ready® varieties 
 B. napus varieties B. napus varieties B. rapa varieties 
1995 25,000 5,000 0 
1996 190,000 50,000 0 
1997 0 0 Minimal 
1998 0 0 50,000 
1999 0 0 64,000 
Sources: Evans, 1999; and Saskatchewan Wheat Pool, 1999. 
 
 
 
4.4.1 The Systems 
By the spring of 1996, Monsanto and AgrEvo had developed a variety of IPPM 
systems to manage the differentiation of GM canola from the traditional canola 
stream (Table 4.4).  Monsanto had two separate systems—one with the 
Saskatchewan Wheat Pool, Alberta Wheat Pool and Manitoba Pool Elevators and 
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the other with Limagrain and Cargill—while AgrEvo worked exclusively through 
the three Pool elevator companies.  In 1997 Monsanto added two additional IPPM 
systems for Roundup Ready® B. rapa varieties. Each of these systems involved an 
agreement between the research company, a breeder, a grain merchant, farmers, 
truckers and an oilseed crusher. The objective of the IPPM system was to contain the 
herbicide tolerant canola separate and distinct from traditional canola marketing 
channels. This meant that the HT canola not touch any part of the export handling 
system, including elevators, rail cars and port terminals. The 1996 production was 
delivered to Canadian oilseed crushing plants that had markets for the oil and meal 
in Canada and the US where regulatory approval had been granted (Saskatchewan 
Wheat Pool, 1997). In each case, the grain merchant acted as the operating agent for 
the system, managing the supply chain from seed multiplication to processing. 
 
As shown in Table 4.4, each of the supply chains began with a specific variety 
which included a proprietary herbicide tolerant gene which was backcrossed or 
inserted into a plant by either a contract breeder or by a partner company (e.g. 
Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada, Plant Genetics Systems, University of Alberta, 
Alberta Wheat Pool, Limagrain, AgrEvo, Pioneer Hi-Bred or Zeneca/Advanta).  
Once this variety was registered, Monsanto or AgrEvo contracted with one of the 
grain merchants (one of the three Prairie Pools elevator companies, United Grain 
Growers or Cargill) to manage the development and management of an IPPM 
system.  That company then multiplied the seed, undertook production contracts 
with specific farmers, arranged delivery from farms to a processor with contract 
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truckers, and arranged for a custom crush, segregation and diversion of the resulting 
oil and meal into the North American market. 
 
Table 4.4:  Key elements in the canola IPPM systems, 1995-99 
Links in the 
supply chain 
AgrEvo  Liberty 
LinkTM varieties 
Monsanto Roundup Ready® varieties 
Species B. napus B. napus  B. napus B. rapa B. rapa 
Variety names 
(year approved) 
Innovator (95) 
 
Quantum (95); 
Quest (96) 
LG3295 (96) 41P50 and 
41P51 (96) 
Hysyn 101 RR 
(97) 
Seed developer(s) Ag. Canada and 
Plant Genetics 
Systems in 
collaboration with 
AgrEvo 
University of 
Alberta and 
Alberta Wheat 
Pool for 3 Pools 
Limagrain Pioneer Hi-
Bred 
Zeneca/ 
Advanta 
Grain 
merchant(s) 
Saskatchewan Wheat 
Pool, Alberta Wheat 
Pool, Manitoba Pool 
Elevators 
Saskatchewan 
Wheat Pool, 
Alberta Wheat 
Pool, Manitoba 
Pool Elevators 
Cargill United 
Grain 
Growers 
(UGG) 
Cargill 
Farmers  
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
1999 
 
310 
2,375 
0 
0 
0 
 
480 
1,700 
0 
0 
0 
 
0 
incl 
0 
0 
0 
 
0 
0 
minimal 
625 
800 
 
0 
0 
incl 
incl 
incl 
Trucking 
arranged by: 
Pools Pools Cargill UGG Cargill 
Crushers Canbra at 
Lethbridge, 
CanAmera at Altona 
and Harrowby  
CanAmera at 
Nipawin and 
Lloydminster  
Cargill at 
Clavet 
Archer 
Daniels 
Midland at 
Lloydminster 
Canbra at 
Lethbridge 
Source: Smyth and Phillips, 2001a. 
 
 
The participating companies all agreed that the herbicide resistant technology 
brought real value to producers and all agreed that there was a need to bring this 
technology to the marketplace. Both AgrEvo and Monsanto acknowledged, 
however, that if these varieties were co-mingled in the export system, then Canadian 
canola would be shut out of export markets. In response, private Canadian firms 
agreed to release materials only if they were approved in the ‘key canola markets’, 
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defined as Canada, Japan, US and Mexico by the Expert Committee for Canola of 
the Pest Management Review Agency. 
 
Cost estimates were found for two of the five IPPM systems (Table 4.5). While there 
is room for debate about the costs, the two estimates suggest that transaction costs 
for the IPPM system were very high. There are five main areas where additional 
costs were incurred: by the producer, during transportation, by the processor, in 
administration and through opportunity costs.  
 
Table 4.5: Identified Costs of 1996 IPPM Systems ($C) 
Cost Category AgrEvo & Manitoba 
Pool Elevators ($/mt) 
Saskatchewan Wheat 
Pool ($/mt) 
Producer on-farm costs $1 $1 
Freight Inefficiency $5-6 $7-10 
Dead Freight $1.50-2 $2-3 
Processor $3-4 $3-5 
Administration $4 $5 
Opportunity cost $10 
Collective subsidy 
$20 
$5-7 
Total IPPM Cost $34-37 $33-41 
mt = metric tonne 
Sources: Manitoba Pool Elevators, 1996; and Saskatchewan Wheat Pool, 1997. 
 
The added cost for producers was due to separate on-farm storage requirements of 
the IPPM system production contracts. Farmers were required to store these varieties 
in separate bins, which at times left some of the bin capacity unused.  The cost of 
inefficient use of on-farm storage was estimated to be $1/mt.  
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The inefficiency in transporting the transgenic canola was more substantial as only 
selected crushers were used. AgrEvo used the CanAmera sites located at Harrowby, 
Manitoba, and Altona, Alberta, along with Canbra’s site at Lethbridge, Alberta. 
Monsanto used a wider array of crushers, including CanAmera at Nipawin and 
Lloydminster, Cargill at Clavet and Archer Daniels Midland at Lloydminster. 
Nevertheless, each system used a specific set of crushers. With an average of 40-
45% of the total Canadian canola production occurring in Saskatchewan, producers 
often faced lengthy trucking distances. These costs were shared among the 
producers, seed companies and the grain elevator companies.  
 
Transportation costs were estimated to be higher due to freight inefficiencies and 
dead freight. Freight inefficiencies are defined as those costs of trucking that 
exceeded average costs of delivering to the nearest local elevator. A producer would 
normally deliver canola to their nearest local elevator, but the canola had to be 
trucked directly to the crushing facility because elevators were excluded in this 
system. The producers paid a portion of this cost. Dead freight costs relate to the 
volumes on-farm that had to be delivered as partial loads. The freight inefficiency 
cost of transporting the HT canola to processors resulted in costs of $7-10/mt. Dead 
freight costs were estimated to be $2-3/mt.  
 
The canola processors faced cost increases due to the IPPM system. Manitoba Pool 
Elevator (1996, p. 1) documents note that “[t]he domestic crusher was obliged to 
segregate raw transgenic canola seed, transgenic canola oil and transgenic canola 
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meal from traditional stocks under the IPP [identity preserved production] system 
developed for transgenic canola introduction.” This required the processors to 
physically clean the production equipment prior to crushing the HT canola (usually 
during a seasonal shutdown), as well as after the HT run was finished. This was 
done to ensure that the transgenic canola oil did not co-mingle with oils destined for 
export markets. The processors involved identified their incremental cost to be in the 
range of $3-5/mt. 
 
Many non-recoverable costs occurred in administration. The Saskatchewan Wheat 
Pool, for example, actively managed all of the producer contracts it had to ensure 
that compliance with the terms were met and that co-mingling was avoided. In an 
effort to ensure the purity of the IPPM system, seed agents from AgrEvo, Monsanto 
and the Saskatchewan Wheat Pool (Pool) mapped all the fields in which HT canola 
was grown. Once harvest commenced AgrEvo, Monsanto and the Pool co-ordinated 
to ensure that an agent from one of the companies would be on farm during the 
harvest to inspect the harvested supplies, apply grain confetti and to seal the bin. The 
confetti had the company logo on one side and a unique grower identification 
number on the other. This placed a very real constraint on producers while at the 
same time providing the Pool marketing department with accurate information of 
where and how much HT canola was available. At this point, the Pool worked with 
the processors to arrange to have the HT canola trucked to be crushed at a 
designated oil crushing plant that was just about to have a scheduled shut down and 
cleaning. Once a crush date was determined, the Pool contracted with commercial 
 103
truckers to pick up the HT canola from farmers and deliver the HT canola to the 
designated processors. When the canola was to be trucked, an agent from the Pool 
was on farm to inspect to ensure that none of the bins had been opened or tampered 
with. This process was very difficult due to the simple logistics of trucking grain in 
the winter in Western Canada. Snowstorms, impassable roads and bad driving 
conditions all complicated the co-ordination of trucking process. These requirements 
were all labour intensive and were estimated to cost $4-5/mt. 
 
The grain merchants also identified an opportunity cost of crops in IPPM systems.  
In effect, separating the seed, being constrained on when and where to bring it to the 
market and being forced to move it according to a predetermined plan, severely 
limited the marketer’s ability to lock in high prices in what is traditionally a volatile 
market. The Saskatchewan Wheat Pool (1997, p.2) reported that “[f]rom a general 
market perspective, an IP program like this does not allow for access to all attractive 
alternative markets. This is a potential cost due to possible increased margin 
potentials, which cannot be achieved. The potential unrealized profit opportunity 
could well be in excess of $10/mt.” It is not clear, but some of that opportunity cost 
could have been because North American buyers recognized that they had some 
market power in the circumstances and exploited it. Furthermore, the grain 
merchants estimated other unallocated expenses cost all parts of the supply chain an 
estimated $5-7/mt. The Saskatchewan Wheat Pool (1997, p.2) concluded that “[i]n 
order to develop and promote this technology, the producer of the technology, 
AgrEvo [and Monsanto], the producers of the seed, the [Saskatchewan Wheat Pool, 
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Alberta Wheat Pool and Manitoba Pool Elevators], and the beneficiary of the 
technology, the producer, all contributed to the subsidization of the IPP program.”   
 
In total, the two IPPM systems cost an estimated $33-41/mt. Based on acreage, it is 
estimated that the IPPM systems adopted in 1995-6 cost between $2.8-3.5 million 
for the AgrEvo based system and $750,000-930,000 for the Monsanto based 
systems. As noted, all the stakeholders in the IPPM process shared these costs. The 
producers assumed the identified on-farm costs and some of the increased 
transportation costs; they did not receive any price formal premium, and in some 
cases, were forced to take spot prices that were unattractive relative to other markets. 
The grain company assumed the dead freight costs, a portion of the freight 
inefficiency and part of the administration cost through their normal operating 
margins (Saskatchewan Wheat Pool, 1997). The crushers picked up most of the 
incremental crushing costs. The remaining costs (opportunity cost, administration 
and other subsidies) were divided and paid by Monsanto and AgrEvo, based on the 
acreage they had under cultivation. In Monsanto’s case, they expensed this 
additional cost to research and development costs related to the development of the 
technology.  
 
The total cost of the IPPM operated in conjunction with the Saskatchewan Wheat 
Pool in 1995-6 was estimated to exceed $4 million. The average five-year farm-gate 
price for canola, from 1991-96, was $280/tonne. Using the cost increase range of 
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$33-$41, the increased cost of these IPPM systems ranged from a low of 12% to a 
high of 15% of the average farm-gate price.  
 
These cost increases, however, must be balanced against any expected or realized 
gains. Early figures suggested that farmers gained upwards of C$10/acre or 
C$5/tonne benefit from the new technologies (Mayer, 1997) and the Canola Council 
of Canada (2001) estimates that the net benefit to farmers between 1997 and 2000 
was C$464 million, which for most farmers would have more than compensated for 
their added producer costs. The grain merchants may have gained margins on new 
volumes since then, which probably have compensated for their incremental system 
costs: by 2003 an estimated 89% of canola acreage involved HT varieties. 
Furthermore, in most cases the canola was crushed through subsidiary crushers, 
increasing their volumes and offsetting some of the incremental costs.  Finally, 
although the research/seed companies may have lost some money due to the costs of 
the IPPM systems, they gained significantly in terms of market adoption (Table 4.6).  
It is very likely that if Monsanto and AgrEvo had introduced the seeds without 
IPPM systems, farmers would have shunned the new seeds.  So the only real choice 
for early and aggressive adoption was to pay for IPPM systems.  In this case one 
could argue that the two companies accelerated adoption by at least one year, which 
was estimated to have a net present value in 1995 of more than $100 million.  
Clearly, the IPPM system for HT canola directed to Japan was a win-win situation. 
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Table 4.6:  Net present value of earlier adoption of new canola technologies in 
        Canada 
 
Year % acres in GM 
canola 
Revenue impacts of one year delay in introduction 
assuming $15/acre benefit  ($M) 
 Actual Delayed Actual Delayed Absolute 
Difference 
Net Present value 
in 1995 of 
difference 
1995 1%  2.0 0.0 -2.0 -2.0 
1996 4% 1% 5.3 1.3 -4.0 -3.6 
1997 33% 4% 59.6 7.2 -52.4 -43.3 
1998 44% 33% 89.3 67.0 -22.3 -16.8 
1999 69% 44% 143.9 91.7 -52.1 -35.6 
Total   300.1 167.2 -132.9 -101.3 
Source: Smyth and Phillips, 2001b. 
 
The results are less clear for IPPM systems for either Europe or for B. rapa.  Given 
the uncertainty about Europe, the canola industry made a deliberate decision to 
abandon the market in 1996. The European market was not a strong export market 
for Canadian canola—Europe is usually self-sufficient in terms of canola production 
and actually exports canola when price premiums are available. The canola 
industry’s view was that future European canola exports had limited potential so, 
once Japan approved GM products in 1997, the IPPM system was discontinued, 
thereby removing all possibility of supplying European canola markets. 
 
Monsanto’s IPPM system since 1997 for four B. rapa varieties has posed more 
difficulties.  Although the logic is the same as for the B. napus varieties, the 
economics are different.  B. rapa has taken longer to get approval because of 
different environmental impacts (the seed can stay in soil for up to 15 years and still 
germinate). As a result of the longer approval time, and much smaller market (B. 
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rapa is estimated to account for less than 10% of canola acreage in Western Canada 
in 1999), Monsanto has decided to terminate its work on B. rapa. 
 
 
4.4.2 Governance Mechanisms 
This section utilizes the methodology to examine how transparency was 
incorporated into the process and how this facilitated foreign market reassurance 
regarding Canada’s ability to differentiate the canola exports. Specifically, this 
section identifies the importance of the role played by the canola industry 
organization, the Canola Council of Canada (CCC). The Canola Council of Canada 
initiated and facilitated many of the discussions that were held with the Japanese 
importers. The CCC’s role was crucial in providing trust and assurance that Canada 
would meet its commitment of exporting only non-GM canola to Japan. This section 
provides the details on the relationships that existed within the area of overlap in 
Figure 3.2 between the canola industry and Canadian regulators. 
 
Although the Seeds Act requires that any new canola variety seeking registration in 
Canada be an improvement over existing varieties, decisions are made based on 
agronomic attributes and not potential market impacts. Given delays in approvals in 
Japan and the EU, the industry was challenged to develop a system that would 
provide assurances to import markets that the products shipped contained only 
approved varieties. This involved three discrete steps. First, the Canola Council of 
Canada worked with the industry participants to develop agreement that all 
shipments to Japan and the EU should contain only varieties approved for import by 
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those countries. Second, the individual industry actors developed their own IPPM 
systems to handle their proprietary products. Third, the CCC and the provincial 
growers’ associations worked with the grain exporters and the key regulators and 
buyers in Japan and the EU to raise confidence in the Canadian solution. 
 
The process began in February 1995 when the Pest Management Regulatory Agency 
submitted recommendations for approval for two varieties of HT canola to the 
Expert Committee for Canola (this followed three years of regulatory review for 
feed, food and environmental safety). The Department of Agriculture, which 
oversaw the Seeds Act (that responsibility has since devolved to the CFIA, approved 
the two varieties in March 1995. Once the new varieties were registered through the 
Seeds Act, the product was fully licensed to be grown and enter the grain handling 
system, which implicitly includes exports. The CFIA did not have any authority (nor 
do they at present) to require the owner of the variety or the canola industry to 
segregate the new varieties from traditional varieties. Once oilseed varieties are 
granted variety approval by the CFIA, all production and exporting issues belong to 
the various oilseed industries. 
 
Early in 1995 the Canola Council of Canada asked the Expert Committee for Canola 
to delay making recommendations for future registrations of GM canola until such 
time as the developers could demonstrate that the product had regulatory approval in 
the defined market (i.e. Canada, US and Japan). Canada and the US had already 
approved the licensing and importing of GM products. Japan was in the process of 
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developing regulatory policies. Given the lack of a legal mandate, the regulators 
were not able to respond. 
 
As a result, the canola industry came together in late 1995 to discuss the concern 
that the major canola importing countries had not yet developed guidelines for 
importing GM products. The result of this discussion process was a voluntary 
agreement between the seed, grain and processing companies to co-operate and to 
separate the 1996 production (the limited 1995 production was for seed purposes 
only and did not enter the handling system). This agreement respected the CCC’s 
request that products from these fields not be allowed to reach international markets 
until the appropriate national regulators approved imports of GM products.  
 
The second stage was to develop the IPPM systems. It was realized early in the 
process that the project could not be done without the full co-operation, support and 
involvement of a grain handler. The only way to develop an acceptable and efficient 
system was to have knowledge of the production process and the marketplace, which 
only existed in the grain companies. They analyzed grain flow patterns and designed 
systems, which fit with the market and the grain handling processes currently in 
place. The Saskatchewan Wheat Pool, Alberta Wheat Pool and Manitoba Pool 
Elevators, in particular, were instrumental in the early IPPM programs for both 
Monsanto and AgrEvo. Each company developed a set of procedures that each of 
the stakeholders (seed companies, producer, grain handler, transporter and 
processing companies) would apply to IPPM the grain. This involved a team of 
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experts in regulatory affairs, development and marketing departments in the grain 
and seed/research companies.  The teams also kept the Canola Council of Canada 
and, through the Council, the Canadian regulators fully informed of the entire 
process, from design to planting and harvest to crushing. This transparent process 
helped build the trust within Canada that was necessary to convince foreign 
regulators and buyers of the sincerity of the effort.  
 
While the IPPM systems were being developed, the CCC worked with grain 
exporters, regulators and importers in Japan to convince them that Canada was 
identity preserving GM varieties and that problems would not arise in export 
shipments. Both Monsanto and AgrEvo officials admit that the CCC played a vital 
role in providing the Japanese with the assurances that Canada could and would 
identity preserve, which allowed the Japanese to continue to import while the new 
varieties were under review. This mutually beneficial arrangement contributed to 
IPPM policy having greater legitimacy in the eyes of Canada’s key canola export 
markets. One of the primary reasons that the Japanese had a large degree of ex ante 
trust in the Canadian IPPM system was that it was built upon a 20 year relationship. 
Beginning in 1977, the Canadian and Japanese industry began annual consultations 
on crop quality and quantity (Adolphe, 2000); these consultations became biannual 
in 1987. The CCC over the years convinced the Japanese that Canada has a credible 
variety registration system that prevents new varieties from being released without 
first being approved by industry and government. The lengthy working relationship 
and understanding of the variety registration system allowed the Japanese to trust 
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that the Canadian canola industry could identity preserve GM canola and did not 
demand any additional insurance clauses, right of inspection or testing. 
 
It is extremely doubtful whether an outside group or agency could have developed 
an effective IPPM system. If the design of the system had been contracted to an 
outside agency that lacked a fundamental understanding of grain transfer, there is a 
high probability that the system would not have had the capability to successfully 
meet the defined objectives. Had the IPPM process been forced upon the industry by 
government, there is some doubt as to whether this would have produced superior 
results. AgrEvo and the Saskatchewan Wheat Pool believe that by taking the 
initiative on this issue and working with the CCC, they were able to develop a 
system that met the needs of Japanese regulators, Canadian farmers and the 
technology developers.  A mandated program might have met the needs of 
regulators, but it would not likely have encouraged industry funding nor would it 
likely have been as effective in getting the seed in the hands of as many innovative 
farmers (a critical goal of the programs). Finally, it is worth noting that the system 
was effective—there were no documented reports of co-mingling. 
 
 
4.5 Conclusions 
The methodological framework would suggest that in the areas of overlap, one of 
the principal actors needs to be the initiator of a strategy to address the issues that 
are created from the commercialization of transformative technologies. Commonly, 
the initiator is the regulatory agency. In the case of ensuring that GM canola was 
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contained within the North American market, this was not an option--the initiative 
had to come from industry. Whether industry based initiatives to develop 
governance structures and to manage the marketplace liabilities would be met with 
the same level of foreign market assurance as existed in the mid 1990s is doubtful 
today. However, this study identifies how industry and regulators can and did work 
co-operatively to develop standards that provided confidence to concerned export 
markets. The market liabilities were identified, strategies were then developed and 
relationships were utilized to ensure that Canada could continue to export canola to 
concerned markets while these markets completed their own regulatory 
requirements.  
 
Market transactions for goods with experience and credence attributes require a high 
degree of trust, which requires both effective public and private regulatory 
mechanisms.  The canola industry’s experience with genetically modified herbicide 
tolerant canola illustrates that, provided there is a public base for managing credence 
and experiential issues, the industry can effectively handle many of the market 
considerations through private identity preserved production and marketing systems.  
Provided the expected returns exceed the costs, private initiative will work. All 
industry participants assert that this will depend on tolerance levels for shipments 
(Kennedy, 1999).  Regardless of whether an IPPM system is established to capture 
value for a GM trait, special crop trait or traditional variety, it can not deliver a 
100% guarantee of purity. This lack of a purity guarantee has the potential to create 
outrage with consumers should co-mingling occur and products on grocery store 
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shelves be tested and found to contain GM ingredients. Realistic tolerance levels 
will need to be implemented prior to the increased use of IPPM systems.  
 
Provided realistic tolerance levels can be established, IPPM systems may become a 
permanent method of capturing attribute value from food product markets. Kennett, 
et al., (1998) observed that grading standards can reduce the need for vertical 
integration, which is likely true for search and experience goods. Credence goods, 
however, impose requirements that a grading system cannot handle. Industry 
participants in those IPPM systems studied observed that the design of every IPPM 
system will vary depending on the genetics and marketing of the variety involved. 
Grading, which homogenizes products, would not satisfy the commercial needs of 
the industry.   
 
So far all of the IPPM systems developed have been custom built to meet the 
specifications of the technology owner and the market. The limited horizontal co-
ordination between the systems has come through the research companies (e.g. 
Monsanto and AgrEvo) working with their agents (the grain companies) and through 
the CCC’s efforts in export markets. For the most part the grain companies have 
viewed the IPPM systems as valuable proprietary services. Ultimately, however, 
these systems are designed to earn trust, which is a cumulative process.  Past 
successful actions can contribute to achieving a higher level of trust but failures in 
one part of the market can spill-over to other market segments. If IPPM systems are 
here to stay, then it may not be enough to rely on independent systems. 
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One aspect of the operation of the IPPM system that, on the surface, is not readily 
identifiable as a benefit is the ‘learning experience’ that was gained by all 
stakeholders involved in this process.  The operation of this IPPM system for 
genetically modified canola was the first incidence of a system designed to prevent 
the co-mingling of a transgenic product from conventional products. With the 
present day movement towards consumer-driven agriculture as opposed to producer-
driven agriculture, the requirement for IPPM systems will only increase. The 
participants in this IPPM system have gained valuable knowledge in developing a 
functioning and internationally credibly system that insures the quality of export 
products. 
 
This research is relevant to those in other grain and oilseed commodities that are 
considering product differentiation. The driver of this IPPM system was to ensure 
that access to foreign markets was maintained even after introduction of a new 
variety that was not yet approved in those markets. As the demands for product 
differentiation change, so to will the design specifications of the IPPM system. 
Striving to meet a 0.9% tolerance level (present EU level allowed for unintentional 
co-mingling) with a crop that is an open pollinator may be virtually impossible due 
to cross-pollination. The possibility of meeting 0.9% tolerance levels with self-
pollinators is much greater. From this research it is clear that product differentiation 
systems require leaders or ‘integrators’.  The supply chain can be organized and 
regulated by an integrator at the start of the supply chain or at the demand end (as 
appears to be happening in the UK). Furthermore, this research suggests that 
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regardless of where the initiative starts, it is extremely important that that integrator 
have a financial stake in the outcome.  Hence, demand side efforts will require a 
retailer or manufacturer who can see some benefit, such as a price premium or 
market share, from their activities. The costs are simply too large to do this as a pro 
bono effort.  
 
There would appear to be two ways in which IPPM systems could be made more 
efficient. Ultimately, the goal should be to manage liability. One of the pan-industry 
participants—such as the Canola Council of Canada or the Canadian Seed Trade 
Association—could become the custom developer or integrator for the system, 
providing purpose-built but quality-assured systems to meet market needs.  The 
difficulty is that neither entity has any equity at stake in the transactions which may 
lower the entity's commitment to the quality-assured system. This may reduce the 
quality-assured system's credibility in the eyes of producers and customers. 
Alternatively, the industry could adopt an external quality assurance system—such 
as the International Standards Organization (ISO) or Hazard Analysis Critical 
Control Point (HACCP) systems—to standardize the process of developing IPPM 
systems. This would differ from a traditional grading system in that the quality 
assurance system would assure integrity of process and not the standard itself, which 
would be a negotiated or contracted feature determined in the marketplace. The 
result of this is that the developer of the quality assurance system can not monitor 
the final product, just the overall system. Any time the standards are contracted to 
private firms, there is the chance for opportunistic behaviour. This would leave the 
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operation of the system in the hands of the firms with equity at stake but could help 
to build cumulative trust in the system. 
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Chapter 5 
 
Product Differentiation and Consumer Labeling 
 
 
5.1   Introduction 
This chapter examines the relationship between the federal regulators and society 
and what the role of the regulators can be regarding food safety. This chapter 
specifically relates to the area of overlap identified by the number 5 in Figure 3.2. 
The focus of the research for this chapter is on how GM products can be 
differentiated during production and how that information is then communicated to 
the public. The intent is to examine the different product differentiation options and 
to assess how consumers relate to each of the options. The chapter identifies the 
driver for each of the product differentiation options and discusses how each of the 
different actors attempts to communicate the information to the consumer. The 
chapter concludes with a review of consumer labeling demands and attempts to 
identify what it is that consumers are searching for regarding label information. 
 
Agricultural biotechnology has in less than a decade dramatically impacted the 
supply and demand of agricultural food products. While biotechnology has offered 
few new food products to the marketplace, it has revolutionized the method of 
producing and delivering conventional food products.  An increasing number of 
cereals and oilseeds are being differentiated due to protein or health attributes, to 
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ensure their value or uniqueness is captured and maintained throughout the supply 
chain.   
 
Over 28 countries plus the EU system have either developed or publicly declared 
their intent to introduce mandatory labeling legislation for GM products (Phillips 
and McNeill, 2002). If exporters in countries producing GM crops wish to retain 
those export markets requiring labeling as clients, then systems of product 
differentiation will have to be established to ensure the continuity of exports to these 
concerned markets. 
 
Formal governance structures for these differentiation systems are frequently 
lacking. Product differentiation systems can be imposed at the time of variety 
registration if the novel trait is deemed to harm food safety. More often than not 
differentiation systems are not required by government edict. Rather, they are 
undertaken to realize private objectives. However, private firms must take great care 
to ensure that the product differentiation systems they choose correlates with their 
objectives. 
 
If the Canadian agri-food industry does not adopt product differentiation systems, 
two alternatives are possible. First, the global agri-food market could continue to 
divide into two distinct markets with only limited interaction between the two. Some 
markets, such as the EU, and some food processors, have decided to forgo GM 
technology for now, and are devoting increasing effort to securing adequate volumes 
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of GM-free foodstuffs to satisfy their customers. Consumers in those markets for the 
most part do not have any opportunity to consume GM foods, as they simply are not 
available, even though a recent poll of British consumers found 40% were indifferent 
to consuming GM food (MORI, 2002). Other markets, such as in North America, 
have rapidly adopted the technology and for the most part do not offer a choice of 
GM-free food to their consumers. There are some small, but growing, niche markets 
for organic and GM-free products in North America that do label in a manner that 
allows the consumer to identify these products. Trade between these two blocks has 
slowed dramatically in all product markets where GM varieties are being used. As a 
result, Canada faces the possibility of losing export markets where GM traits have 
not been commercialized and the consumers in the export markets do not wish GM 
foods in any product lines. For example, US corn exports to the EU dropped from 
US$574 million in 1995 to US$175 million in 1999 and soybean exports dropped 
from US$2.1 billion to US$1.1 billion while Canada’s canola exports to the EU 
dropped from C$204 million to C$8 million (Industry Canada, 2000). Kuntz (2001) 
has estimated that if GM wheat is introduced without a product differentiation 
system, Canada could lose as much as C$185 million per year or 70% of the annual 
premium it earns in the global wheat trade. Meanwhile, food processors in places 
like the EU have diverted their purchases to markets where GM varieties are not 
produced, such as northern Brazil for soybeans and Australia for canola. 
 
A second alternative would be for companies to shelve their new technology.  In 
Canada, GM seed potatoes were withdrawn from the market in 2001 in response to 
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food processor concerns while the developer of GM flax announced it had 
deregistered the variety because Europe, which imports approximately 60% of 
Canadian production, has not approved the variety for import. In the spring of 2004, 
Monsanto announced that it was withdrawing its application for approval of GM 
wheat in Canada due to the concern expressed by Canadian wheat import markets. 
 
Neither of these alternatives is desirable. If Canada, for example, adopts the 
technology and loses key premium markets, much or all of the benefits of the new 
technologies will be offset by market losses, with producers facing the greatest 
losses. Similarly, if Canada forgoes productivity or quality enhancing opportunities, 
its producers will face even stiffer competition in the residual commodity markets 
(see Phillips and Khachatourians, 2001, for further discussion of this). 
 
Lehnert, et al., (2000, p. 409) succinctly make the point about successful product 
introduction: 
 
Failures occurring during the establishment of a new product or a new 
process cause high correction costs.  They may often lead to losses of 
market share and damage to the image of the supply chain.  It is 
therefore reasonable to pay attention to potential failures in the early 
stages of establishment and process planning. 
 
This lynch-pin concept regarding product commercialization, defines a new 
approach required for the introduction of new GM crops: do no harm! Caution, 
diligence and concern for others must be the leading motto for all participants in 
differentiation systems. In the past, the focus has been on getting new products into 
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the market, while adjustments to the supply chain were made as one went along. 
Clearly, this strategy is risky.  
 
Industry needs to identify and learn from the difficulties, successes and failures that 
occurred when introducing GM canola, corn, cotton and soybeans to ensure the 
successful introduction of new GM crops. 
 
Section 5.2 examines the literature on product differentiation and provides a 
definition for each system. A detailed examination of the features that are unique to 
each form of product differentiation and how they relate to the conceptual 
framework is offered in Section 5.3. Section 5.4 uses the framework to examine the 
labeling debate. Section 5.5 offers some conclusions. 
 
 
5.2   Background 
The definition of product differentiation can have several nuances, depending on the 
justification for the differentiation. Frequently the terms identity preserved 
production and marketing (IPPM), segregation and traceability are used 
interchangeably in the biotechnology and supply chain literature. This is creating 
misconceptions about the distinct role that each of these product differentiation 
systems has in the supply of agri-food products. The purpose of this section is to 
identify definitions that exist in the literature to date and to suggest definitions where 
the literature is absent. 
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Identity Preserved Production and Marketing 
The first product differentiation system, identity preserved production and 
marketing, has evolved over time in the grain and oilseed industry. Purchasers of 
raw products became more demanding about the quality and purity of the product 
they were purchasing so the grain handling system gradually developed distinct 
channels to market the differing grades of grains and oilseeds. All grains and 
oilseeds are purchased by a grading system in today’s marketplace and this grading 
system has premiums that rise as one moves from low to high grades. The 
relationship of premiums to differing grades for private market incentives is the 
definition of an IPPM system. 
 
Identify preserved production and marketing systems are initiated by private firms in 
the grain and oilseed industry to extract premiums from a marketplace that has 
expressed a willingness to pay for an identifiable and marketable product trait or 
feature. An IPPM system is a ‘closed loop’ channel that facilitates the production 
and delivery of an assured quality by allowing identification of a commodity from 
the germplasm or breeding stock to the processed product on a retail shelf 
(Buckwell, et al., 1999; Lin, 2002). These IPPM systems are predominantly 
voluntary private firm based initiatives that range between systems that are loosely 
structured (i.e. malting barley) with high tolerance levels and those with rigid 
structures (i.e. non-GM European markets) with minimal tolerance levels. Firms 
operating in the minimal tolerance field achieve this by developing and adhering to 
strict protocols that specify production standards, provide for sampling and ensure 
appropriate documentation to audit the flow of product.  
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A survey of the literature on IPPM shows that while there is growing discussion 
about IPPM systems, there are very few working definitions. Lin (2002) suggests 
that an identity preservation system “… is a more stringent (and expensive) handling 
process and requires that strict separation, typically involving containerized 
shipping, is maintained at all times. IP lessens the need for additional testing as 
control of the commodity changes hands, and it lowers liability and risk of biotech 
and non-biotech commingling for growers and handlers.” (p.263) This definition 
conflicts with the definition offered in this chapter as Lin sees IPPM as having a 
limited role in the movement of grains and oilseeds due to extremely low tolerance 
levels. Lin’s definition of IPPM and segregation still deals with the same system, 
one that is initiated voluntarily by private firms in an attempt to capture premiums. It 
is shown below how IPPM systems differ from segregation systems. 
 
The remainder of the literature on IPPM systems relates to theoretical and 
operational uses of IPPM systems. Bullock, et al., (2000) and Bullock and 
Desquilbet (2001) discuss differentiation between GM and non-GM products and 
Herrman, et al., (1999) examine the feasibility of wheat segregation. Bender, et al., 
(1999), Bender and Hill (2000) and Good, et al., (2000) have released a series of 
papers on handling specialty corn and soybean crops, with costs being the focus, not 
the defining of the system used to handle the specialty crop. Additionally, 
Miranowski, et al., (1999) offer some perspectives on the economics of IPPM, while 
Maltsbarger and Kalaitzandonakes (2000) provide a solid theoretical model for 
examining the cost of identity preservation. 
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Numerous IPPM systems are operating in Canada and around the world. Some 
extend only between the breeders and the wholesale market or processor, while 
others extend right up to the retailer. Their structure depends on the attribute they are 
trying to preserve. Some novel oils, such as low linolenic oils that are more stable in 
fryers, only have value at the processing level while others, such as high oleic oils, 
have health attributes that can be marketed to consumers. Identity preserved 
production and marketing systems are important for providing information to 
consumers about the provenance of a product, as those attributes are not visible or 
detectable in the product itself. 
 
Segregation 
The second product differentiation system, segregation, has frequently been 
incorrectly applied to the grading of different classes of grains and oilseeds in order 
to receive a higher price for the commodity than if it were allowed to be co-mingled. 
Segregation systems have a formal structure and in fact can act as regulatory 
standards. Segregation differs from IPPM in that the focus of the system is not on 
capturing premiums but rather on ensuring that potentially hazardous crops are 
prevented from entering supply chains that have products destined for human 
consumption. 
 
Segregation can be defined as a regulatory tool that is required for variety approval 
and commercial release of grain and oilseed varieties that could enter the supply 
chain and create the potential for serious health hazards. The majority of these 
varieties would be crop varieties developed for industrial uses. Segregation systems 
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can be developed as part of a variety registration process, where government 
regulators use contract registration to ensure that certain novel varieties will not 
enter the handling system of like varieties. The private firm seeking registration of 
the novel variety has to demonstrate that there is a segregation system developed to 
ensure the containment of the variety. 
 
Lin (2002) defines segregation as the requirement “… that crops be kept separate to 
avoid commingling during planting, harvesting, loading and unloading, storage and 
transport.” (p. 263)  Segregation systems will be used when potential food safety 
concerns exist over the co-mingling of the segregated product and all other like 
products. In short, IPPM are used to capture premiums and segregation is used to 
ensure food safety. 
 
There are very few segregation system presently operation in Canada. There is a 
small amount of Brassica juncea being segregated for the first time in 2002. The 
best known segregation system in Canada is for high erucic acid rapeseed. This 
variety of rapeseed has been produced using a segregation system since 1982.  
 
Traceability 
The third product differentiation system, traceability, is commonly used in the food 
industry. Retail products found with unacceptable bacteria levels or intolerable 
levels of pesticide or chemical residues need to be quickly and completely removed 
from store-shelves. Traceability systems allow for retailers and the supply chain to 
 126
identify the source of contamination and thereby initiate procedures to remedy the 
situation. 
 
The key focus of traceability is increasingly on food safety. For the purposes of this 
paper, traceability will refer to systems that focus on ensuring food safety. Recently, 
the focus for developing traceability systems for new sectors of the marketplace has 
shifted from food safety towards extracting premiums from the marketplace. 
Extracting market premiums could never be the driver for developing a traceability 
system. In and of itself traceability systems do not define quality, they simply trace 
it. If market premiums are the driver, then the developers need to use an IPPM 
system as these systems are properly structured to capture premiums.  
 
The International Organization for Standardization has defined traceability as the 
“… ability to trace the history, application or location of an entity by means of 
recorded identifications …” and the Codex Alimentarius Commission has adopted 
this as its working definition for all Codex standards (Codex, 2001). The EU (2001) 
has defined traceability quite clearly in relation to GM products. Directive 
2001/18/EC defines traceability as “… the ability to trace GMOs and products 
produced from GMOs at all stages of the placing on the market throughout the 
production and distribution chains facilitating quality control and also the possibility 
to withdraw products. Importantly, effective traceability provides a ‘safety net’ 
should any unforeseen adverse effects be established.” (p. 2) 
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The economic literature from supply chain management defines traceability as the 
information system necessary to provide the history of a product or a process from 
origin to point of final sale (Wilson and Clarke, 1998; Jack et al., 1998; Timon and 
O’Reilly, 1998). While Dickinson and Bailey (2001) suggest that their results from a 
laboratory auction market regarding features of meat traceability show there is 
willingness by consumers to pay premiums for traceability, the key focus has to be 
on food safety. Prior to adopting traceability systems there has to a clear indication 
of specifically what aspects of food safety can be improved by the adoption. 
Marginal improvements in food safety would be a dubious reason for proceeding, 
rather there must be a clear and evident improvement in the level of food safety. 
 
Traceability systems have been developed for beef products in Canada. Traceability 
was developed in conjunction with a quality assurance system to reassure export 
markets about the quality of Canadian beef products. However, it should be noted 
that this system has been met with great resistance at the farm level, as producers do 
not want to allow government regulators onto their farms or provide regulators with 
any sensitive farm information. In part, this is due to the lack of on-farm regulation 
to date in Canadian agriculture. In a similar quality assurance effort, the Canadian 
grain and oilseed industries are conducting a two-year pilot project in 2002 and 2003 
to evaluate the costs and benefits of an on-farm HACCP based traceability system.  
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5.3   The Conceptual Framework 
This section examines the area of overlap in Figure 3.2 identified by the number 5. 
This area of overlap between regulators and consumers is key to understanding how 
and why Canadian consumers express confidence in the quality and safety of the 
food products that are available to be purchased in Canada. Each product 
differentiation system provides the consumer with a different message and how 
elements of these systems can be incorporated to provide the most valued 
information to the consumer is an important issue. As will be shown, the way 
information is presented to consumers using labels is viewed in a variety of ways.  
 
Each product differentiation system has features that are unique, while also 
possessing features that are common to one of, if not both of, the other systems. 
Table 5.1 compares numerous features of product differentiation. These features are 
classified into those that apply to the complete supply chain and those that apply to 
the three distinct stages of supply chains. The first stage are features that are most 
commonly related to the production stage of the supply chain. Included in this stage 
are seed development firms, producers and grain handlers. The second stage of the 
supply chain is the processing stage. This stage includes all firms involved in the 
supply chain from the point when a raw ingredient is received to the point that a 
final product is shipped to the retailer. The third stage is the retail stage of the supply 
chain. This stage includes those firms that provide products to consumers, such as 
grocery stores and restaurants.  
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Overall Supply Chain Management 
The features in this stage are those that are important to the entire supply chain. 
Unlike the features in the following sections, these features span all sectors of the 
food industry and each participant in the supply chain must ensure that their 
commitment to these features is at least as strong as the other participants. 
 
The objective of an IPPM system is revenue management. Premiums need to be 
available to attract participants and the efforts of participants will be directed 
towards receiving a share of the premium. Participation in these systems will be 
voluntary. The lead stakeholder in IPPM systems are private firms seeking to 
capture the increased value of special traits. The role of the regulatory body will be 
to ensure that industry standards are in place to prevent consumer fraud from 
occurring. The information may be asymmetric as only the product seller can know 
with certainty what level, if any, of cheating has occurred in the delivery of the 
product. Moral hazards may be present due to the presence of premiums. Effective 
IPPM systems that span entire supply chains must have accurate two-way 
information flows. This means that information about purity and quality of the 
product flows downstream and that information coming from consumer demand 
flows upstream. While the information flow in IPPM systems is two-way, the focus 
of these systems is downstream. Each participant in the system wants to ensure they 
extract a portion of the value of the special trait while they are involved with either 
the production, processing or retailing of the product. This means that each 
participant will focus on the needs of the next participant in the supply chain. Market 
failure can result in fraud charges for mis- or improper labeling and also create 
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awareness with consumers that certain brand names can not be trusted. Testing and 
auditing will be done by second parties acting on behalf of the brand owner or 
developer of the special trait. 
 
Table 5.1: Comparing identity preservation, segregation and traceability 
 
 IPPM Segregation Traceability 
1. Overall management  
Objective Revenue management Liability management Product safety  
Status Voluntary Mandatory Voluntary or mandatory 
Lead stakeholder Private company Regulator Commodity group, 
standards organization or 
regulator 
Regulatory agency 
involvement 
Consumer fraud Regulatory oversight Consumer fraud 
Information Asymmetric Full Asymmetric 
Risk Moral hazard None Moral hazard 
Information flow  Two way Two way One way 
Supply chain focus Downstream Downstream Upstream 
Penalties for failure in product 
market 
Consumer fraud 
charges; lost brand 
value 
Criminal prosecution; 
mandated product recalls 
Consumer fraud charges; 
exclusion from product 
category 
Testing/auditing 2nd party/brand owner 1st party/regulator 3rd party/standards 
organization 
2. Production stage features 
Production arrangements Formal production 
contracts 
Regulation and contracts Membership in quality 
standard 
Production controls In-season agronomic 
rules vary with product 
Formal buffer zones; 
post production land use 
controls 
Process standards adopted 
and record keeping 
Premiums for producers  Short and long term  Short and long term Short term 
3. Processing stage features 
Enforcement  Private Public Collective 
Quality criteria based on  Product standards Regulations and or 
HACCP rules 
Processes (e.g. ISO) 
Tolerance levels Variable  Set in law Performance based 
Testing/auditing 2nd party  1st party  3rd party 
4. Retail stage features 
Provides access to Branded product 
markets 
Markets Product categories 
Information provided to Consumer Regulator Regulator, retailer or 
processor 
Final market price premiums Yes None None 
Labelling Private brands None  Quality standard 
Source: Author 
 
The objective of a segregation system is to manage any and all liabilities that may 
arise through the production and processing of the commodity. Participation is not 
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optional, any producer or firm involved with segregated products will have to 
comply with standards established that have been approved by the regulatory 
agency. The private firm will have the responsibility of developing the actual 
system, but the regulatory agency will be the final arbiter on approving the system 
for field use. Information will be fully disclosed due to the importance of protecting 
food safety, which will result in the lowering of risks in the system. Segregation 
systems must have two-way information flow due to the concern about food safety 
should co-mingling occur. The focus of product delivery within a segregation supply 
chain will be downstream. Segregated commodities commonly have industrial value, 
so these products will be supplied to meet the criteria of the processor. The costs of 
market failure would most definitely see a complete recall of any and all products 
suspected of being affected. It may also result in criminal prosecution in the most 
severe instance. Testing and auditing will be vital features of segregation systems 
and will be conducted by agents of, or acting on behalf of, the regulator. This 
process will also reinforce the level of trust with foreign export markets. 
 
The objective of traceability systems is ensuring that products available for 
consumption are as safe as possible. For example, the beef industry uses a 
traceability system to ensure that no animals are butchered with drug residues still in 
the meat, producers that sell livestock too soon after treatment can be prohibited 
from selling. Participation in a traceability system can be voluntary, this will depend 
on where in the supply chain the participant is located. The closer the participant is 
to the start of the supply chain, the more likely it will be that participation is 
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voluntary. The lead stakeholder may be a commodity group demanding greater 
clarity in or selection of food products, a standards council that is comprised of 
industry representatives from all sectors of the supply chain or the regulator to 
ensure consumer protection. Information may be asymmetric due to the voluntary 
nature at the start of traceability supply chains. A moral hazard may also exist due to 
the inability to fully test for some features of traceability. Traceability systems will 
only have information flows that are one-way as these systems are designed to react 
quickly to food safety concerns. If a product is discovered to exceed any defined 
tolerance level at any point in the supply chain, traceability will be used to identify 
the source of the problem and to locate any and all retail products that may be 
affected. This results in the focus of traceability systems being upstream. Market 
failures can also result in consumer fraud charges in addition to permanent exclusion 
from selling into that supply chain. Testing and auditing will be conducted according 
to the standards developed by third party organizations. 
 
Production Stage Features 
The production stage features are those at the front end of the supply chain and 
involve seed development firms, producers and grain and oilseed handlers. 
Historically, this has been the starting point for supply chains, as seed development 
firms would commercialize a new crop variety and marketing the benefits of the 
variety would result in producers adopting the variety. This push version of supply 
chains has had difficulty adapting to the demands of consumers for a pull supply 
chain. 
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Identity preserved production and marketing systems are voluntarily developed by 
private firms to ensure that all stakeholders in the supply chain for a specific product 
capture a share of the value from special trait varieties. Private firms may use 
technical use agreements to protect the intellectual property of the special trait or 
production contracts that have specific conditions that must be met in order to 
receive the premium. Grain companies typically organize and manage these 
contracts. These systems are typically developed for niche market products (i.e. 
organic products) and are typified by small acreage and low volumes. There is 
presently some debate as to whether long run premiums for producers are 
sustainable, as they may be bid away due to competition among producers. 
Producers may compete for contracts with premiums, causing the firm offering the 
contracts to lower the premiums and eventually removing the premium. 
 
Segregation is focused on ensuring that the integrity of the special trait is not 
allowed to adventitiously co-mingle with other products destined for the human 
supply chain. Production contracts would be used by the private firms to ensure that 
all of the commodity being segregated is collected and that the producer retains no 
amount of seed. Buffer zones are required for segregation systems as a preventative 
measure for reducing cross-pollination. Producers may also have restrictions placed 
on what crop varieties would be allowed to be grown the following year on fields 
that produced segregated crops. Premiums would be available in both the short and 
long term to ensure that product supply is maintained. 
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Traceability is very fragmented at the producer stage. Production arrangement would 
largely be made through membership in the organization established to create and 
manage the industry. Production control would be through industry standards and 
stringent record keeping. The cost of initially becoming involved in a traceability 
system results in short term premiums being available to attract producers. This 
premium may be available to attract the necessary supply. Long term benefits are 
not evident as the premiums evaporate when the desired number of producers 
become involved.  
 
Processing Stage Features 
Processing stage features are those that relate to firms involved in the manufacturing 
of food products. Most of these features contain aspects of quality assurance and 
industry developed standards.   
 
Quality standards will be enforced by private commitment to industry standards, as 
the value of the product will be greater given higher purity and/or protein levels. The 
enforcement of standards is crucial as products that do not conform to the desired 
quality level will not be accepted. Tolerance levels will vary from product to product 
and also will depend on the preferences of the final consumer. Testing and tolerance 
levels will be important to ensure that the purity and the high quality levels of the 
product are maintained. Frequently, these tests will be conducted by second parties. 
 
Enforcement of standards will be very important in segregation systems. To ensure 
that products that could be a hazard to the human food supply chain are prevented 
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from entering that supply chain, functional operating standards must be agreed to by 
all participants. The enforcement of these standards will need to be rigorous. Quality 
will be defined in regulations or be created through the implementation of a HACCP 
system. Tolerance levels for co-mingling will be set by the regulator. Because of the 
importance of standards, the features of testing and tolerance levels will also be 
important. Testing will need to be conducted frequently to ensure that the 
commodity is being properly segregated and that none of the product is entering 
other supply chains accidentally. This will be done by agents of the regulator. 
 
The processing stage is very important for traceability as this is the stage in the 
supply chain where traceability begins to be rigorously applied. Enforcement of 
standards is valued in traceability due to the nature of traceability to focus on 
increased food safety. The lack of high standards and careful enforcement of the 
standards may result in costly recalls of products therefore, the enforcement of 
standards will be done collectively in an attempt to ensure continued high quality. 
Quality will be focused on the production processes to ensure that the highest 
standards possible are maintained at all times. Tolerance levels exist for food safety 
reasons as no product can be entirely 100% free of potentially harmful effects, so 
tolerance levels are established at levels that ensure safe consumption. When 
tolerance levels are exceeded, the risk of harm to the public develops and these 
products must then be recalled from the marketplace. The costs of recall are 
substantial. Not only does the firm have the cost of gathering and disposing of the 
product in question, there may also be a loss of trust in that brand name by 
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consumers that will require aggressive marketing campaigns to overcome. Testing 
and auditing of traceability systems are done by third parties. 
 
Retail Stage Features 
The final stage of the supply chain is the retail stage. The features in this category 
apply to those firms that are involved with selling food products to consumers. This 
is the stage of the pull supply chain (as opposed to the traditional push supply chain) 
that is now seen as driving many modern supply chains. 
 
Identity preserved production and marketing systems may play a large role in the 
introduction of new GM food products. New GM products may be introduced 
without complete international market acceptance and IPPM systems can be used to 
ensure continued access to these markets. An IPPM system will be able to provide 
information to the consumer about the uniqueness of the branded product that is 
being identity preserved. For an IPPM system to function properly, and ensure that 
all stakeholders remain committed to the process, final market price premiums must 
be available. If this premium is not available for the retailer, an incentive is created 
for the retailer to no longer carry the product. Products of IPPM systems will need to 
be labeled to justify the final market premium. If the consumer is not able to identify 
the value of the product, the consumer will not pay a premium to purchase the 
product. 
 
Segregation systems will also be used to ensure that market access is continually 
guaranteed. A co-ordinated education and marketing effort by the regulatory agency 
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and the private firms involved can be effective in creating trust in foreign markets 
that production of potentially hazardous products can exist and not jeopardize export 
market streams. Most segregated products are differentiated until the product 
reaches the processing stage therefore, there are no final market premiums available, 
nor is labeling of the product a concern. Most segregated products will be for 
industrial uses only, that is why premiums and labeling are not determining factors. 
 
Traceability is crucial for providing access to new categories of products. Many 
markets have demanded documentation regarding product composition prior to 
allowing market access. Consumer information is fundamental for traceability 
systems as they are designed to increase information regarding food safety to 
consumers. Information is also provided back up the supply chain to regulators and 
processors. Final market premiums are not available for traceability systems. 
Labeling is important to traceability to ensure high quality standards and allow 
consumers to identify with this feature. 
 
The discussion above attempts to identify features common to product 
differentiation. These features are classified as to whether and how they pertain to 
identity preservation, segregation and traceability. As is evident, some features differ 
depending on the system in which they are applied. It will be important for those 
involved in product differentiation to examine what features are most commonly 
related to the product requiring differentiation and if and how those features overlap. 
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This model of comparison will assist with determining which system best relates to 
the identified needs of the product being differentiated. 
 
 
5.4   Using the Framework 
This section uses the framework to analyze the information that consumers are 
receiving from food labels. Mandatory and voluntary labeling of GM food products 
is a very contentious issue with North America preferring to voluntarily label and 
Europe following a mandatory labeling regime. The framework will be utilized to 
attempt to understand what message it is that consumers are looking for and what 
information they are receiving. Some recent studies of consumer purchase patterns 
seem to suggest that what consumers expect regarding label information does not 
reflect the reality of grocery store purchases. This analysis will show why label 
information needs to communicate clear information and that broad-based claims are 
being discounted by consumers. 
 
Many individuals and social advocacy groups are calling on the Canadian 
government to force private firms involved in supplying food products to the 
marketplace containing GM ingredients to label for GM content. This segment of 
society advocates that the government should impose mandatory labeling on the 
food industry regardless of the cost. Meanwhile, the food industry has developed a 
voluntary labeling system for GM content. The key question that both groups seem 
to miss in this debate is whether labeling for GM content will provide consumers 
with product information that increases their knowledge about the product. Even if 
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labeling imparts some information, it is far from clear whether consumers will gain 
enough to justify the cost.  
 
The lack of proper structures in supply chains to manage and communicate 
information to consumers has resulted in public distrust of GM food products. In 
some markets the level of mistrust is greater than in others. Many consumer 
acceptance studies of GM food products show the majority surveyed want labeling 
for GM content but in both experimental and real-market tests, the presence of GM-
labeled food has not had a significant impact on actual purchase decisions. If 80% - 
90% of consumers truly wanted products free of GM elements, then the demand for 
certified organic products and those few foods labeled as GM-free would be 
growing correspondingly. When consumers are faced with actual purchase choices, 
the presence or absence of GM labeling does not appear to be of great importance to 
the majority of the retail market. This begs the question that if consumers are not 
presently making conscious purchasing decisions to avoid GM foods, is there any 
incremental value that would be gained by labeling for GM content? 
 
This creates a two-fold challenge. First, it is not clear that there are economic 
incentives for firms to provide GM labeling information. If there is no economic 
incentive, the market will not voluntarily provide this information. Alternatively, 
firms will simply provide what is most profitable and least risky, which could mean 
that only GM or only GM free products would be available, or that precautionary 
labeling claims (such as ‘may contain’) would be used. Alternatively, if GM labeling 
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is perceived to be of political value, the government has the option of requiring 
mandatory labeling. The cost of labeling for GM content would then be passed on to 
consumers. There is growing evidence, however, that consumers may not derive 
enough value from the added information to justify the cost. Second, even where 
economic incentives may exist, it is not clear how supply chains will provide greater 
information about GM food products to consumers. Research shows that labeling 
terminology such as GM, non-GM or GM-free is the least valued, in terms of 
providing product information, by consumers. This may be due to the limited 
amount of time that North American consumers devote to purchasing groceries. 
 
The second challenge is how to manage and communicate information to 
consumers. As shown above, the three systems used to provide information to 
consumers are: segregation; identity preservation; and traceability. Each system 
communicates a different message to the consumer. Segregation and IPPM systems 
are initiated at the start of the supply chain and are used to manage the flow and/or 
quality of the food product, whereas traceability is initiated by downstream firms in 
the supply chain to provide the ability to detect origins of food safety problems and 
rectify the problem in the most efficacious and least costly way.  
 
Relationship Between Willingness to Pay and Demands for Labeling 
The challenge of determining how much consumers would be willing to pay to have 
increased product or labeling information is that, wherever possible, most people 
want that information at no cost. Frequently critics of biotechnology make the 
statement that ‘labeling for GM is costless, all that is required is to put a label on the 
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products’. Obviously nothing is costless, but the challenge is to determine what costs 
will be accepted by consumers. In short, consumer studies can go a long way to 
determining the aggregate value individuals place on this new information, making 
it possible to determine what would be the optimal amount of information that 
should be provided. 
 
The recent literature in this field suggests that consumer willingness to pay for 
products labeled as GM can vary widely (Table 5.2). Rousu, et al., (2002) examine 
whether there is a consumer preference for products labeled with a 1% tolerance 
level versus a 5% tolerance level. This study found that consumption of products 
labeled as GM dropped between 7% - 13% regardless of whether the tolerance level 
was 1% or 5%. In fact, the authors suggest that there is no statistical support for 
American consumers having a preference for a 1% tolerance level over a 5% 
tolerance level. The conclusions reached from this research suggest that if the US 
were to adopt a tolerance level for the labeling of GM food products that a 5% 
would be the socially optimal level. 
 
Moon and Balasubramanian (2002) examine willingness to pay in the US and UK 
by offering consumers the choice between two identically priced boxes of breakfast 
cereal: one box is labeled GM and the other is labeled non-GM. When asked which 
cereal they would choose if priced the same, 71% of UK respondents chose non-
GM, while 2% chose the GM cereal and 23% were indifferent. Correspondingly in 
the US, 44% chose the non-GM product, 6% preferred the GM product and 22% had 
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no preference. However, willingness to consume non-GM cereal dropped 
considerably when a premium for non-GM was introduced. Support for non-GM 
dropped to 56% in the UK and to 37% in the US when a small premium for 
consuming non-GM cereal was required. The number of consumers not willing to 
pay a premium (22%) was identical in both countries.  
 
New Zealand research on consumer willingness to pay by Kaye-Blake, et al., (2002) 
examines the strength for labeling by asking whether consumers would pay 2%, 5% 
or 10% more for groceries to learn about GM content. The authors found that 23% 
of the population would pay 10% more, 27% would pay 5% more and 24% would 
pay 2% more for product information on GM content. The aggregate value of the 
willingness to pay was estimated to be NZ$285 million annually, while the Australia 
New Zealand Food Authority has estimated the annual cost of labeling to be NZ$42 
million. A previous analysis by Smyth and Phillips (2001b) suggests we should take 
this estimate of willingness to pay with some caution. In comparative Canada-US 
analyses, people tended to respond with higher amounts they were willing to pay if 
asked in percentage terms than in dollars and cents per week. Thus, the cost-benefit 
ratio may not be nearly as wide as the Kaye-Blake, et al., (2002) study suggests. 
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Table 5.2: Comparison of survey and research results 
Author Date Countries Methodology Results 
Rousu, et al. 2002 USA Experimental 
auction 
5% tolerance level for GM 
content is socially optimal 
Moon and 
Balasubram
-anian 
2002 UK and 
USA 
Consumer survey 
data 
UK – 77% prefer non-GM 
US – 44% prefer non-GM 
Kaye-Blake, 
et al. 
2002 New 
Zealand 
Consumer survey 
data 
Value of willingness to pay is 
NZ$285M and cost of GM 
labeling is NZ$42M 
Grimsrud,  
et al. 
2002 Norway Consumer survey 
data 
Discount GM bread by 49% 
Discount GM salmon by 55% 
McCluskey,  
et al. 
2001 Japan Consumer survey 
data 
Discount GM noodles by 60% 
Discount GM tofu by 62% 
 
A study of consumers in Norway by Grimsrud, et al., (2002) found that substantial 
discounts were required to get Norwegian consumers to purchase GM bread and GM 
salmon. The authors found that to entice consumers to purchase GM bread a price 
discount of 49.5% was required and a discount of 55.6% was required for GM 
salmon. One interesting result from this study found that 26.8% of consumers would 
purchase GM bread and 17.8% would purchase GM salmon with no discount. 
However, 61% said they would never purchase GM bread at any discount and 67% 
would never purchase GM salmon. A similar study done by McCluskey, et al., 
(2001) examined consumer responses to GM foods in Japan. This study examined 
willingness to purchase GM tofu and GM noodles and found that without a discount 
only 4% would purchase GM tofu and 3% would purchase GM noodles. The study 
determined that a discount of 60% was required to generate purchase of GM noodles 
and a discount of 62% for GM tofu.  
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This brief survey of willingness to pay literature highlights that every market has 
consumers who perceive and will purchase GM foods as an equivalent to 
conventional food purchases. On the other end of the spectrum are a group of 
consumers which will never purchase GM food products. The large group in the 
middle is the group of interest to researchers. Olubobokun, et al., (2002) conclude 
that “[i]f a consumer perceives a health benefit from the consumption of a particular 
product, this will be demonstrated by a willingness to pay a premium above the 
market price ….” (p. 5) Willingness to pay does not appear to have a strong 
correlation to labeling for either GM or non-GM products. 
 
The issue of labeling, whether it be mandatory or voluntary, spans the full spectrum 
of opinions. Critics of biotechnology and environmental groups constantly proclaim 
that over 95% of consumers are demanding labeling for GM content, while the 
biotech industry responds by saying that calls for GM labeling are only coming from 
2% of consumers. Obviously both of these numbers are being used to promote 
specific agendas and the real number lies somewhere in the middle. The question is 
to which side of 50% does this number fall? 
 
Consumer Perceptions About Food Labels Regarding GM Content 
Huffman, et al., (2002) attempt to determine whether mandatory or voluntary 
labeling produces the most efficient economic outcome (Table 5.3). In an 
experimental bid auction involving products that had basic labels, voluntary labels 
and mandatory labels for cooking oil, chips and potatoes, the authors found that the 
participants discounted the GM labeled oil more than the other products. One 
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interesting result from this study was that in the mandatory labeling experiment the 
plain labeled products were perceived as the non-GM product, yet in the voluntary 
labeling experiment the plain labeled product was perceived as the GM product. 
This study demonstrates how consumers, when faced with a lack of clear 
information, make their own decisions based on the appearance of the product. 
These decisions may be correct or incorrect. This study concluded that for the US 
market, voluntary labeling would be a more efficient policy than mandatory 
labeling. 
 
Table 5.3: Comparison of labeling surveys and research results 
Author Date Countries Method Results 
Wolf and 
Kari 
2001 USA Consumer 
survey data 
80-92% of consumers wanted 
mandatory labeling 
Wolf,  
et al. 
2001 USA Simulated 
market test 
GM-free lowest rated 
information characteristic 
Wolf and 
Pachico 
2002 Colombia Consumer 
survey data 
Colombia: 13% aware of GM 
foods 
Wolf, 
et al. 
2002 Italy Consumer 
survey data 
Italy: 28% aware of GM foods 
ABE 2002 Europe Consumer 
survey data 
52% of French consumers 
willing to purchase GM 
IFIC 2002 USA Consumer 
survey data 
72% aware of biotechnology yet 
only 35% aware of GM foods 
Council of 
Canadians 
2000 Canada Consumer 
survey data 
When asked if GM foods should 
be labeled, 95% said yes  
Greenpeace 2001 Canada Consumer 
survey data 
Asked if labeling should be 
mandatory, 87% said yes 
Huffman, 
et al. 
2002 USA Experimental 
auction 
Voluntary labeling more 
efficient than mandatory  
 
A study by Wolf and Kari (2001) found that US attitudes to GM products over four 
time periods between 1999 and 2001 were relatively constant. The authors found 
that in each of the four surveys, 80% - 92% of respondents felt that the US 
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government should impose mandatory labeling for GM products. One interesting 
feature of this study regarding labels found that 80% of consumers read nutritional 
labels when purchasing a product for the first time and 60% read ingredient labels in 
the same situation. Einsiedel, et al., (2002) suggests that the percentage of 
consumers reading labels drops dramatically for subsequent purchases of the same 
product (to as low as 20% by some estimates). 
 
Additional research by Wolf, et al., (2001) concluded that many consumers do not 
understand the term GM-free when included as product label information. Using 
simulated test markets for salty snack food and fresh packed vegetables, the authors 
found that of the eight characteristics available to inform the consumer about the 
product, the characteristic ‘free of genetically modified ingredients’ was the lowest 
rated in terms of providing information to the product purchaser. This experiment 
also revealed that consumers, who prior to the experiment indicated that GM free 
ingredients were extremely or very desirable when making a purchase decision, 
when faced with actual purchase choices did not express a higher interest in the food 
products labeled GM free. 
 
Recent studies on consumer attitudes in Colombia and Italy (Wolf and Pachico, 
2002 and Wolf, et al., 2002) show much lower levels of consumer awareness 
towards GM food products. Surveys in Colombia show only 13% had any 
familiarity with GM foods while 77% reported no awareness. This research points 
out that 40% of consumers routinely do not have enough food to feed their families 
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and that low prices were the most important factor when making a food purchase 
decision. This fact is important as almost 75% of consumers surveyed expressed 
food safety concerns about GM food products, yet nearly two-thirds of these 
consumers were willing to buy GM food products. Consumer surveys in Italy show 
that 28% of consumers are familiar with GM foods and only 43% would be willing 
to purchase GM food products. Interestingly, 40% of Italian consumers expect to 
increase their purchase of organic food products in the next 12-month period. 
 
An Agricultural Biotechnology in Europe (2002) poll on purchasing GM food 
products found that 52% of French respondents would continue with usual food 
purchases if the products contained GM ingredients. Those that were opposed to 
purchasing GM products were then asked if they would purchase GM food products 
if there were environmental benefits and 47% of these respondents said they would 
be willing to purchase GM products. The remaining 25% were unwilling to purchase 
GM products for any reason. 
 
As part of the ongoing polling of Americans regarding GM foods, the International 
Food Information Council (IFIC) released their eighth poll of consumers since 1997 
(IFIC, 2003). This poll found that while 72% responded that they had either read or 
heard about biotechnology, only 36% were aware that GM food products are 
presently available for sale. Over six years of polling, IFIC has found that the 
number of consumers willing to purchase GM foods that had been engineered to 
taste better or be fresher ranged from a high of 62% in February 1999 to a low of 
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51% in October 1999. A new question for the polls done since 2001 asked for any 
additional information that consumers would prefer to see on product labels and in 
the four subsequent polls, only 1-2% responded that they would like labels to 
provide information on genetic modification  
 
Critics of GM food products present numbers that represent the other end of 
spectrum. In early 2000, The Council of Canadians commissioned a national poll on 
attitudes to GM foods. Respondents were asked first a series of questions about their 
views on GM foods (such as ‘I worry about the safety of GM foods’), to which 75% 
expressed concerns. Respondents were then asked if GM foods should always be 
labeled, and 95% agreed they should. In September 2001, Greenpeace released 
results from a Decima poll commissioned by Greenpeace and found that when asked 
if consumers had the right to know if GM ingredients were being used, 95% 
responded in the positive. When asked whether labeling systems should be 
mandatory or voluntary, 87% wanted mandatory labeling. 
 
All of the calls for and information about labeling can be put in context when 
consumer shopping habits are examined. The Produce Marketing Association 
(PMA) has closely examined shopping trends and a recent study by PMA 
summarizing shopping habits for 2001 found that the primary factors for consumers 
when making produce purchases are: expected taste (87%); appearance (83%); 
cleanliness (74%); degree of ripeness (70%); and nutritional values (57%). Recent 
research from the UK supports these consumer purchase factors (Costello, et al., 
 149
2002). This research highlights the fact that when consumers are in a retail store 
faced with a purchase decision, concern over whether the product is GM, non-GM or 
GM-free may be trivial for the vast majority of consumers, given North American 
purchasing habits.  As a result, labeling systems alone would appear to be a poor 
way to communicate with consumers and would not substantially enhance post-
market monitoring and surveillance.  
 
 
5.5   Conclusions 
Biotechnology innovations in agriculture present a clear challenge to the traditional 
marketing system. Transactions for new, proprietary, novel-trait crop varieties 
require a more extensive set of institutions than for traditional commodity varieties. 
Companies assisted by governments and industry associations have developed 
product differentiation systems that handle both the risks and assists with capturing 
the returns from the introduction of new products with commercially valuable input 
and output traits. Spot markets are increasingly competing with proprietary 
vertically integrated supply chains, which has the potential to lower the quality of 
the delivered product.  The optimal structure and organization of these new supply 
chains has not evolved yet, but over time one would expect a more stable set of 
relationships to emerge. 
 
The driver of each existing product differentiation system differs for important 
reasons from the drivers of the other systems. The use of IPPM systems is driven by 
private firm initiatives to capture the value associated with a special trait. 
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Segregation systems are driven by regulatory agencies, where the objective is to 
prevent a potentially hazardous commodity from entering the supply chain for 
human food products. Traceability systems are driven by informing consumers about 
increased food safety measures.  
 
One observation is that the low level of consumer willingness to pay for labeling 
information regarding GM, non-GM or GM-free products means consumers do not 
perceive a benefit from the labels. Consumers willingly express desires to have these 
products labeled so that they can be differentiated, but when the purchase decisions 
are taking place within grocery stores the perceived value of this kind of labeling 
rapidly diminishes. Organic products are clearly labeled as such, yet consumption of 
these products is still small. The reality of this may be as simple as the large 
majority of consumers want to go into a grocery store and purchase their food 
products as quickly as possible. Produce and meats are purchased based on 
appearance and processed foods based on brand recognition. Within this context, 
labeling for GM content is largely ignored. 
 
While mandatory GM labeling does not appear to be economically justifiable, some 
alternative is needed to provide consumers with the information they are demanding. 
It is also apparent that trying to develop traceability systems based on current 
definitions of GM foods would not be feasible, as there are simply too many 
contrasting market signals for this to work. Ideally, the best route would be for 
representatives of the biotechnology industry, the food processing industry and 
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government departments and agencies to come together with parts of civil society to 
develop a strategy for post-market monitoring and surveillance. In the first instance, 
the strategy should provide labeling information regarding GM content to consumers 
that is valid and meaningful, keeping in mind the way people actually shop and 
consume foods. To function and meet the needs of all consumers, it is likely that any 
resulting system will need to operate in such a way that enables all types of 
information to flow between the supply chain and consumers.  
 
Ultimately, the success or failure of any resulting system should be judged based on 
whether it facilitates an increase in the amount of product information that flows 
down the supply chain, while at the same time enables commercialization and 
optimal production and use of safe food. Those international markets that prefer 
mandatory GM labeling to protect domestic markets may be demanding labeling for 
ideological or political reasons rather than ensuring the delivery of safe food. Overly 
complex and inflexible systems that simply impede commercial activity will not 
achieve the intent or goal of the program—delivery of healthy, nutritious and safe 
food to consumers. The argument about labeling for GM content is not focused on 
food safety, but rather on consumer choice. 
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Chapter 6 
 
Institutional and Liability Challenges of Gene Flow From  
Genetically Modified Crops 
 
 
6.1   Introduction 
This chapter examines the area of overlap between industry and society in Figure 
3.2. When a society is presented with the commercialization of a transformative 
technology, it is important to know whether the adopters of the innovation are also 
the consumers of the innovation. This is because the reason that the adopters will 
incorporate the innovation into their operations may not match what consumers 
demand. In the instance of genetically modified crops, the adopters are the farmers 
who plant the crops and the end user of the product is the largely urban consumer 
who is purchasing the final product from a grocery store. The focus of this chapter is 
to examine how the biotechnology industry has addressed some of the liability 
issues that have developed over the past decade. 
 
The first generation products of biotechnology are poised to begin their tenth year of 
production in Canada, the US and several other nations. The large majority of these 
food products are derived from three leading biotech crops: canola, corn and 
soybeans. For the most part, these products entered the marketplace with minimal 
restricting regulations. The environment for the anticipated introduction of third 
 153
generation biotech crops (e.g. involving novel uses) is vastly different from the one 
that first generation biotech crops faced. Third generation crops, such as those 
producing proteins or antibodies for use in clinical drugs, will face restructured 
regulatory systems, radically altered marketplaces and new technology options 
(Phillips and Khachatourians, 2001). 
 
Genetic engineering has the potential to create many new genetically modified (GM) 
crops that will create substantial value in the marketplace. There are two main 
challenges facing the industry. On the one hand, the investors and firms investing in 
these technologies are vitally interested in capturing a share of the returns on 
investment in order to pay for the large development and commercialization costs. 
On the other hand, firms and society are vitally interested in ensuring that the new 
traits and varieties created do not impose liabilities that offset the value being 
generated. At the farm level, in particular, there is significant risk of dilution of the 
rents and for co-mingling of the new traits with other crops, creating potential new 
liabilities. 
 
There are methods available to restrict cross-pollination and volunteer seed, 
however, societal pressure would seem to have removed the option of seed sterility. 
Many development groups, environmental NGOs and third world governments 
expressed concern that the ‘terminator’ technology could threaten landrace varieties, 
increase corporate concentration, reduce biological diversity and ultimately 
destablize less developed countries agroeconomies (Visser, et al., 2001). In October 
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1999, Robert Shapiro, Monsanto CEO said: “We are making a public commitment 
not to commercialize sterile seed technologies, such as the one dubbed ‘terminator’” 
(Shapiro, 1999). Many expected that this would effectively close the door on further 
pursuit of this kind of gene research, as other seed development companies were 
expected to follow the lead of Monsanto. On March 26th, 2002, Syngenta received a 
patent for controlling plant fertility but since has publicly pledged not to 
commercialize this technology. 
 
First generation, input-trait GM crops have been judged by regulators as 
substantially equivalent to existing varieties and allowed to be introduced into many 
of the existing commodity food systems without any separation. A number of 
liabilities exist. Many of these GM crops have the potential to cross-pollinate with 
other crops of the same species or weedy relatives, or to become volunteers in other 
crops, creating potential new environmental risks that may diminish the benefits of 
the technologies or create quality problems and new liabilities in other crops or the 
food system. Second generation crops, which involve output modifications, will 
likely only be viable if they can assure the purity of their quality, which is 
problematic with the potential for gene transfer. Third generation crops, with new 
industrial, nutraceutical or pharmaceutical properties, will clearly require significant 
gene control systems, or simply will not be allowed to be produced. In each case, the 
firms are also concerned that they face dilution of some of the benefits of their 
innovation because of the self-reproducibility of many of the GM crops. 
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Fundamentally, the allocation of the benefits and management of these risks will 
need to be brought about by a combination of institutions and biological controls. 
Institutionally, the public sector will continue to have a say on when, where and how 
GM crops are introduced and propagated, as well as in adjudicating property rights. 
Meanwhile, private firms will likely have a major role managing and enforcing 
contracts and systems to capture their benefits and to manage the risks and liabilities 
of these new crops. While regulation and markets may be able to control some gene 
transfers, many genes are likely to continue to travel. Regardless of how effective 
regulations or contracts are, some actors either deliberately or inadvertently will 
misappropriate these new technologies, diluting the benefits and creating potential 
new risks and liabilities. Furthermore, even if all ‘cheating’ could be controlled, 
many plant species are promiscuous sexually, creating natural gene flows. In short, 
we need to look for a combination of both organizational and biological control 
mechanisms to manage the benefits and risks. 
 
This chapter lays out the argument and evidence supporting the position that both 
the public and private sector need to re-examine the role for biological control 
mechanisms in rent capture and risk and liability management. This is needed to 
increase the net private and social returns from GM crops, which are necessary for 
sustained innovation. Section 6.2 provides the background to this issue. Section 6.3 
examines the scope and scale of the risks and liabilities for GM crops, as they relate 
to the conceptual framework. Section 6.4 applies the framework to develop an 
outline of the array of organizational and biological control mechanisms that exist. 
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Section 6.5 offers some concluding observations and a brief discussion of the 
implications for research and policy. 
 
 
6.2.   Background 
There are two main streams of literature relevant to this issue. A large amount of 
legal and economic work exists on how patents and other intellectual property rights 
(IPRs) provide the conditions for private investment in agri-food research. 
Meanwhile, much of the economics literature related to GM crops focused on 
evaluating the ‘gains to research’ has acknowledged the potential for ‘externalities’ 
that could reduce the net gain from GM innovations. 
 
Suffice it to say, there is a large body of literature related to the role of patents in 
creating the incentives for private investment (e.g. Santaniello, et al., 2000). The 
establishment of enforceable property rights for products of genetic crop research 
has significant implications for the amount of research that the private sector will 
provide. In the absence of enforceable property rights, many of the products of 
research can be copied or reproduced. While all firms that use the research output 
may benefit, without property rights there is no way for the market to fully 
remunerate any firm for doing research. This creates a ‘public good’ market failure 
resulting in under-investment in research activities. This is one of the main 
explanations given for the high internal rate of return for most agri-food research, 
estimated by Alston, et al., (2000) to be in the 70% range. Recently, governments, 
and to some extent the private sector, have addressed the ‘public good’ market 
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failure in research by establishing effective property rights over the products of 
research. As outlined by Gray, et al., (1999) the assignment of intellectual property 
rights provided some of the added ability to capture value from research. In Canada, 
for instance, the Seeds Act has always protected the name of registered varieties but 
it wasn’t until the adoption of Plant Breeders’ Rights in 1990 that breeders could 
forbid the sale of registered varieties without royalty payments. This assignment 
followed a number of milestones, including the US Patent and Trademark Office 
decision in 1985 to grant patents for whole plants.  
 
The problem with the current package of IPRs is that they do not fully control the 
use of a new technology once it is expressed in seed. Most GM crops can be 
propagated in subsequent years with seed from previous years. While regulations 
and private contracts attempt to manage that activity, many in the industry note that 
they are far from effective. Industry sources estimate that in Saskatchewan alone, 
more than 300,000 acres of wheat in 2000 were planted to unregulated plant 
varieties and that up to 3% of exports by volume are composed of some varieties 
that have not been approved for release in Canada. This results in Canada exporting 
crops to other countries that contain small percentages of crop types not approved 
for use in Canada and possibly, not approved for import in the importing country. 
Furthermore, officials in Monsanto have estimated that without their TUAs, they 
would lose as much as 25% of the royalty payments for Roundup Ready® crops 
without hybrids; even with the TUAs, they estimate that 10% of the acreage planted 
to Roundup Ready® crops are not covered by agreements and do not involve royalty 
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payments (Phillips, 2001). Clearly, risks are greater and dilution is significant when 
the industry has to rely simply on the power of institutions. 
 
The second literature, mostly from economics, offers estimates of the economic 
cost-benefit of GM crops. While the evidence is scarce, the early estimates (e.g. 
Moschini, et al., 1999 and Kalaitzandonakes, 2003) suggest that most of the new 
GM crops provide fairly significant net social benefits, with the innovators capturing 
a large share of the returns. While most of the works have simply looked at the 
productivity enhancement and its impact on markets, a few have examined the 
impact of new risks or liabilities on the demand or supply side of the analysis. On 
the demand side, the recent consumer backlash against GM foods highlights one 
possible risk of new GM crops. Following on Ackerlof’s work (1970) on the market 
for lemons, Fulton and Giannakas (2001), for example, suggest that in some 
instances where consumer fears are high enough, the inability to segregate and label 
GM and non-GM crops and foods could result in global welfare losses. Kuntz 
(2001) examined the impact of GM wheat varieties on Canada’s wheat exports, 
concluding that in a worst case, more than C$185 million or 70% of the quality 
premium earned in the market could be lost without effective separation. On the 
supply side, a number of researchers have looked at how unmanaged risks could 
diminish the benefits (e.g. Mayer and Furtan, 1997). In response, a number of 
researchers have looked at how either government or market institutions could 
manage that risk. Smyth and Phillips (2001a), Phillips and Smyth (2004) and Lin 
(2002), for instance, look at the how evolution of private identity preserved 
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production and marketing systems have evolved to manage the new GM crops. The 
overriding impression from the systems currently in place is that they are 
idiosyncratic, costly and do not manage all the concerns. 
 
The key message from the literature is that both the distribution of benefits and the 
management of risks and liabilities can only partially be managed by institutions. 
The studies show that even with the best institutions in the world, some benefit 
dilution continues while risks and liabilities remain. Biological control mechanisms 
could provide a useful adjunct or alternative to often costly or inefficient 
institutional approaches. 
 
 
6.3 The Conceptual Framework 
This section of the chapter focuses on the area in Figure 3.2 identified by the number 
6. This area of overlap, between industry and society, is very important for the 
successful commercialization and adoption of transformative technology products. If 
liabilities develop that are perceived by the public to be linked, either directly or 
indirectly, to the innovative product, consumers will be less likely to purchase the 
product. The interaction between industry and society can be very dynamic in some 
industries or sectors of the economy. This section will examine how the 
biotechnology industry has identified several liabilities that have developed relating 
to GM canola. The focus will be to identify how the biotechnology industry has 
communicated information relating to these liabilities to other stakeholders. 
 
 160
The liability cost of GM technologies escaping, co-mingling and adversely affecting 
the quality of other products is large and growing. A number of recent examples 
from canola and other sectors show the impact. Four key liability issues can be 
identified and at least partially quantified. Both volunteers and pollen flow create the 
conditions that could lead to co-mingling of GM and non-GM crops, which 
jeopardize the value of the crop in some markets and, if undetected until it is 
processed into foods, entire products or product lines. Finally, inability to control 
gene flow also has impeded transfer of genetic material between nations that 
developed the new varieties and those that want to adopt new technologies. 
 
There are two ways that GM genes flow and create liabilities. First, through normal 
agriculture harvest practices, seed are left behind that germinate in the spring and 
depending on the crop planted may create a tolerance-level liability. The second is 
that pollen of the GM plant could fertilize a conventional plant and the resulting 
hybrid seed has the potential to possess the trait for that GM gene. 
 
There is no harvesting system in place in the world that is capable of containing all 
the seeds that are produced on a plot of land. This is due to: 
• lodging, where plants break in the wind and the seeds fall to the ground, 
germinating in the following spring; 
• shelling, which occurs mainly in oilseed crops when the mature plant 
becomes brittle and the movement by harvesting equipment causes some 
of the pods to shatter prior to being harvested, falling to the ground and 
germinating the next spring; 
• a wet harvest, which can cause some low-lying crop to be left to 
germinate the next season, or wind that can blow swaths apart leaving 
portions unharvested; 
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• animals or fowl feeding on crops in the fall and scattering heads of grain 
from a swath that are not harvested; and 
• harvesting equipment for grain and oilseeds that, no matter how well set, 
puts over a small percentage of seed that germinates in spring. 
 
Many of these factors can combine, with the result that a large number of seeds 
often remain in the field. Gulden, et al., (2003) have estimated that as many as 3,000 
canola seeds per square meter can lie in the soil following harvesting. When planting 
occurs the next spring, these seeds are present to germinate and create the problem 
of controlling volunteer grain. In canola for example, spraying with 2,4-D controls 
this problem. However this chemical application means an additional cost of C$1.50 
- C$2.00/acre to the producer, while for organic producers this is not an option. The 
introduction of herbicide tolerant (HT) wheat is expected to make control of 
volunteers more difficult as 2,4-D does not control volunteer wheat, with the result 
that producers will have to use a more expensive chemical when controlling HT 
wheat volunteers. Officials with Monsanto have suggested that the most cost 
effective method to control volunteer GM wheat will be to tank-mix and apply 
Roundup® and Assure® at an estimated cost of C$6.19/acre. This method of 
volunteer GM wheat control is more than triple the cost of volunteer GM canola 
control. Officials with Aventis suggest that all corn chemicals, with the exception of 
Liberty™, can be used to control volunteer StarLink™ corn. The application rates of 
these chemicals vary. 
 
A study prepared for the Canola Council of Canada surveyed 650 western Canadian 
canola growers on numerous issues, one of which was management of volunteer 
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canola (Canola Council of Canada, 2001). Half of the producers surveyed grew HT 
canola and half grew conventional canola. Of the producers planting HT canola in 
2000, 61% said that management of volunteer HT canola was about the same as it 
was for managing volunteer conventional canola. Interestingly, 16% said that 
managing volunteer HT canola was easier than with conventional canola varieties. 
The remaining 23% said that it was more difficult to manage volunteer HT canola. 
 
Cross-pollination is an issue that has great importance to commercial agriculture, yet 
in some crops minimal literature is available on this subject (Table 6.1). For 
example, the most recent research conducted on the drift of wheat pollen was done 
in Saskatchewan in the 1930s. This has resulted in a research gap of over 60 years 
and studies that have recently been completed are challenging the standards that are 
presently in place to prevent wheat cross-pollination (Hucl, 1996 and Hucl and 
Matus-Cadiz, 2001). In corn, Losey’s (1999) study was the first to examine corn 
pollen drift in over 25 years. This study spawned numerous other studies that were 
conducted in 1999 and 2000, many of which concluded that 90% of corn pollen was 
deposited within 5 metres of the edge of the cornfield. Canola pollen however is 
dispersed over a much wider range. In one instance canola pollen has been traced to 
a distance of 25 kms (Kennedy, 1999). 
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Table 6.1: Impacts from GM Crops 
Issue Canola Wheat Corn 
Potential to  
out-cross 
Yes Yes 
(limited) 
Yes 
(limited) 
Detected distance 
of pollen drift 
25 kms 200 m for some 
varieties 
50 m 
Chemical control 
of volunteers 
Yes 
$1.50-2.00/acre 
Yes 
$6.19/acre 
Yes 
Varying rates 
Required 
isolation distance 
between plots for 
seed 
100 m for like varieties, 
800 m for other canola 
crops 
3m for other crops,  
1m for same variety 
Ranges from 15 m to 
200 m depending on 
plot size 
Source: Canadian Seed Growers Association, 2001. 
 
Canola, for example, is frequently an open pollinating crop, which means that HT 
varieties can cross-pollinate with each other, with conventional varieties and with 
weedy relatives. This has resulted in cross-pollinated hybrids that are resistant to 
more than one chemical. In 1999, the first triple-resistant canola was discovered in 
Alberta (Western Producer, 2000). These plants were subjected to chemical and 
DNA testing and were found to be resistant to Roundup®, Liberty™ and Pursuit™. 
While many in the canola industry were predicting that this would eventually occur, 
this triple-resistant hybrid was created in just two years. While resistant to new 
stronger chemicals, the hybrid variety is still susceptible to 2,4-D and can be 
controlled. The concern among many producers is that other crops, such as wheat, 
may already have developed resistance to some chemicals, making it more difficult 
to control cross-pollinated weeds or volunteers, with the result that efforts may be 
extremely expensive or all but impossible. 
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Because canola is open pollinating, particularly the Brassica rapa variety, this also 
creates concerns about canola gene escape into wild relative species. Technically, 
Brassica napus is capable of self-replicating but frequently up to as much as 50% of 
the pollen is dispersed. Mayer and Furtan (1997) estimate that any infestation of 
herbicide resistant wild mustard above four plants per square metre would reduce 
the benefits of HT canola to below zero. There is already significant evidence that 
some weeds are developing resistance to one or more of the herbicides involved in 
the canola industry.  
 
Recent research from France has examined the potential for genes from rapeseed to 
flow into wild mustard (known as out-crossing), hoary mustard and wild radish 
(Chèvre, et al., 2000). This study found that on average, the rate of out-crossing was 
0.18% for wild mustard, 1.9% for hoary mustard and 23.8% for wild radish. 
Collaborative research between Canada and France (Lefol, et al., 1996a) has shown 
that cross-pollination between canola and wild mustard is virtually non-existent. 
This study examined 2.9 million wild mustard seeds and concluded that no hybrid 
was found and that the actual cross-fertilization rate would appear to be very low, 
below one per million (ibid.). A study on the possible hybridization between canola 
and hoary mustard (Lefol, et al., 1996b) found that while it was technically possible, 
the hoary mustard seed had to be imported from France to enable the study to take 
place in Canada, as hoary mustard is unable to survive the winter season on the 
Canadian prairies. While wild radish is a weed in the Maritimes of Canada (with 
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only one sighting in Alberta), given limited canola production in the Maritimes, the 
potential for gene escape into wild radish was judged to be remote at best. 
 
Given this level of biological uncertainty, volunteers and cross-pollinated varieties 
or weeds are inevitably going to be co-mingled in the commodity food system. 
Consumer demand is constantly increasing in regard to whether consumer products 
should contain GM materials. Regardless of the market, consumer surveys continue 
to show rising preferences for organic and non-GM products. However, presently 
these markets are small, niche markets that frequently operate with a price premium 
exceeding 100%, thereby prohibiting many segments of society from being able to 
purchase these products. At a minimum, consumers simply want to know what they 
are eating, be it organic, GM-free or GM foods. To foster consumer trust in products 
labeled non-GM and organic, control of GM cross-pollination and volunteer GM 
seed will be essential.  
 
There are a number of examples where co-mingling has imposed significant costs on 
an industry. Perhaps the best known case relates to Aventis’ StarLink™ corn. That 
variety was approved for use in the US as an animal feed and was required to be 
produced in segregated areas, surrounded by a buffer crop, which also was supposed 
to be marketed as feed. To make a long story short, the GM trait in the feed corn was 
found in the food chain, contaminating an estimated 10% of all foods containing 
corn meal. The costs of containing and removing the offending variety have been 
huge. Aventis has settled at a cost of US$110 million to compensate producers and 
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pay for the logistics of withdrawing the variety while many food manufacturers, 
such as Taco Bell, had to recall whole product lines that were produced using this 
unapproved corn event.  
 
While the StarLink™ contamination was an extreme case, it does not seem to have 
destroyed public confidence in the entire product line. There are, however, examples 
where contaminations have jeopardized entire product lines. The introduction of HT 
canola in western Canada destroyed the growing, albeit limited, market for organic 
canola. Because of the likelihood of out-crossing and pollen flow, buyers have 
shown increased reluctance to buy organically produced Western Canadian canola 
because it might contain transgenes, which would violate the voluntary organic 
standard in Canada. There is little authoritative data on the volumes or prices for 
Western Canadian organic canola, but some ballpark estimates are possible using 
industry sources (Grier, 2001). A conservative estimate would put the size of the 
market at less than 2% of the total canola market, equal to about 20,000 tonnes of 
organic canola traded annually, at a 100% price premium to conventional oil. This 
lost market amounted to between C$100,000 and C$200,000 annually, but probably 
underestimates the opportunity cost of a market that many viewed had significant 
potential for growth over this period.  
 
It is important to note that this market loss can not be solely attributed to the 
biotechnology industry. The organic industry’s decision to adopt a zero tolerance 
regarding the presence of transgenic seeds or ingredients has, to a large degree, 
forced it out of the marketplace. It is possible to provide a counter-argument that the 
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organic industry’s inability to produce and export organic canola is the direct result 
of its own standards that reflect impractical production logistics. The production and 
sale of certified seed has tolerance levels for co-mingling of other seed, so if the 
professional seed industry has internationally accepted tolerance levels, the organic 
standards of zero percent tolerance, essentially acts as a barrier for the whole 
industry. Additionally, as discussed by Kershen (2002), the inadvertent presence of 
transgenic material in organic products does not result in the loss of organic 
certification for that crop. Kershen shows that organic producers only lose their 
certification if it can be proven that they intentionally used a prohibitive substance, 
such as transgenic seeds, or do not take adequate product differentiation strategies. 
Organic canola producers may have been able to serve foreign markets for their 
products had they been able to demonstrate that any detected transgenic material 
was inadvertently there and that they could document the procedures they had taken 
to prevent co-mingling. 
 
It is not clear yet who bears ultimate liability for cross contaminations or co-
mingling. The StarLink™ incident spawned numerous lawsuits by producers, 
producer organizations and the state of Missouri against Aventis in an attempt to 
seek compensation for depressed corn prices that they claim resulted from lost 
foreign sales. Similarly, the pending counter-suit in Canada by Mr. Percy Schmeiser 
against Monsanto argues that because Monsanto owns the intellectual property, it 
also should be liable for any lost sales due to contamination. 
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While co-mingling and adverse market responses are important, the problems of 
managing gene flow also have significant potential to lower the diffusion and 
adoption of new technologies, and hence lower the commercial and social benefits 
of the investments. There are a number of ways that poor gene controls have 
impeded technology transfer. 
 
An incident in Europe highlights the challenges facing governments and industry. In 
the spring of 2000 it was announced that the EU found a breeders lot of canola seed 
imported by Advanta that contained 0.4% unapproved GM traits. Advanta quickly 
determined that the unexpected presence of GM canola was caused by gene flow 
from GM foundation seeds that had been planted in a neighbouring field. Canadian 
seed growers had followed isolation rules but the genes still moved into the 
conventional foundation seed. While the total acreage in most countries was 
insignificant (Sweden and Germany had 300ha and France had 600ha) the outrage 
expressed by environmental groups, the media and some government officials 
surprised many in the Canadian canola industry. While many in the Canadian canola 
industry termed the EU response an ‘over-reaction’ and felt that they were acting 
with ‘hysteria’, this incident highlights the need for a technology that can prevent 
reoccurrence of similar incidents. The European countries faced a cost in dealing 
with this problem: France ordered all 600 ha to be ploughed down and Sweden 
allowed the canola to be harvested but prohibited the canola from entering the 
domestic or European market. 
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Containment regulations can also make adoption of new crops prohibitive. Many 
producers only adopt new crop varieties after watching a neighbour have success 
with that variety. A common practice for producers in Western Canada is to seed 80 
acres of a new variety as a test before fully adopting the variety. When Monsanto 
and AgrEvo introduced their GM canola varieties, they did so with 80 acre 
production contracts as they believed this was the most economical method for 
producers to evaluate the new technology. The increased use of buffer zones to 
control cross-pollination has the potential to drastically reduce the adoption rate of 
new technology crops. If the StarLink™ buffer zone of 660 feet is used as a base, 
this entirely removes the option of 80 acre production contracts as the buffer zone 
consumes the entire 80 acres. Moving to 160 acre production contracts is still very 
restrictive, as 76% of the land would be consumed in the buffer zone. Producers 
would be required to plant 40 acres in the center of a quarter-section, a sub-optimal 
evaluation size, and plant 120 acres to a crop that provides sub-optimal rent. 
 
Finally, ineffective IPRs in many countries reduce their attractiveness as markets for 
new technologies, causing them to lag in the adoption of new traits and varieties. In 
the canola sector, few companies would chose to export new cultivars to major 
growing regions in China or India because of the lack of effective IPR protections. 
As a result, about half of the producers of rapeseed/canola in the world are unable to 
access the latest technologies, which is one of the contributing factors to lower 
yields in those areas. India, for instance, posts average canola crop yields almost 
40% below Canada's while China, in spite of significant subsidies for irrigation and 
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fertilizer use, still post yields about 3% below Canada's. Finding a more effective 
IPR mechanism that is not dependent on institutions that are often very weak in 
many of these countries might improve diffusion of new cultivars and technologies. 
If Third World yields were to rise even 5% due to new varieties, total canola 
production there would rise by about one million tonnes, worth approximately 
US$225 million to those producers and their markets. 
 
In brief, plants and people cannot be trusted to do what markets require. As a result, 
genes move, creating co-mingled traits in the food system and liabilities in the 
transfer of technologies between markets.  
 
 
6.4   Using the Framework 
While the previous section outlined some of the liabilities that have arisen from GM 
crops, this section of the chapter focuses on what kinds of controls, both 
organizational and biological, are available to control and manage these liabilities. 
The application of Figure 3.2 to the challenge of managing marketplace liabilities 
provides the opportunity to assess how seed sterility technologies may be part of the 
solution to the problem of cross-pollination and co-mingling. In reality, the 
outcomes of the application of seed sterility are well known to all consumers in the 
form of seedless grapes and watermelon.  
 
Fundamentally, risks can be managed by either institutions or biological controls or 
a combination of the two. Institutionally, the public sector evaluates new GM crops 
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for safety considerations, examining the new products against known products to 
determine whether they involve any new risks related to human consumption, the 
environment and livestock (if used as feed ingredient). If the new variety is 
determined to be substantially equivalent, then it will usually be approved for 
release. Most regulators also have some ability to examine risks once the products 
enter the market and may intervene if an unexpected risk is detected. While some of 
these products might be only conditionally released (e.g. for production in a 
specified area or under conditions of isolation from food crops), most will be 
released without condition. In both cases, the private sector is generally responsible 
for managing the risks of new GM products once they enter the market. They use a 
combination of contracts, testing and auditing to ensure conformity.  While these 
mechanisms are very important, they cannot manage all the risks—genes are likely 
to travel. Regardless of how effective regulations or contracts are, some actors will 
either deliberately or inadvertently misuse new technologies, creating potential new 
liabilities. More importantly, however, many plant species are promiscuous sexually, 
creating natural gene flows. In short, we need to look for biological control 
mechanisms to manage many of the risks and liabilities of these new crops.  
 
Pollens are produced in large numbers and are transferred to the carpels by vehicles 
such as wind, animals and insects. Pollination as a process allows for a limited 
fertilization of plant ova across the species spectrum. In order for pollination to be 
successful, physical attributes of pollen must be genetically competent to endure the 
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physical carriers and fulfil their intended function. Interference with these attributes 
could become the choice of scientific options for control of the GM gene flow.  
 
Smyth, et al., (2002) provide a thorough summary of the options available for 
genetic manipulation and the interference of pollen development. Recent Canadian 
research conducted by Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada has developed a seed 
containment strategy for plants. Schernthaner, et al., (2003) describe a two-part 
system where a seed lethality gene prevents the second generation seed from 
germinating, but allows the plant to grow in conjunction with a second component 
that represses the lethality gene, thus controlling it from spreading to other plants. 
This system of preventing unwanted spread of novel traits within sexually 
compatible plants was successfully tested in tobacco. 
 
Given that pollination is simply the means for distributing genetic material, pollens 
with an incomplete set of genetic material would potentially impede pollination. The 
1990s brought new efforts to ensure sterility, not for processing or gustatory value, 
but for commercial IPRs protection. Efforts are underway to limit the diffusion of 
transgenes through genetic use restriction technologies (GURTS) to turn off 
reproduction for either transgenic varieties or traits. Some dubbed this approach the 
‘terminator gene.’ Smyth, et al. (2002), provide a summary of recent patents that 
restrict genetic expression, thus resulting in sterile seed. The GURTs technology has 
the ability to address an identifiable concern in agriculture, the unwanted spread of 
transgenic seeds possessing specific traits. This concern may become elevated with 
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the expected increased production of plants with identified industrial and 
pharmaceutical applications. 
 
The use of sterile seeds per se is widely practiced and has not been objectionable 
while the GURTS technology is being criticized because it could deny poor farmers 
from saving seeds for future use. However, the crudest form of this technology was 
known and is documented long before notions of inheritance and genetics were 
known. From ancient writings of the Mediterranean, seedless grapes were known to 
have existed. Since the 1930s seedless edible crop varieties produced by traditional 
plant breeding methods have been produced (e.g. seedless grapes in 1936 and 
watermelons in 1951) and posses certain advantages (Table 6.2).  
 
Table 6.2: Advantages of Seedless Fruit and Vegetable Crops 
 Advantages 
Crop Fruit 
quality 
Shelf life Taste Processing Production IPRs 
Citrus More tissue NA Better Juice NA Yes 
Cucumber Crunchier NA Better Pickles NA Yes 
Grapes More tissue 
for raisins 
NA Better Juice NA Yes 
Tomato More tissue NA Better Juice and ketchup NA Yes 
Watermelon More tissue NA Better Juice NA Yes 
NA = no advantage over seed variety 
Source: Smyth, et al., 2002. 
 
The ultimate question may well be that of choice—that is, whether the ‘terminator’ 
technology is the only option. There is the possibility that many of the concerns 
about genetically modified crops could be overcome by the further advancements in 
science (Daniell, 1999). A number of biological options exist, depending on the crop 
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and its attributes. Both traditional and molecular genetic methods already provide 
mechanisms to create hybrids while working at a more refined molecular level offers 
the potential to control GM traits. Recently there has been an effort to reduce the 
risk of biotechnology crops by engineering foreign genes via the chloroplast instead 
of the nuclear genome. Such recombinants would only express the new traits in 
selected parts of the plant, rather than in the whole plant. Hence, any pollen drift 
would not include the transgenes. These and other options offer some promise. 
 
‘Terminator’ technology, which has come to symbolize all the possible scientific 
options, is the end result of an evolved ‘normal science’ process. It could be argued 
that because Monsanto has ceased efforts to purchase this technology from Delta & 
Pine Land, that efforts to develop the concept and other technologies will cease. This 
may, however, be a classic case of paradigm shift and start of another wave of 
‘normal science’ that targets the new tools of genetics and biotechnology towards 
management and control of GM gene flow to non-GM plants in the first instance and 
to bolster IPRs in the second.  
 
Biological control of liabilities, either through contemporary technologies described 
above or those yet to be devised, are the science side of the story. The human, 
institutional element is the complementary side. Ultimately these two parts fit 
together in a discussion of the relative costs (risks) and benefits of alternative 
options. As noted in section 3, the costs of not managing the risks are potentially 
very high, ranging from a net present value of C$1-2 million lost sales in the organic 
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canola market to the US$110 million cost of the StarLinkTM failure. Similarly, 
control mechanisms are not cheap. Often incomplete institutional approaches can 
cost in the millions for those technologies that are widely dispersed, with both high 
fixed and variable costs. One potential advantage of the GURTs biological control 
mechanism is that while it is costly to develop, the marginal cost may be as low as 
US$250,000 per new variety released (Visser, et al., 2001), which would add only 
about 10% to the cost of a new commercial variety.  Given that many firms report 
they lose at least 10% of their returns due to incomplete property rights, this option 
may be significantly more effective than other approaches. 
 
While biological control mechanisms offer a cost effective and practical means to 
control the spread of transgenic crops, the firms engaged in this area of research are 
fully aware of the potential social backlash that may result if the application of this 
technology is not communicated appropriately to the public. While biotechnology 
companies employ scientists who continually explore new horizons in molecular 
genetics and push back the barriers of knowledge, all of this is done within a society 
that exhibits less and less confidence in large multi-national corporations. There are 
multiple reasons for this lack of confidence, but one looming and potentially 
crippling impact upon agricultural biotechnology is that consumers will reject 
innovative new products and this will lead to a collapse of the industry. Enterprises 
that are undertaking basic scientific research and those that are commercializing the 
new transformative technologies, need to adopt innovative strategies for educating 
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and informing societies about the benefits and the risks of new transgenic crop 
developments. 
 
 
 6.5   Conclusions 
The area of overlap from Figure 3.2 that is addressed in this chapter, identifies how 
society and industry have real challenges in communicating in an informative 
manner. The two-way lack of trust is painfully evident. Consumers do not trust what 
industry tells them and industry hears what consumers want, but are not convinced 
that this represents the majority of consumers. When there is a gap in the level of 
trust between industry and society, the framework would suggest that the only 
remaining stakeholder that can provide some basic level of reassurance in this 
situation is the regulatory agency.  
 
As long as a new product is safe, Canadian regulators are virtually powerless to 
remove products from the marketplace. Possibly what is needed regarding post 
market surveillance and monitoring of transgenic crops is a multifaceted 
organization of industry, regulators and societal representation to provide a basic 
and solid level of confidence for these products, in an increasingly sceptical society. 
Clearly, when private, for profit capitalism collides with a society that has a growing 
consciousness regarding the production and composition of food products, there is 
an absence of a body, organization or stakeholder that can act as a trusted 
intermediary. Identifying and promoting this trusted intermediary is crucial to the 
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continued successful commercialization of new transformative technology products 
in modern societies. Increasingly, it appears that the logical intermediary to provide 
this basic level of trust is the regulatory agency. 
 
Regulators will be faced with two options regarding third generation GM crops: they 
can outright reject them or they can impose detailed production and market 
segregation regulations. The outright rejection of new biotech crop varieties may be 
excessive given the level of risk and potential benefits. Numerous benefits have 
already been suggested for third generation GM crops such as tobacco that fights 
cancer, tomatoes that reduce heart disease and cholesterol-reducing grains. If new 
risk management measures are excessive, they could certainly jeopardize future 
research and development (R&D) investments in those areas. Capital is one of the 
most liquid commodities in today’s marketplace and, by banning GM products, 
countries (and the global industry) risk losing not only investment capital but R&D 
firms as well. 
 
In this chapter it is argued that GURTs types of technology could provide some 
advantages. First, they could act as built-in safety mechanisms to prevent the escape 
of potentially harmful traits (e.g. HT) from new GM crops. Second, they could 
prevent pirate growers from exploiting GM seeds. Third, they could reduce product 
liabilities assigned to the seed growers by preventing contamination with non-
transgenic crops. 
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There would appear to be a three pronged approach that could realize the benefits of 
new crops while at the same time minimizing risks. On the institutional side, 
governments can and should improve the regulatory oversight of second and third 
generation GM crops, possibly aggressively using refugia, contract registration, 
regional regulation and mandatory crop rotations and audits. Meanwhile, industry 
must take its responsibilities more seriously. The introduction of first generation GM 
products was directed at getting producers to adopt the technology, and many of 
them do not appear to have a strong appreciation for the importance of managing the 
technology and containing it. Moreover, the launch of these products went largely 
unnoticed by consumers and much of the industry. This approach cannot and will 
not work for second and third generation products. Many of the risks and potential 
liabilities of GM crops are only partially manageable by public and private 
institutions. Institutional costs to manage risks are high, while the cost of failure is 
even higher. Ultimately, inability to manage the risks and control the liabilities may 
sink the technology. 
 
As has been demonstrated, the lack of control mechanisms of GM pollen and seed 
are presently affecting producers and exporters of not only crops and oilseeds, but 
other products as well. To continue in this direction where no control mechanisms 
exist will only result in higher costs for seed development companies and producers. 
With domestic subsidies on the decline, affected producers may turn to litigation as 
a means of recouping lost revenues. Regulators and industry officials need to 
examine what the market impacts would be from commercially releasing a control 
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mechanism for GM crops versus leaving the situation as it is, with an expected rise 
in litigation costs. While the initial cost of introducing a control mechanism may be 
high, the long-term benefits of such a technology may justify commercialization. 
 
In short, even with the best institutions, some risks will remain. Hence, biological 
control mechanisms need to be considered. While control mechanisms address many 
of the problems occurring in agriculture, they are also seen as a major concern by 
many even within the industry. The problem of GM cross-pollination and volunteer 
GM growth are both resolved when the use of a biological control is considered. 
However, the technology still has to resolve many questions regarding its stability 
and the method of expression prior to allowing it to be seriously considered as a 
viable technology. 
 
Ultimately, what is now needed is a full and open discussion by proponents and 
opponents of the technology, in an attempt to determine how to address the existing 
problems. Delay will only compound these problems.  
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Chapter 7 
 
Regulatory Challenges and Liabilities from Plant-Made Pharmaceuticals 
 
 
7.1   Introduction 
This chapter focuses on the final area of overlap from Figure 3.2, the very center 
where all three spheres overlap. This particular section of the framework can be 
defined as an area where there is a regulatory vacuum. At this point, the science is 
far ahead of the regulatory ability to keep pace and in many instances, the 
regulations are only preliminary and more detailed regulations are in the process of 
being developed, but have not yet been legislated. The intent of this chapter is to 
examine one such area, molecular production of novel proteins in plants, to gain a 
more thorough understanding of the stakeholder relationship dynamics that occur 
within a regulatory vacuum. 
 
The introduction and rapid adoption of GM crops at the close of the 20th century was 
arguably one of the defining moments in the history of agriculture within the 
century. This rapid global adoption of GM varieties of canola, corn, cotton and 
soybeans was not without controversy. At the opening of the 21st century the 
contentious debate shows no signs of abating. The array of issues is wide and varied, 
ranging from social issues such as consumer acceptance to scientific issues like gene 
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flow. One hot, new issue is whether and how we should produce pharmaceutical 
proteins in food plants.  
 
The application of this technology has great potential to increase availability of 
pharmaceutical products to consumers. Some estimates by the pharmaceutical 
industry suggest that as little as one-and-a-half acres of pharmaceutical crop could 
satisfy the therapeutic needs of 10,000 patients. As the population ages, the need for 
therapeutics will rise, raising the importance of researching new protein and 
antibody delivery systems. However, the use of food plants as the host organism for 
the expression of pharmaceutical proteins and antibodies is fraught with peril if the 
pharmaceutical plants are allowed to co-mingle with other food plants and enter the 
supply chain for human consumption. The detected presence of co-mingled 
pharmaceutical plants in processed food products has the potential to greatly disrupt 
(and destabilize) markets.  
 
This chapter examines the science and economics of pharmaceutical gene flow, 
discusses the development of regulations targeted at controlling gene flow and 
reviews the results of commercialization of these crop varieties. 
 
 
7.2   Background 
Debate about gene flow has grown in importance over the past several years, 
especially with the commencement of crop trials involving plants expressing 
pharmaceutical proteins. The cost of producing drugs is incredibly expensive, with 
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the average drug costing over US$260 million to develop and commercialize; some 
drug companies report spending in the range of US$700-800 million for specific 
new drugs. In an attempt to lower the cost of producing base components (proteins 
and antibodies) for new drugs, research involving the use of plants as vectors of 
expression is occurring (Table 7.1). Numerous countries have experimented with 
pharmaceutical crop trials, but only Canada and the US have any long-term history 
regarding the development of regulations targeted at pharmaceutical field trials and 
sustained experience with field trials.  
 
As Table 7.1 shows, the potential economic benefit from using transgenic plants as 
the basis for expression of pharmaceuticals is high compared to other production 
vectors. The cost of using plants to produce pharmaceutical proteins is relatively low 
and some plants may be able to produce pharmaceutical proteins for an extended 
period of time. The quality of the product is expected to be high relative to some 
other production systems. The risk of contamination from other sources of 
contaminants is low and importantly, the cost of storing PMP products is expected to 
be relatively inexpensive. 
 
Gene flow between transgenic plants and conventional plants and weedy relatives 
has been a hotly contested issue in recent years. New research is continually 
appearing regarding a variety of transgenic plant types that challenges conventional 
thinking about gene flow, but as of yet there is no point of consensus in the scientific 
community regarding gene flow. Debates have mainly focused on the ability of 
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transgenic food crop varieties to cross-pollinate conventional varieties and whether 
the resulting progeny are viable. A parallel debate is focusing on gene flow and 
progeny viability with weedy relatives of transgenic crops. While literature is 
emerging regarding transgenic gene flow, there is a noticeable absence of literature 
regarding cross-pollination and gene flow involving pharmaceutical plants. 
 
Table 7.1: Comparison of production systems for recombinant human pharmaceutical 
      proteins 
 
System Overall 
Cost 
Production 
timescale 
Scale-up 
capacity 
Product 
quality 
Glyco-
sylation 
Contamination 
risks 
Storage cost 
Bacteria Low Short High Low None Endotoxins Moderate 
Yeast Medium Medium High Medium Incorrect Low risk Moderate 
Mammalian 
cell culture 
High Long Very low Very 
high 
Correct Viruses, prions 
and oncogenic 
DNA 
Expensive 
Transgenic 
animals 
High Very long Low Very 
high 
Correct Viruses, prions 
and oncogenic 
DNA 
Expensive 
Plant cell 
cultures 
Medium Medium Medium High Minor 
differences 
Low risk Moderate 
Transgenic 
plants 
Very 
low 
Long Very 
high 
High Minor 
differences 
Low risk Inexpensive 
Source: Ma, et al., 2003. 
 
Scientists and industry offer two justifications for pursuing plant made 
pharmaceuticals (PMPs). First, production of high-quality biological material is 
presently done using mammalian cells inside a bioreactor, which is very expensive 
and results in high drug costs that could potentially limit the number of people that 
benefit from new drugs. Second, even at the present time, there is an insufficient 
level of bioreactor capacity available to meet the current demand, let alone the 
expected increase in demand over the next decade.  
 
 184
At root, the issue comes down to cost. Figure 7.1 compares the costs of the various 
antibody production systems that are used in treatment. The production of these 
antibodies are valuable for the treatment of several diseases in two categories, those 
which affect the general population, like arthritis, viral infections and cancer and 
those which affect smaller cohorts of people with particular inherited disease or 
metabolic disorders. 
 
The prevailing technology of using mammalian cells to produce human antibodies 
costs in the range of US$105-175 per gram. It has been estimated (McCloskey, 
2002) that PMPs might be able to produce the same amount of antibodies at a cost of 
US$15-190 per gram. The range of variation in anticipated PMP costs arises from 
the prospect that the use of PMPs will lower production costs to a level that is 
economically feasible for potential new proteins that are presently prohibitively 
expensive to produce. Mammalian cell bioreactors take an average of five to seven 
years to build and cost US$600 million. Given the lumpiness of this investment, 
there is a real chance that there could soon be inadequate supply. McCloskey 
estimates that at present 20 to 50 products could be delayed due to the unavailability 
of bioreactor capacity. Currently the production of four pharmaceutical products 
requiring biologics occupies 75% of mammalian cell fermentation capacity. By the 
end of this decade, there could be more than 80 competing antibody dependent 
products with an estimated value exceeding US$20 billion, provided adequate 
production systems can be developed. The potential size of the market underlies the 
importance of exploring the potential of developing PMPs.  
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Figure 7.1: Cost of various antibody production systems ($M US to produce 
        300 kg) 
 
Source: Pew Initiative on Food and Biotechnology, 2002. 
 
As the technical possibilities of and demand for human antibodies grow, there will 
be increasing pressure to use PMPs in the production system, forcing industry and 
government to consider the appropriate regulation of those plants. Of paramount 
importance will be assurances that the production of pharmaceutical proteins in food 
plants will not co-mingle with conventional crop production destined for human 
consumption. The detection of drug proteins in processed food products could 
destroy the social trust in pharmaceutical crop technology and ultimately destroy the 
ability to take advantage of this technology. 
 
Pharmaceuticals field trials first began in 1992 in the United States (Table 7.2). In 
North America, the use of pharmaceutical trials was limited through the early to mid 
1990s. In the US, trials became more common in 1998 and appeared to have 
declined following 2001. Trials accelerated earlier in Canada (beginning in 1996), 
but peaked earlier at a lower level and declined following 2000. A host of other 
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countries recorded a small number of pharmaceutical field trials between 1995 and 
2002. 
 
Table 7.2: History of pharmaceutical field trials 
History of Pharmaceutical Crops Trials  Country 
‘92 ‘93 ‘94 ‘95 ‘96 ‘97 ‘98 ‘99 ‘00 ‘01 ‘02 Total 
US 1 - - - 1 1 8 12 14 18 7 62 
Canada - - 1 2 11 5 11 8 6 3 6 53 
Japan - - - - - - - - 7 - - 7 
France - - - 1 - 1 - 3 - 1 - 6 
Argentina - - - - - - 3 - - - - 3 
Australia - - - - - - - - - - 1 1 
Italy - - - - - - - - - 1 - 1 
Spain - - - - - 1 - - - - - 1 
Total 1 0 1 3 12 8 22 23 27 23 14 134 
Source: Smyth, et al., 2004. 
 
There are several reasons for variations in the number of field trials during the past 
decade. First, the issuance of approvals differed amongst nations and regions. 
Second, the pace of discovery can be serendipitous or planned. The crop 
pharmaceutical industry itself is in the early stages of development so that there is 
great uncertainty and lumpiness in its need for trials. Field trials, as well as 
conventional pharmaceuticals clinical trials, are unlikely to have a predictable trend. 
Third, variations in field trials can occur because of seasonal and/or environmental 
conditions can dictate postponement of trials, this adds to the fluctuations in the 
numbers. Fourth, as judged by the analysis of the crop kinds, we should expect 
fluctuations in the numbers of pharmaceuticals that could be derived from any one 
crop. The genetic and physiological constraints in plants place limits to their use for 
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transgenic plant construction, both in food and pharmaceutical contexts 
(Khachatourians, et al., 2002). 
 
There was no identifiable advantage for either country in the early stages of PMP 
crop research (Figure 7.2). Canada enjoyed a research advantage from 1996-1998, 
while the US enjoyed the advantage from 1999-2001. Both countries converged 
again in 2002. Canada’s early advantage was derived from the research conducted 
with canola, which proved in the late 1990s to present too many safety concerns to 
proceed. The US lead was based upon research using corn as the plant of choice 
between 1999 and 2001. By 2002, corn may be falling out of favour in the US for 
crop trials, while trials are climbing in Canada again based on testing with safflower.  
 
Figure 7.2: Competitive Advantage Comparison in Pharmaceutical Trials 
  
 
The evolution of PMPs has mirrored the research trends in agricultural 
biotechnology: transformation research started with tobacco, moved to dicotyledons 
like canola and finally to monocotyledons, where the first research was with rice 
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(Smyth, et al., 2004). The different crop varieties used for pharmaceutical trials are 
shown in Table 7.3. Canola was the early favourite due to the canola transformation 
research that had already taken place and its attractive oil properties. After several 
years of pharmaceutical crop experimentation in Canada, it became obvious that 
canola was not a suitable host plant due to the high incidence of pollen flow and the 
threat posed to the large farm production of canola in Western Canada. At the time 
that pharmaceutical canola trials were ending, trials started with corn, rice and 
tobacco. The use of corn and tobacco for pharmaceutical trials grew between 1997 
and 2001, while experiments with rice have been minimal. Experiments with the use 
of flax occurred briefly in Canada in the late 1990s, but concerns about seed 
dispersal during harvest removed the potential of further trials. Safflower trials have 
commenced in the past three years as this research has replaced the previous canola 
research. A variety of other crops such as forages, vegetables and flowers have been 
experimented with, but it would seem that little in the way of useful pharmaceutical 
potential is available in these plant varieties. The one exception to this may be the 
use of poppies in Australia for improved production of opium. Field trials of 
transgenic pharmaceutical poppies started in 2002 and it would appear that there is 
some long-term potential with the use of poppies. Figure 7.3 provides a summary of 
global pharmaceutical variety trials by crop. 
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Table 7.3: Historical perspective of pharmaceutical crop kinds 
Crop  ‘92 ‘93 ‘94 ‘95 ‘96 ‘97 ‘98 ‘99 ‘00 ‘01 ‘02 
Alfalfa 1 - - - - - 3 - - - - 
Barley - - - - - - - - - 1 - 
Canola - - 1 2 2 8 4 - - - - 
Clover - - - - - - - - - 1 - 
Corn - - - - - 1 5 11 11 14 4 
Flax  - - - - - 1 1 2 - - 
Mustard - - - - 1 - 2 - - - - 
Poppy - - - - - - - - - - 1 
Rice - - - - - 1 2 2 2 2 - 
Safflower - - - - - - - - 1 2 4 
Sugar Cane - - - - - - - - - 1 - 
Tobacco - - - 1 - 1 - 5 5 9 4 
Tomato - - - - - - 1 - - - - 
Source: Smyth, et al., 2004. 
 
There was a noticeable decline in pharmaceutical crop trials in 2002. There may be 
three reasons for this. First, crop trials are cyclical by their very nature and this may 
be nothing more than a natural dip in the number of trials. Second, drug companies 
have been conducting trials for 5-6 years with some crop kinds and have now 
completed Phase 3 clinical trials and are waiting to see what the financial outcome 
will be prior to commencing new research. Third, the smaller drug companies 
conducting the trials may be seeking strategic partnerships with the large 
pharmaceutical firms before proceeding. 
 
Figure 7.3: Breakdown of Pharmaceutical Trials into Crop Kinds 
Source: Smyth, et al., 2004. 
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The three leading crop species used for pharmaceutical trials by design (availability 
of vectors and transformation systems) and/or choice (agronomy and growers) have 
been corn, tobacco and canola. The problem is that corn and canola are intended for 
human consumption and, as outcrossers, the potential for co-mingling or cross-
pollination exists, raising concerns about using these species for pharmaceutical 
trials. Table 7.4 presents the major transgenic crop kinds, identifies whether they are 
used in pharmaceutical trials and examines their modality of consumption. 
 
Table 7.4: Transgenic crops and human consumption 
Modality of consumptionCrop 
category 
Specific transgenic crops 
(either approved or in 
trials) 
Use in 
pharma-
ceutical 
trials 
Cross-
pollination 
potential Plant tissue(s) 
and 
organs* 
Extracell-
ular plant 
metabolic 
ingredients 
Cereals Corn, barley, rice, wheat Yes Low- 
Medium 
Direct No 
Oilseeds Canola, flax, mustard, 
cotton, safflower 
Yes High Mainly 
indirect 
Yes 
Pulses Soybean Yes Low Direct and 
indirect 
No 
Forages Alfalfa, clover, tobacco, 
sugar cane, sugar beets 
Yes Medium Very 
minimal 
indirect 
No 
Fruits and 
Vegetables 
(including 
juices) 
Poppy, cantaloupe, melon, 
radish, potato, squash, 
tomato, strawberry, lettuce 
and papaya 
Yes Low-High Direct Yes 
Note: Includes plant cells, tissues and organs that include rDNA and/or primary or secondary 
metabolites (i.e. excluding DNA such as oils, starches, proteins, amino acids and processed 
materials and tissues, including juice). 
Source: Smyth, et al., 2004. 
 
Transgenic crop is the leading cereal corn. It is grown in ten countries and accounts 
for 11% of global corn acres (James, 2003). The leading transgenic oilseed is 
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canola—grown in Canada and the US—with about 16% of world acreage planted to 
transgenic varieties. Soybean, the sole transformed pulse crop, is grown in eight 
countries and GM soybeans account for 55% of the global soybean acres. The 
leading transgenic forage crop is tobacco, while a wide variety of transgenic fruits 
and vegetables are in field trials and are expected to enter commercial production 
shortly. Transgenic cereals, fruits and vegetables are for the most part, consumed 
directly or in lightly processed forms. Cereals such as table corn and rice, are 
consumed both directly (without industrial processing) and in various processed 
snacks and meals. Transgenic fruits and vegetables are also consumed directly, 
while some processing occurs in the juice-making process. Transgenic oilseeds are 
largely used to produce processed oils, which are used as minor ingredients in 
processed foods or to fry foods. While most pulses are consumed directly, soybeans, 
the only transgenic pulse, is mostly used for animal feed or as a feed stock in food 
processing—only a small portion of soy proteins are used in the production of 
directly consumed products, such as tofu. Forage products are rarely consumed 
directly by humans, except for a small amount of alfalfa sprouts. 
 
As the technology of PMPs rapidly moves from laboratory to field, the regulations 
developed to control these new crop varieties have been severely tested. While 
regulators in the US have argued that the detection of ProdiGene’s experimental 
pharmaceutical corn in a silo of soybeans late in 2002 is proof that the regulations 
are working, the simple fact that a pharmaceutical crop that was supposed to be 
contained on-farm actually reached a grain terminal without being detected, shows 
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that the regulations are likely not stringent enough. The containment of living plants 
is proving to be increasingly challenging given the scientific inability to completely 
control nature. 
 
The issue of gene flow in canola was documented by Smyth, et al., (2002) and that 
situation remains unchanged. Scientists and regulators are still in a conundrum at 
best or conflict at worst about the impacts and regulations of gene flow. The issue of 
unintended gene flow first became a global news issue in the fall of 2001 with the 
discovery that some varieties of Mexican maize contained transgenic material that 
should not have been there (Quist and Chapela, 2001). While this research was 
contested within the scientific community and is presently the subject of a North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) Commission for Environmental Co-
operation (CEC) Chapter 13 panel review, the concern continued into the summer of 
2002 as a research team led by Allison Snow of Ohio State University reported 
preliminary evidence suggesting that the trait from transgene insertions in 
sunflowers may be able to move to other plants, thus creating the conditions for 
‘superweeds’ (Snow, et al., 2003).  
 
As we have seen, the first, and most widely publicized regulatory violation, was the 
debacle of StarLink™ corn introduced by Aventis (Table 7.5). Aventis received 
split-run approval for this variety of corn, meaning that it could be produced within 
an identity preservation system for use as animal feed, but had not received approval 
for human consumption. Although Aventis paid a premium of US$0.25/bushel to 
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contain the corn and suggested rules to ensure it was used only for animal feed, the 
evidence suggests that Aventis and the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 
did not do enough to ensure that producers were aware of the split-run approval. As 
a result, the StarLink™ corn co-mingled with corn destined for human consumption. 
Close to 300 food products containing StarLink™ corn were detected and recalled, 
at an estimated cost of US$100 million. Aventis recently settle a lawsuit with 
affected corn producers for US$110 million. 
 
The extent of the problem was more clearly defined in the fall of 2002 and the 
spring of 2003 with a few high profile regulatory actions. In November 2002, 
ProdiGene Inc. was fined US$250,000 for allowing experimental pharmaceutical 
corn grown in 2001 to volunteer and grow to maturity within a soybean crop grown 
in the same field in 2002. The regulatory infringement was discovered by inspectors 
with the United States Department of Agriculture Animal and Plant Health 
Inspection Services (APHIS). The affected soybean crop was harvested and pooled 
in a commercial grain silo, thus contaminating an estimated 500,000 bushels of 
soybeans. The cost to ProdiGene for buying the contaminated soybeans and having 
them transported to be destroyed was estimated to be US$3.5 million. 
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Table 7.5: Transgenic crop regulatory violations, 1998-03 
Company and 
crop year of 
violation 
Crop Location Violation Impact 
Aventis 
CropScience, 
1998-2000 
Corn Numerous 
states 
Failed to prevent 
corn approved for 
animal feed from 
entering corn 
destined for human 
consumption 
Paid US$0.25/bushel premium 
to contain corn, recall of nearly 
300 corn food products at an 
estimated cost of US$100 
million and settled lawsuit for 
US$110 million  
ProdiGene, 
2001-02 
Corn Nebraska Volunteer corn 
growing in soybean 
field 
Fined US$250,000 and forced 
to pay clean-up costs of US$3.5 
million. 
Dow 
AgroSciences, 
2002 
Corn Hawaii No tree windbreak 
and bordering rows 
Fined US$8,800  
Pioneer Hi-
Bred, 2002 
Corn Hawaii Plot planted in 
unapproved location 
Fined US$ 9,900 
Dow 
AgroSciences, 
2003 
Corn Hawaii Plants detected with 
unapproved gene 
and failure to 
promptly notify the 
EPA 
Fined US$72,000 
Source: http://131.104.232.9/agnet-archives.htm.  
 
Finally in April 2003, Dow was again fined for violating an EPA permit in Kauai. 
This time the fine was US$72,000 and resulted from the detection of 12 transgenic 
corn plants that contained an unapproved gene that is suspected of coming from the 
pollen from another experimental plot located nearby. Although Dow officials 
discovered this unplanned gene flow, Dow failed to notify the EPA promptly and 
EPA officials expressed disappointment over the delayed response by Dow. When 
this incident was reported in the Washington Post (April 24, 2003), the article stated 
that this incident was “… the latest setback for a biotechnology industry struggling 
to comply with government rules. … some advocates say the problems cast doubt on 
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a fundamental premise of government policy: that experimental varieties of corn or 
other crops can be planted in fields but kept out of food crops.” 
 
Four separate, but related, regulatory violations within a six-month period may be 
nothing more than a freak occurrence and may never happen again. What is 
troubling however, and likely more representative of the real issue, is that these 
regulatory violations may be simply the tip of the iceberg and that evidence of 
regulatory violations may continue to surface over the coming years. So far there 
appears to be a lack of commitment and understanding of the importance of a 
transparent, accountable and effective regime for new trait crops. 
 
 
7.3   The Conceptual Framework 
This section of the chapter examines the institutional actors that have the potential to 
play a role when a regulatory vacuum exists. The absence of clear, concise 
regulations results in a myriad of potential stakeholders attempting to position 
themselves as the leader. This can result in power struggles within bureaucratic 
departments and can also lead to marketplace liabilities due the lack of regulations. 
The focus of this section of the chapter is to understand how liability is managed by 
institutions and regulations. 
 
The challenge of regulating pharmaceutical crops is with the overlap of medicine 
and agriculture. Drug companies are beginning to use plants as expression vectors 
for proteins and antibodies that are used in the production of new drugs. The 
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regulation of pharmaceutical crops is not clearly organized in the US, as it involves 
the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), the EPA, the Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) and, at times the National Institutes of Health (NIH). In 
Canada, the regulation of PMPs involves Health Canada, the CFIA, Environment 
Canada and the Canadian Institute of Health Research (CIHR). A clearer model of 
regulation is required to adequately address the emerging liabilities from 
pharmaceutical crop regulatory violations. 
 
Ultimately, regulatory systems are designed to assess risks of new products or 
processes, using a scientific risk assessment framework. When a firm violates the 
regulations or the regulations fail to properly assess and manage the risks, a liability 
is triggered. Legally, a liability results when an obligation is not fulfilled. From this 
perspective, there are only two recognized kinds of liability, criminal and civil. 
Criminal liability occurs when there has been a criminal act committed, such that the 
liable party broke the obligation of the law of the land. Civil liability occurs when an 
obligation has not been met by a party, which can then result in civil litigation to 
seek compensation on behalf of those affected. Lawsuits from those affected by 
thalidomide and silicone breast implants are examples of civil liability. While many 
will say that putting any other adjective in front of liability is meaningless, this 
chapter argues that transgenic innovations can potentially foster the establishment of 
socio-economic liability. For the purposes of this research, a socio-economic 
liability has been defined as the decline in social trust for all innovations and the 
economic decline from commercialization delays when a company or government 
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regulatory body fails to meet their publicly stated objectives, otherwise viewed as 
their social responsibility.  
 
One key concept of liability that is particularly relevant to PMPs is the concept of 
strict liability. Strict liabilities are found for one-time, unnatural occurrences. With 
strict liability, the prosecution has to prove there was unnatural use of a product and 
that the plaintiff suffered harm, but the prosecution does not have to prove how the 
harm arose. The case of Rylands v Fletcher (1868) is frequently cited in legal 
literature as a reference for strict liability, and is explained in Chapter 2. This ruling 
has three important considerations for the gene flow of pharmaceutical crops. First, 
the drift of transgenic pollen is not a one-time occurrence, rather it happens 
annually, for a period of up to three to six weeks in many crop varieties. Second, it 
would seem impossible to argue that transgenic pollen is stored in any form or 
fashion upon a farm or a field test plot. The third consideration important to this 
issue is that the presence of pharmaceutical genes in crops destined for human 
consumption could be inherently dangerous. The key argument from Rylands v 
Fletcher was that the danger was not naturally occurring. There is a strong argument 
to be made that PMPs are not naturally occurring and that the unintended gene flow 
from these crops may be inherently dangerous. 
 
The different forms of liability can be classified according to the following 
governance mechanisms. Criminal liability is strictly a legal issue and dealt with by 
the courts. In these cases, individuals have broken the law and are either punished 
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financially or by serving time in a penal institution. Civil liability is an economic 
issue and, while it can be handled by the court system, it is more common for these 
cases to be settled out of court. Many American civil litigation lawsuits are class 
action suits against large firms and courts often awards financial compensation to 
those negatively affected regardless of the ability to pay. Executives of the offending 
firms are not normally prosecuted through criminal proceedings or even held liable 
for any court findings, unless there is demonstrated breech of their fiduciary trust. 
Socio-economic liability, in contrast, is not dealt with by the court system, but 
rather, is reflected in the attitudes of the consumers within a given society. Whereas 
the other two forms of liability have handling mechanisms, this form of liability 
incurs public costs reflected in the loss of trust in a product line or producing region, 
rather than simply directed at a specific company or a branded product.  
 
The relationship between the stakeholders can be analyzed using an inter-
disciplinary framework (Figure 3.2). Each sector has control over a central domain, 
which can be described as their portion of the sphere that does not overlap with any 
other sphere. In the areas of overlap however, the jurisdiction and incentives can be 
difficult to discern. In the US, regulations for biotechnology are the shared 
responsibility of the USDA, the EPA and the FDA. The combined regulations of 
these government agencies have, for the most part, been effective at preventing 
regulatory oversights. The private firms in the agriculture biotechnology industry 
have developed their own operating procedures, which enact and manage the 
regulatory decisions and in some instances have greater stringency than the 
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regulations established by the federal regulatory bodies. Industry associations in the 
US, such as the Biotechnology Industry Organization (BIO), have worked 
progressively with the private firms to develop industry standards (a collective 
activity that requires voice) that are designed to support the federal regulations, but 
also to demonstrate to the public that the industry is conscious of potential concerns 
and have taken action to try and ensure that no oversights exist. 
 
The response of regulatory agencies has differed between Canada and the US. 
Canada has adopted a three channeled product differentiation system that 
distinguishes products for different economic reasons. Smyth and Phillips (2003) 
have demonstrated how identity preserved production and marketing systems are 
used by private firms to capture premiums for niche market products, how the CFIA 
has implemented segregation of industrial crops (such as high erucic acid rapeseed) 
that could endanger food safety through co-mingling and how retailers and others in 
the supply chain are implementing traceability systems to meet consumers demands 
for more timely product recalls and tracing. This array of product differentiation 
systems has worked well in Canada, while in the US, the difference is that the 
federal regulatory agencies involved in the regulation of transgenic crops are less 
specific about the purposes of their systems—for example they have never 
demanded the same level of segregation of crops as in Canada.  
 
Recently, the federal regulatory bodies in the US have relaxed some of the 
regulations relating to crop production and a process is in place for applications to 
 200
deregulate some transgenic crop varieties. The federal regulatory agencies in the 
model have moved out of the portion of the spheres where overlap occurs but this 
regulatory withdrawal has not been followed-up by actions initiated by the private 
firms or the industry associations. The lack of progressive actions from private firms 
and the industry associations has resulted in the creation of a regulatory gap for the 
field testing of PMPs. The result of this was regulatory violations between 2001 and 
2003, which prompted the federal regulatory agencies in the US to respond by 
strengthening the regulation of PMP crop trials. 
 
 
7.4   Using the Framework 
This section of the chapter uses the framework to provide an understanding of how 
important it is to have strong institutions associated with transformative 
technologies. This section highlights that even industrialized countries have 
struggled with this at times. As will be shown, the absence of strong institutions, can 
result in numerous marketplace liabilities associated with the products of the 
transformative technology. 
 
Strong governance institutions are especially important for the production of PMPs, 
which have the possibility of entering and endangering the human food supply 
chain. These governance institutions currently range from national regulatory 
agencies, to private industry organizations, to judicial systems. An international 
comparison of the three leading forms of governing institutions (Table 7.6) 
illustrates which institutions lead in different markets. The commercialization of 
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PMPs varies greatly from country to country, depending upon how far the actual 
governance system diverges from a comprehensive regulatory regime—what can be 
posited as the optimum. 
 
Table 7.6: Relationship of governance institutions 
Type of Governance Institution Country 
Federal Regulatory 
Body 
Industry Association Judicial System 
Canada Strong Medium Strong 
United States Medium Strong Strong 
France Strong Weak Medium-Strong 
Australia Strong Medium Strong 
Argentina Weak Weak Weak 
Japan Strong Weak Strong 
Italy Weak Weak Not available 
Spain Medium Weak Not available 
Source: Author. 
 
The terminologies used in the above table are made using the Canadian institutions 
as baselines. The regulatory system in Canada is science based, requires firms to 
submit raw data and delivers consistent decisions. Comparisons of foreign 
regulatory bodies are made against this basis. The evaluation of the industry 
association is derived from the size of the biotechnology industry and the fact that 
there is a lack of a single national organization to speak on behalf of the sector, 
rather there are several regional-based organizations competing for a voice with the 
national organization. Industry organizations in other countries are compared against 
this structure. The Canadian judicial system is evaluated by the courts (both 
provincial and federal) ability to protect the intellectual property of the firms. 
Granted, there are a limited number of cases on which to base this evaluation, 
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however, the protection of intellectual property rights is an important component of 
future R&D investments. Assessments of judicial systems in other countries have 
been made using this baseline. 
 
The optimum would include three strong institutional pillars that are able to 
anticipate and manage risks. This would require a strong regulatory body that 
anticipates issues of concern to society and begins to develop regulations prior to the 
commercialization of products. Strong industry associations are also needed to 
operate as progressive lobby groups with a wide network of industry representation 
that can develop industry standards that either can become the base for regulations 
or can exceed the regulations provided by government. Finally, strong judicial 
systems are needed to mediate issues relating to the commercialization of transgenic 
crops and the ownership of the corresponding intellectual property (in effect, they 
keep industry operating and accountable). 
 
A closer examination of the regulatory systems in Canada and the US reveal some 
surprising differences. Some would argue that the Canadian regulatory agencies 
have been more vigilant regarding transgenic crops that their American counterparts. 
Beginning in the early 1990s Canadian regulators stated that all transgenic crops (as 
well as all mutagenic crops) would be treated as plants with novel traits (PNTs) and 
therefore, subject to additional regulation than conventional crops varieties. Every 
new PNT requires mandatory trial oversight, efficacy and impact on safety of food, 
feed and the environment. Government agencies demand to see both the raw data 
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and summaries of all tests performed and have the final say on every introduction. 
The Canadian system also has a formal system of contract registration for risky 
industrial crops and imposes criminal penalties for infractions. While the Canadian 
regulators have not completed their development of special rules for PMPs, they 
have been very influential in directing companies away from areas deemed to be of 
higher risk (e.g. canola) by simply reminding the developers that such products will 
not be approved. Meanwhile, BIOTECanada is a smaller association than in the US 
and has not developed the synergy that its counterpart, BIO, enjoys in the US. While 
the Canadian judicial systems is viewed highly in terms of its independence and 
professionalism, it is inherently weaker than in the US because of the limited use of 
class action suits and the very narrow parameters applied for punitive damages. 
 
The initial regulations in the early 1990s in the US were viewed by the industry as 
being too lax and therefore insufficient to establish trust with consumers. In 
response, the industry asked the regulators to strengthen the regulations for 
transgenic crops. Nevertheless, the American regulatory system has consistently 
been less rigorous in the approach to dealing with transgenic crops that regulators in 
Canada—e.g. most reviews are voluntary, non-transgenic novel traits are not 
reviewed and the regulatory agencies only see study summaries rather than raw data. 
As in Canada, the US regulators have not sorted out how to handle PMPs.  The extra 
challenge they face is that they do not have the same powers and legal authority that 
Canadian regulators have to direct developers away from crops. While the 
regulatory mechanism may be weaker, the other two domains are stronger. The 
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industry association is considerably larger than in Canada, has better access to key 
decision makers within the US government and a stronger voice in the US than in 
Canada. BIO is viewed by many as a very authoritative voice when speaking on 
issues affecting the industry. The courts, similarly, are more engaged, partly because 
they are more open to class actions and because they award much higher punitive 
damages than in Canada.  For instance, Aventis was pursued by a class action suit in 
the US claiming that the impacts of StarLink™ had depressed corn prices in the US 
and resulted in economic losses for corn producers. Faced with a potentially larger 
judgement, both parties settled very early into the trial, agreeing on US$110 million 
in compensation. 
 
On 6 March 2003, APHIS announced that they would strengthen permit conditions 
for field testing transgenic crops, including field trials for PMPs. The number of site 
inspections will increase to five during the trial and two the following season. The 
permits for pharmaceutical trials will state that no corn can be grown within one 
mile of the trial site and that no food or feed crop can be grown on the site the 
following season. The size of the buffer zone was doubled from 25 to 50 feet. This 
strengthening of regulatory requirements, in part, can be seen as a method to address 
the concerns that arose following the regulatory violations between 2001and 2003. 
 
With the exception of Canada and the US, there have been very few PMP crop trials 
and this creates a challenge when trying to evaluate the relative strength of the 
related governance institutions. Three European nations have varying levels of 
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government regulatory bodies. France has been strongly opposed to transgenic crops 
and developed strict regulations for transgenic field trials, Italy has changed 
positions over the past five years and transgenic crops are presently forbidden, while 
Spain has averaged between 45,000 and 55,000 acres of Bt corn for the past five 
years (Brookes, 2002). While this is a relatively small amount of production, it does 
indicate that the Spanish regulators have developed a functioning regulatory system 
for the co-existence of transgenic and conventional cropping. The main industry 
association in Europe, EuropaBio, is a loose coalition of biotechnology firms 
operating in Europe, but due to the high level of organized opposition, diverse nature 
of the EU and widely dispersed power and authorities in the EU, its voice is not 
heard loudly. The French judicial system has, albeit with a limited number of cases, 
protected the integrity of research and field trials of transgenic crops (ensuring the 
isolation of trials, even from protestors, is a foundational requirement for any 
effective regulatory regime), while the court systems in Italy and Spain have not 
been tested. 
 
It is important to remember that in the context of European PMP field trials, the role 
of well organized and well funded opposition groups should not be overlooked. 
Environmental organizations and anti-technology groups are experts at using the 
European media to present biased and uninformed views of biotechnology. These 
organizations hold considerable power, especially in countries where the 
environmental political parties participate in coalition governments. 
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The countries of Australia, Argentina and Japan have allowed PMP trials to take 
place, but on a very limited basis. Australia’s regulatory agency is modeled on those 
of North America and therefore, has adopted policies consistent with North America 
for transgenic crops. The recent collapse of Argentina’s economy has resulted in, at 
best, chaotic regulations. Japan has a very strong regulatory agency whose decisions 
are consistent with North American decisions, but lag by a period of several years. 
Australia has a developing industry association, but it is limited as Australia has 
only commercialized transgenic cotton. Argentina and Japan have virtual no 
effective industry associations. Australia has a judicial system similar to North 
America but the federal constitution empowers each Australian state individually to 
approve or ban transgenic crops, which may possibly create a legal jurisdictional 
battle, with a number of expected lawsuits against the states enacting moratoriums. 
Again, the disruption of Argentina’s economy has reduced the ability of its judicial 
system to provide consistent decisions, especially in relationship to protecting 
intellectual property. Japan’s judicial system has historically been a strong supporter 
of biotechnology, but there is growing social concern about biotechnology and this 
may be reflected in future court decisions. 
 
Based on an analysis of the Canadian and American governance institutions relating 
to biotechnology, it can be argued that to have a functioning regulatory system there 
is a requirement to have strong institutions in all three pillars. Australia is 
developing a functioning regulatory structure, but only after careful observation of 
events in North America. All the other countries, France, Argentina, Japan, Italy and 
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Spain, are lacking a strong institution in at least one of the three governance pillars. 
This lack of institutional leadership results in an imbalance of authority, which may 
indicate that either the government agencies have too much regulatory power and 
are unrealistic in their expectations of biotechnology companies, or that there is no 
structured bureaucracy capable of making consistent policy decision.  
 
 
7.5   Conclusions 
The challenge of PMPs is going to be to structure a fully integrated regulatory 
system that effectively evaluates, manages and communicates about the liabilities of 
a system, and ultimately one that both enforces and is seen to enforce failures. In 
spite of the US regulatory changes, there is an apparent inability of regulators to 
enforce the regulations. In the ProdiGene case, the cost of the fine, clean-up and 
destroying the contaminated soybeans was estimated to be US$3.75 million. The 
problem with imposing such a large fine on a small biotechnology company is that 
there is seldom enough cash-flow within the company to pay a fine of this 
magnitude. For example, the American government had to loan ProdiGene the 
money to pay the fine. This is symptomatic of the biotechnology industry as a 
whole, as small biotechnology companies do not have sufficient financial resources 
to pay large regulatory violation fines. The problem is that if firms know that 
governments will provide loans or loan guarantees in the event of fines from 
regulatory violation, what incentives exist for the firms to adopt standards that 
improve the control of pharmaceutical crops? If existing enforcement mechanisms 
are found wanting or are lacking, can trust be sustained? 
 208
While the framework used in this research shows the equilibrium, quite clearly, 
these frameworks are not in equilibrium in many of the countries undertaking PMP 
crop trials. In the US, it can be argued that none of the spheres are overlapping with 
each other. This creates regulatory gaps that, little by little, erode society’s faith in 
the ability of government and industry to manage these new crop technologies. The 
intention of the crop trial process is to build integrity for the crop variety engaged in 
the trial process. When regulatory violations occur within this process, not only is 
the integrity of the process diminished but people begin to question the merit of, in 
this case, PMPs being grown in food crops.  
 
The challenge would seem to be that in countries where the regulators are unwilling 
or unable to step forward and be the leading and dominant institution, private 
industry is shirking the responsibility as proper guardians of new innovations. 
Similarly, where industry organizations are unable to generate consensus on or 
adherence to proper standards and procedures, governments have often been 
unwilling or unable to fill these gaps. One option might be to let the legal system 
step in and establish standards and regulations based on decisions from multiple 
lawsuits. This may well occur if these stakeholders do not begin to take more 
seriously their responsibility to society regarding the production of PMPs.  
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Chapter Eight 
 
Conclusions 
 
 
8.1   Introduction 
Innovation is perhaps one of the most interesting phenomena in society. It has the 
ability to amaze us with the advancement and/or the capability of the 
commercialized product. Conversely, it has the potential to frighten us when we 
consider the possible applications of the technology.  
 
The purpose of the research for this thesis has been to examine how innovation has 
affected agriculture, specifically through the commercialization of products from the 
innovation of agricultural biotechnology. The commercialization of the products 
from this innovation in Canada had dramatic impacts within the industry, the federal 
regulatory agencies and the end consumers. The agricultural biotechnology industry 
was ill-prepared for the social backlash against this technology and scrambled wildly 
to implement measures of control. Regulator faced conflicting pressures from 
proponents and advocates of the technology. Many consumers expressed concerns 
about the application of this technology and demanded better methods of 
identification of these products in the marketplace. The commercialization of 
products from agricultural biotechnology affected the whole of society. 
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Each of the three academic disciplines relevant to the research for this thesis has 
grappled with how to understand innovations from transformative technological 
change. Economics has started to develop literature on how intellectual property 
rights play a role in protecting innovations, but do not examine the actual challenge 
of regulating the innovation. Political science theories and typologies have been 
developed to analyze the process of policy development, but have not proceeded to 
develop models that assess how innovations force dramatic changes on the policy 
development process. Sociology frameworks focus on the risk analysis process and 
how information about these risks are managed and communicated, but there has 
been little research into how innovations create flux in the risk analysis process. 
 
The economic literature relating to intellectual property is focused on developing 
models that take the number of patents issued and attempt to quantify how this 
knowledge is captured in the marketplace and what level of economic benefit is 
generated. While this is new and exciting research, it does not focus on the root of 
the issue, which is, the process of innovation. Economists are beginning to identify 
that the knowledge-based economy impacts their discipline, but to date, there has 
been minimal research that examines the economic cost of the regulatory process for 
innovative products resulting from transformative technologies. Developing a 
greater level of understanding about the how regulations can, and do, affect the 
innovation process will grow in importance over the next decade as societies witness 
a rapid growth in the commercialization of innovative products.  
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Political science has developed an extensive area of research regarding policy 
development and the analysis of these developments. The challenge of applying 
these typologies and theories to innovation is that technology transformations can 
create such a paradigm shift that multiple factors are changed in the policy analysis 
process, thus reducing the reliability and/or the predictive value of the analysis. 
When a transformative technology shift happens in a society, so many factors are 
changing at one time, that it is difficult to hold everything constant and to measure 
the effects of changing one variable. Technology transformations have a dynamic all 
their own and a better understanding of the impact on institutions and authority 
structures would be highly valued. 
 
There is a growing amount of research on risk management and risk communication 
and how to broaden the entire risk analysis process to make it more socially 
encompassing and, thereby, more socially acceptable. The challenge of 
understanding risk management and risk communication within technology 
transformation is that in some societies, the institutions required to facilitate these 
processes are incapable of rapidly responding to innovative products. While the 
institutions in some societies may be capable of this rapid adjustment, the means to 
inform wide cross-sections of the society are not. The result of this is that only a 
very small percentage of a society's citizenry is aware of the technology 
transformation at the crucial period of regulatory policy development. Innovations 
from technology transformations have a dramatic impact on the way that the entire 
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risk analysis process is undertaken and additional research that focuses on these 
impacts would be very timely. 
 
The challenge of regulating innovation is a precarious balance – on one hand the 
regulator can under-regulate and face the risk of an onslaught of consumer concerns, 
while on the other they can over-regulate and risk having R&D investments either 
cease or move to other jurisdictions with less stringent regulations. The sensitivity of 
too much or not enough regulation is crucial to the continuing success of the 
biotechnology industry. 
 
 
8.2   Findings 
The results of this research relate to the commercialization of products from 
agricultural biotechnology in Canada between 1995 and 2004. While this innovative 
technology has been regulated for a decade now, the science is advancing rapidly, 
requiring ongoing regulatory efforts. The products are moving from input based, 
producer benefit varieties to output based, consumer benefit varieties. The regulation 
of GM crops and foods is new and there are still gaps in the regulatory structure for 
this innovation. 
 
In the process of examining the four different areas of overlap within the framework 
outlined in Chapter 3, several key findings were identified. As innovative products 
from transformative technologies increasingly make their way through the 
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regulatory approval process and gain entry to the marketplace, it will be important to 
understand the role of institutions and the influence that they may be able to exert on 
the commercialization process. While there is great reluctance within Canada to 
move away from a science-based regulatory system, it is becoming increasingly 
evident that some form of societal harmonization between industry, government and 
consumers needs to be developed. 
 
Most of the regulatory framework relating to the approval of new agricultural crop 
varieties, applies to pre-commercialization issues and concerns. Historically, the use 
of a sciences-based risk analysis system was utilized to determine if the proposed 
variety was at least as good as existing varieties. Once approval was granted, 
regulators no longer possessed a mandate to regulate for commercialization or 
market acceptance issues. The advent of agricultural biotechnology brought market 
acceptance to the forefront, as outlined in Chapter 4, and ultimately forced industry 
competitors to join forces to protect export markets from the products which had just 
received regulatory approval. Chapter 4 highlights the importance of industry-
government communications facing innovative products. 
 
Market transactions for goods with experience and credence attributes require a high 
degree of trust, which requires both effective public and private regulatory 
mechanisms. The canola industry's experience with GM canola illustrates that where 
there is a public base for managing credence and experiential issues, the industry can 
effectively handle many of the market considerations through private identity 
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preserved production and marketing systems. Ultimately, these systems are designed 
to earn trust, which is a cumulative process and past successful actions can 
contribute to achieving a higher level of trust. Failures in one part of the market can 
spillover to other market segments. Provided the expected returns exceed (or are at 
least aligned with) the scale and distribution costs, private initiative to minimize and 
manage liabilities will work.  
 
Biotechnology innovations in agriculture present a clear challenge to the traditional 
marketing system. Transactions for new, proprietary, novel-trait crop varieties 
require a more extensive set of institutions than for traditional commodity varieties. 
The optimal structure and organization of these new supply chains has not evolved 
yet due to the lack of clear market signals. Over time one would expect a more 
stable set of relationships to emerge. In the case of business, the low level of 
consumer willingness to pay for labeling information regarding GM, non-GM or 
GM-free products would appear to indicate that consumers do not perceive a benefit 
from the labels. While mandatory GM labeling does not appear to be economically 
justifiable (as there are simply too many contrasting market signals for this to work), 
some alternative is needed to provide consumers with the information and choice 
they are demanding. To function and meet the needs of all consumers, it is likely 
that any resulting system will need to operate in a way that enables the appropriate 
information to flow between the supply chain and consumers. Ultimately, the 
success or failure of any resulting system should be judged based on whether it 
facilitates an increase in the amount of product information that flows along the 
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supply chain, while at the same time enables commercialization and optimal 
production and use of safe food. 
 
The relationships between product differentiation and consumer demands for 
product labeling are examined in Chapter 5. This chapter discusses how innovation 
has affected the supply chain for agricultural biotechnology products and identifies 
the dynamics of the relationship between consumers and regulators. The majority of 
consumers are calling for mandatory labeling of genetically modified food products, 
something that the government, at this point, is clearly not prepared to undertake. 
The opposing government/social perspectives, shows that when innovation affects 
consumer confidence in the commercialized product, society expects government to 
interject in the process as a means of re-establishing trust in the product. 
Government may not have the mandate or the political desire to implement what 
society requests, but the innovation of agricultural biotechnology shows that society 
has expectations of government, especially government regulators, to take action.  
 
Regulators will possibly be faced with three options regarding the 
commercialization of future GM crops: they can outright reject them as may be 
dictated by the use of the Precautionary Principle; they can impose detailed 
production and market separation regulations that provide informed choice with low 
to reasonable levels of risk; or they can forego regulations altogether. The outright 
rejection of new biotech crop varieties may be excessive given that capital is one of 
the most liquid commodities in today’s global marketplace and by banning GM 
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products countries (and the global industry) risk losing not only investment capital 
but R&D firms as well. Institutionally, governments can and should improve the 
regulatory oversight of future generations of GM crops, while industry must take its 
responsibilities more seriously. The whole concept of consumer empowerment has 
been badly dealt with by government and industry. These stakeholders have, for the 
most part, adopted the strategy of ignoring the consumer and hoping their concerns 
will go away. This strategy has not worked and it has been the recent willingness of 
the judiciary to hear lawsuits against multi-national seed development firms that has 
forced a reconsideration of this strategy. However, the challenge in trying to 
accommodate consumer empowerment is that the fragmentation of the voice of 
consumers makes it difficult to legitimize the concerns of society. Consumer groups 
need to be more willing to participate in joint regulatory decision making processes 
(e.g. the recent voluntary labeling report from the Canadian General Standards 
Board), thus providing the process with a degree of social credibility. Completely 
unregulated production and processing is what worries many, as firms may move to 
these jurisdictions and export products where no information needs to be provided. 
 
Chapter 6 presents an analysis of the interactions between the agricultural 
biotechnology industry and the larger society. This chapter identifies the importance 
of the global marketplace regarding commercialization of innovative products. 
While the direct user of GM crops in Canada has largely been producers in the three 
Prairie provinces, the ultimate end user of the final product is consumers the world 
over. Marketplace failures caused by firms rushing to gain the all important market 
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share with a new innovative product, has the potential to not only jeopardize the 
local marketplace, but the global marketplace as well when faced with market 
failure. The increased degree of connectivity between innovative firms and global 
consumers has resulted in situation where local liabilities become global concerns in 
a rapid manner. The marketing phrase ‘think globally, act locally’ may have no 
greater application than in the agricultural biotechnology industry. 
 
The challenge of future innovations from agriculture biotechnology is going to be to 
structure a fully integrated regulatory system that effectively evaluates, manages and 
communicates about the liabilities, and ultimately one that both enforces rules and is 
seen to remedy failures. Regulatory gaps erode society’s faith in the ability of 
government and industry to manage innovations and ineffective enforcement 
mechanisms undermine the integrity of the entire liability management process. A 
major concern regarding agricultural biotechnology is that regulators are unwilling 
or unable to step forward and be the leading and dominant institution, while private 
industry is shirking the responsibility as proprietors of new innovations. Similarly, 
where industry organizations are unable to generate consensus on or adherence to 
effective standards and procedures, governments have often been unwilling or 
unable to fill these gaps. Consensus on how to identify regulatory gaps needs to be 
rapidly addressed by all participating stakeholders. Further erosion of public 
confidence in agricultural biotechnology innovations may be a distinct possibility if 
action is not soon taken. 
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The importance of removing or at least addressing regulatory gaps is identified in 
Chapter 7. This chapter highlights how one of the newest innovations within 
agricultural biotechnology is creating numerous regulatory challenges as the 
products of this innovation move closer to commercialization. The idea of producing 
drug proteins within plants has presented regulators with some challenging 
questions. The attempts of regulators within Canada and the US to develop effective 
and meaningful regulations have demonstrated the importance of finding the correct 
regulatory balance. To date, Canadian regulators have adopted a case-by-case 
approach to the regulation of PMPs, in part, to ensure that no aspect regulatory 
oversight is neglected, which could have the potential to ultimately cause economic 
hardship on this sector of agricultural biotechnology. 
 
Many of the risks and potential liabilities of GM crops are only partially manageable 
by public and private institutions. Although institutional costs to manage risks are 
high, the cost of failure is even higher. Ultimately, an inability to manage the risks 
and control the liabilities may reduce net returns on investment so much that GM 
technology may become unfeasible for application in agriculture. As Canada moves 
closer toward the litigious society of the US, the ability to manage marketplace 
liabilities will become of paramount concern to the commercializers of new 
innovative products.  
 
There is no stakeholder consensus on how to address the issue of socio-economic 
liability management surrounding transgenic crop varieties. Science-based 
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assessments are not designed to reduce risks to zero. However, societies are 
expecting this unrealistic level of liability management due to the lack of comfort 
zones with this new innovation. Risks in so many other segments of modern 
industrialized societies have been lowered dramatically in the past century (i.e. 
childbirth death rate, water pollution, workplace injuries) that consumers are 
expecting that the risks regarding food consumption be lowered to similar levels. In 
actuality, the food we consume today is markedly safer that it was in the past due to 
greater investments in food safety. We have quality programs in place that work. 
What may be needed is greater awareness of the measures already implemented as 
opposed to entirely new measures. 
 
The key to the successful innovation (or lack thereof) and use of transgenic plant 
and animal products will be regulation. Regulators are becoming increasingly aware 
of the importance of the role they have to play in reassuring society about new 
innovations. But what is also needed to ensure the success of transgenics and future 
innovations is for industry to step up and become a more responsible stakeholder. 
Trust would be created by having industry admit to failures, work more closely with 
concerned groups and by allowing academics to have better access to confidential 
data, given that one of the claims from biotechnology critics is the lack of peer-
reviewed data. Inviting social actors to the table will legitimize concerns and provide 
an avenue for discerning between groups with actual concerns and groups that are 
more interested in press coverage than real liability management. The key to socio-
economic liability management is to ensure that the appropriate set of stakeholders 
 220
work together. Even though each stakeholder may have separate agendas, the goal 
needs to be consensus on the process objectives. 
 
This research has identified how the initial products of biotechnology entered the 
marketplace with minimal consumer awareness, which meant that co-ordinated 
regulatory approaches did not occur. Has this lack of co-ordination affected the 
acceptance of transgenic products in today’s marketplace? Possibly. But it can be 
said, with certainty, that a co-ordinated approach to the regulation of innovative 
products in the future will be essential for the successful marketplace integration. 
Strong institutions can use this framework to identify the proper stakeholders that 
are needed to develop acceptable regulations and to promote these regulations within 
the larger society. The inability to achieve this will only delay and frustrate those 
involved in the regulatory process of transformative technologies. 
 
 
8.3   Strengths and Weaknesses of the Framework 
Over the course of this research period, several publications have resulted. From 
these publications, the following contributions or strengths have been identified. 
Discussion and feedback from these publications have resulted in the identification 
of several challenges regarding the framework. 
 
First, the concept of socio-economic liability has been developed and offered as a 
new category of liability. This concept of liability describes how failures within a 
marketplace can carry over and affect other sectors of the marketplace. The key 
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difference between socio-economic liability and conventional liability is that it is not 
always possible to seek remuneration for damages with socio-economic liability, 
given that the damages may be a loss of trust in a private firm, a federal regulatory 
body or an entire industrial sector. Additionally, liability does not mean that an 
individual experienced pain and/or suffering -- rather the liability can be a reduction 
in confidence of the ability of institutional governance to adequately address a 
societal concern. The value from this new category of liability is that it can be used 
in conjunction with the identification of hypothetical risks to determine the 
marketplace effect that may develop should a risk occur. 
 
Second, clear and concise definitions were provided for the various terminologies 
that existed within product differentiation alternatives. Much of the existing 
literature relating to the topic of product differentiation uses the terms segregation 
and identity preservation interchangeably, which was creating confusion. This 
research offered definitions for three distinct product differentiation options and 
discussed how the governance structures for each system, while similar, have 
features that are unique. The various governance structures were outlined in relation 
to the way the marketplace affects the supply chain for each of these various 
systems. Each product differentiation system has its own driver and economic 
justifications, while at the same time, serving as a liability management tool for the 
different institutional stakeholders. This contribution has been highly valued by 
industry and international regulators as it provides a basis upon which to discuss the 
issues of co-mingling and co-existence between conventional and transgenic crops. 
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Third, this research outlines the importance of strong institutions (public, private and 
collective) and the vital role that they play in relation to innovation. As 
transformative technologies, such as nanotechnology and stem cells, continue to 
enter modern day society, the importance of strong institutions will remain and 
possibly increase. Strong institutions need to be in place in relation to regulation, 
industry and judiciary to allow the necessary parameters for trust to develop and be 
sustained in relation to the transformative technology. If a society is lacking in 
strong institutions, this will have an effect on the successful commercialization of 
the technology and the confidence that consumers have in the marketplace product. 
There is a large information gap in all industrial societies between scientific research 
and development and social awareness. Strong institutions will be required to ensure 
that this information gap does not reduce or negate potential benefits arising from 
future technology advances. 
 
Finally, the focus of this research is a narrow application to a specific period of 
regulatory development in Canada. The result of adopting this approach has been an 
assessment of an actual commercialization scheme for a genetically modified 
product. This kind of assessment is only possible in two countries, Canada and the 
United States and the focus has been largely Canadian. An assessment of an 
operational commercialization scheme would not be possible in Europe, as no 
successful commercialization of a genetically modified product has taken place. By 
demonstrating how successful commercialization can occur, the case study offered 
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in this research will provide valuable insights into how other jurisdictions will deal 
with this issue when faced with commercialization decisions. 
 
The above strengths of the research are related to the identified weaknesses of the 
research. First, the concept of socio-economic liability will be questioned by the 
legal community. For many in the legal community, putting any adjective in front of 
the word liability is meaningless. Classical definitions of liability will always be 
either civil or criminal. Any new classifications of liability will be able to 
categorized into one of these two forms. While some lawyers understand the concept 
of a socio-economic liability, they do not accept that it is a new category; rather, 
many see it as an extension of civil liability.  
 
Second, if regulations can help limit the liabilities from a transformative technology, 
it is not known if this will translate into a greater level of societal trust in innovative 
products. If the regulations do not foster the development of consumer trust in 
innovative products, then the regulations are a cost that will have to be borne by the 
industry, that has little or certainly reduced means to recover this regulatory cost. If 
the cost is high enough and no option for recovery can be identified, it is possible 
that R&D investments would change. 
 
Third, the framework has been developed from an inter-disciplinary standpoint to be 
flexible and fluid. These same conditions may not exist if the framework is applied 
within a narrow, specialized area of innovative research. The framework has been 
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developed to be broadly applied to larger social issues and concerns and its 
application to narrower, more specific issues and concerns has been beyond the 
scope of this research. However, it is important to highlight that the framework has 
not been applied in such a manner and it is possible that the value of its application 
would change. 
 
Finally, it can be argued that by focusing on such a narrow application and time 
frame, the overall quality of the final study is jeopardized. This argument is well 
formulated, but the challenge of actually incorporating it into this research was the 
fact that the innovation of biotechnology is so new, that there are an extremely 
limited number of potential applications at this point in time.  
 
 
8.4   Limitations of Present Research 
Undertaking research in an area where the data are not quantifiable as they can be in 
scientific or mathematical disciplines creates some challenges regarding what is, or 
is not, acceptable levels of risk and liability. Individually, we all have varying levels 
of risk that we are comfortable with. For example, some people invest in highly 
speculative penny stocks on junior stock exchanges while others prefer bonds or 
even guaranteed saving accounts. The result of this is that we all have different 
comfort levels and different perceptions of liability. Certainly this varies among 
individual, but it can be manifested considerably when measured across cultures. 
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One important factor can be included in relation to societal unease, change. 
Frequently, change is one of the most feared aspects of life and work that people are 
forced to deal with. Regardless of its application, it forces us out of our existing 
comfort zone. Change is generally accompanied by a lack of clear and factual 
information, which further compounds the challenge of attempting to understand the 
specific perceptions that societies have regarding innovations. Change creates 
uncertainty and this is not an easy parameter to measure with a high confidence 
level. 
 
Change can also apply to new methods of examining issues, which is the underlying 
rational for this research. Conducting inter-disciplinary research within an institution 
that is based on distinct academic pillars creates its own unique set of challenges. 
Institutions are notoriously slow to respond to change and it requires a strong 
mindset to follow through with a detailed research agenda. A research combination 
of innovation, which by its own characteristics is rapid and fast paced, with that of 
institutional reaction, which tends to be the opposite of innovation, provides for an 
interesting observation of opposing dichotomies. A limitation to this research and 
this process is that the pace of institutions impedes innovation in all its applications 
and this has to be reversed in order to foster and support all innovation applications. 
 
The focus of the research (and thereby the findings), could also be viewed as a 
limitation. The focus of this thesis has been considerably narrow, meaning that it is 
focused specifically on canola and agri-food products within a North American 
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context. The research essentially provides a past, present and future snapshot of one 
innovative product. As a result, the findings are thereby narrowly focused and could 
be viewed as less relevant than a large, more encompassing study.  
 
The focus has also been very narrow in terms of the institutional approach. The 
focus has been on domestic institutions from Canada and partially from the US. The 
result of this limited application is that it only illuminates one aspect of the 
application of this technology. A broader institutional perspective would be 
valuable. 
 
 
8.5   Extensions of Present Research 
The major challenge is that innovation does not have a deterministic relationship 
that can be modeled by a single academic discipline to provide consistent reliable 
outcomes. While institutions are the key to successful technological transformations, 
institutions by their very design have always been limited in the ability to react 
rapidly to an innovation.  
 
Integrated academic research offers a new option to assess transformative 
technologies and the impact they have on society. In drawing upon the research 
strengths of various academic disciplines, future researchers may be able to develop 
frameworks that are capable of providing reliable and consistent outcomes of 
innovation. Research extensions from this thesis could be either case studies or 
theoretical modeling of innovations. The more research undertaken through an 
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interdisciplinary approach, the greater the pool of literature available for future 
students and researchers to draw from and utilize in new and novel approaches. 
 
The development of a more technical model or framework would provide for greater 
in-depth analysis of the specific impacts that would occur from the 
commercialization of products from transformative technologies. The refinement of 
the model may allow for the opportunity to test a specific market impact while 
holding the rest of the model constant. This ability to focus on one specific 
parameter would provide valued understanding of how wide-reaching the impact 
from an innovation can be. 
 
Examining this issue from an international institutional perspective would provide 
an interesting comparison. Comparing the perspectives under the World Trade 
Organization and the BioSafety Protocol would provide for a comprehensive 
evaluation of the issue. Another possible option would be to assess this issue under 
the existing regulatory regime in the European Union to provide a contrast to what 
has occurred in Canada. 
 
Of course, the major benefit would be to have more cases to apply the model to and 
observe the results. One of the challenges in trying to gain a greater understanding of 
transformative technologies is that they are not an everyday occurrence. If they 
were, they would not be classified as transformative. It would be beneficial to apply 
this methodology to some of the other technology innovations of the past few 
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decades, such as the introduction of computers or the Internet. Each application of 
the model will generate greater levels of knowledge about this emerging issue and 
that will be a benefit to all interested in the study of innovation. 
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